What does Mission Communities: Seats and Volunteers conclude, in numbers, about “Does Money Crowd Out Enthusiasm? The Boundaries of Crowding Out”?
Answer: Paying is neither always better nor always worse. In the model of p41, participation in a public setting falls from 0.615 to 0.433 under a small payment, and the payment must reach 1.16 before participation returns to where it began; in a private setting, it rises almost monotonically. Program p42 shows that the option to pass the payment on brings participation in the image-conscious group back from 0.441 to 0.552, and that of the gross gain of 392 people brought by a reward, 0.230 were moved from a nearby project. Whether to pay depends on the list of boundary conditions: visibility, amount, how the payment is tied, the nature of the work and the option to pass it on.
Scope of the numbers: All parameters are illustrative, all calculations come from its programs, and revenue figures are illustrative arithmetic, not forecasts or guarantees. It is general guidance, not legal, tax or investment advice.
Data table
The numbers below are printed verbatim by the chapter's Python program and can be reproduced by running it. standard-library Python onlyprinted values that match the answer: 0.230, 0.441, 0.552, 0.615, 392
| offer | image-sensitive | not sensitive | both |
|---|---|---|---|
| no payment | 0.615 | 0.159 | 0.387 |
| cash 0.2 | 0.441 | 0.212 | 0.326 |
| cash or donate | 0.552 | 0.212 | 0.382 |
| project X turnout 204 -> 596; project Y 216 -> 126 | |||
| gross gain at X 392, net gain 302, displaced share 0.230 |
Show the full program
# Chapter 4. p42: letting people give the payment away, and counting displacement.
# Part 1 uses the threshold model of p41 for two segments of equal size:
# image-sensitive (MU = 0.8, D = 0.15) and not image-sensitive (MU = 0,
# D = 0). Mellstrom and Johannesson (2008) found crowding out for one
# group of potential blood donors only, and that letting people donate
# the payment to charity removed it. Here a payment y = 0.2 is offered
# either as cash, or as cash-or-donate: a contributor who donates it keeps
# the full image (s = 1) but forgoes y, and each takes the better option.
# Part 2 counts displacement (Lacetera, Macis and Slonim 2012 report
# nearly 14,000 blood drives): 4,000 contributors live evenly between
# project X (at 0) and project Y (at 1); joining j is worth v + y_j -
# K * distance, K = 1.0, v ~ N(0, 1) with seed; each joins the better
# project if its worth reaches C = 1.0. X offers y = 0.5. Illustrative.
import math
import random
import statistics
Z = statistics.NormalDist()
C = 1.0
def gap(t):
pdf, cdf = Z.pdf(t), Z.cdf(t)
return pdf / (1 - cdf) + pdf / cdf
def solve(lhs):
lo, hi = -6.0, 6.0
for _ in range(100):
mid = (lo + hi) / 2
if lhs(mid) > 0:
hi = mid
else:
lo = mid
return 1 - Z.cdf((lo + hi) / 2)
def segment(mu, d, y, option):
if y == 0:
return solve(lambda t: t - C + mu * gap(t))
keep = y + mu * gap(0) / (1 + 3 * y)
give = mu * gap(0)
if option and give > keep:
return solve(lambda t: t - C - d + mu * gap(t))
return solve(lambda t: t - C - d + y + mu / (1 + 3 * y) * gap(t))
print("offer image-sensitive not sensitive both")
for name, y, opt in (("no payment", 0.0, False), ("cash 0.2", 0.2, False),
("cash or donate", 0.2, True)):
a, b = segment(0.8, 0.15, y, opt), segment(0.0, 0.0, y, opt)
print("%-16s %12.3f %15.3f %9.3f" % (name, a, b, (a + b) / 2))
RNG = random.Random(20261120)
people = [(i / 3999, RNG.gauss(0, 1)) for i in range(4000)]
def turnout(yx):
x = y = 0
for pos, v in people:
wx, wy = v + yx - pos, v - (1 - pos)
if max(wx, wy) >= C:
if wx >= wy:
x += 1
else:
y += 1
return x, y
x0, y0 = turnout(0.0)
x1, y1 = turnout(0.5)
print("project X turnout %d -> %d; project Y %d -> %d" % (x0, x1, y0, y1))
gross, net = x1 - x0, (x1 + y1) - (x0 + y0)
print("gross gain at X %d, net gain %d, displaced share %.3f" % (
gross, net, 1 - net / gross))Single source and citation
Fan, Y. (2026). Mission-Driven Co-Creation Networks, Paid-Seat Identity Commitment and Voluntary Contribution Flywheels (Version 1.0.0), Chapter 4: Does Money Crowd Out Enthusiasm? The Boundaries of Crowding Out. 5D Library. DOI pending
DOI pending · monograph page goes live after publication · 5DL-B-360 · v1.0.0 · CC-BY-NC-ND-4.0
BibTeX
@book{fan2026360,
author = {Fan, Yafu},
title = {Mission-Driven Co-Creation Networks, Paid-Seat Identity Commitment and Voluntary Contribution Flywheels},
year = {2026},
publisher = {5D Library},
edition = {1.0.0},
note = {DOI pending}
}Other chapter answers in this book
- Chapter 1 · A Seat Is Not Sold on Perks: How Much of Willingness to Pay Is Identity, Recognition and Mission
- Chapter 2 · The IKEA Effect and the Ratchet of Sunk Investment: Effort Raises Value, and Also Breeds Regret
- Chapter 3 · Honours That Cost No Money: Honour Ladders, Public Plaques and the Saturation of Honours
- Chapter 5 · The Dual-Track Funnel: Free Contributors, Paid Seats and Fairness Between the Tracks
- Chapter 6 · The Community Governance Contract: Design Principles, Protection Against Capture by Payers, Refund Reserves and Single-Tier Referral
- Chapter 7 · East-West Classical Sources: The Record of Rites on the Great Unity, the Platform Sutra, Mauss's Essay on the Gift and Franklin's Subscription Library
- Chapter 8 · System Architecture and the Operating Loop: Registries, Ledgers, the Honour Engine, the Seat Lifecycle and Pre-Registered Tests