What does Limited-Edition Scarcity Pricing conclude, in numbers, about “Practice: Moontide's 500 Numbered Card Sets, from Pricing, Ladder and Allocation to Resale Monitoring”?

Answer: Chapter 8 takes Moontide through the whole method: on the same buyers, a uniform-price auction collects RM 16,297 more than a lottery at list price; under the registered prior, the three-step ladder is expected to earn RM 4,416 less and pays only if soft demand has a probability above 0.715; ordering by speed sends RM 4,795 of the early-bird discount to resale accounts, and identity checks with a random order cut that to RM 903; the day-ninety median resale premium is 0.184, and weekly readings flicker, so actions wait for the registered decision point; over the long run, the auction stops paying once it lowers repurchase by 0.0414, a gap that takes several sales to measure. Marked boxes separate evidence, calculations, sources and hypotheses, each hypothesis stating what would refute it; the classical source is the Han Feizi parable of buying the casket and returning the pearl, read as a lesson on packaging premiums.

Scope of the numbers: Legal rules on such claims are described only in general terms, not as legal advice. Marked boxes separate evidence, calculations, sources and hypotheses, each hypothesis stating what would refute it; the classical source is the Han Feizi parable of buying the casket and returning the pearl, read as a lesson on packaging premiums.

中文版

Data table

The numbers below are printed verbatim by the chapter's Python program and can be reproduced by running it. standard-library Python onlyprinted values that match the answer: 0.715, 4416

scenario design sets revenue gross margin P(90% sold) median day to 90%
soft flat 289312.7 90381 60149 0.000 never
soft ladder 249/269/289362.1 97649 62854 0.000 never
soft gentle 269/289335.4 93926 61594 0.000 never
base flat 289500.0 144500 96165 1.000 7.69
base ladder 249/269/289500.0 137500 89375 1.000 6.02
base gentle 269/289500.0 141500 93255 1.000 6.85
strong flat 289500.0 144500 96165 1.000 3.19
strong ladder 249/269/289500.0 137500 89375 1.000 2.72
strong gentle 269/289500.0 141500 93255 1.000 2.98
ladder discount if every set sells: RM 7,000
expected gross margin under the prior soft/base/strong0.25/0.50/0.25:
flat 289 RM 87,161
ladder 249/269/289 RM 82,745
gentle 269/289 RM 85,340
expected cost of the ladder versus flat under the prior: RM 4,416
ladder gains RM 2,705 when soft, loses RM 6,790 otherwise; it pays only if P(soft) > 0.715
Show the full program
# Chapter 8. p81: Should Moontide run its early-bird ladder? Three designs under three demand scenarios.
# Collectors only (resale accounts are handled in p82). WTP lognormal, median RM 260, sigma 0.40 (p10).
# ASSUMPTIONS: each collector visits once, on a day drawn from an exponential with mean 5 days; a visit
# after day 21 (end of the sale window) is lost; a visitor buys one set if WTP >= the current step price.
# Scenarios: soft 800, base 1,440, strong 2,400 collectors. 300 replications each, seeds 8100 onwards.
import math
import random

EDITION, COST, FEE, WINDOW, REPS = 500, 88, 0.03, 21.0, 300
DESIGNS = {"flat 289": [(500, 289)],
           "ladder 249/269/289": [(100, 249), (150, 269), (250, 289)],
           "gentle 269/289": [(150, 269), (350, 289)]}
SCEN = [("soft", 800), ("base", 1440), ("strong", 2400)]
PRIOR = {"soft": 0.25, "base": 0.50, "strong": 0.25}      # Moontide's stated prior over scenarios


def price_at(steps, sold):
    k = sold
    for n, p in steps:
        if k < n:
            return p
        k -= n
    return None


def run(steps, n, seed):
    rng = random.Random(seed)
    vis = sorted((rng.expovariate(1 / 5.0), rng.lognormvariate(math.log(260), 0.40)) for _ in range(n))
    sold, rev, gm, below, t90 = 0, [], [], 0, None
    for day, v in vis:
        if day > WINDOW or sold >= EDITION:
            break
        p = price_at(steps, sold)
        if v >= p:
            sold += 1
            rev.append(p)
            gm.append(p * (1 - FEE) - COST)
            below += p < 289
            if sold == int(0.9 * EDITION):
                t90 = day
    return sold, math.fsum(rev), math.fsum(gm), below, t90


print("scenario  design               sets   revenue  gross margin  P(90% sold)  median day to 90%")
ev, gms = {}, {}
for sname, n in SCEN:
    for dname, steps in DESIGNS.items():
        res = [run(steps, n, 8100 + r) for r in range(REPS)]
        sets = math.fsum(r[0] for r in res) / REPS
        rv = math.fsum(r[1] for r in res) / REPS
        g = math.fsum(r[2] for r in res) / REPS
        days = sorted(r[4] for r in res if r[4] is not None)
        p90 = len(days) / REPS
        med = "{:.2f}".format(days[len(days) // 2]) if days else "never"
        ev[dname] = ev.get(dname, 0.0) + PRIOR[sname] * g
        gms[(sname, dname)] = g
        print("{:<8}  {:<19}  {:5.1f}  {:8.0f}  {:12.0f}  {:11.3f}  {:>17}".format(
            sname, dname, sets, rv, g, p90, med))
full = sum(n * (289 - p) for n, p in DESIGNS["ladder 249/269/289"])
print("ladder discount if every set sells: RM {:,}".format(full))
print("expected gross margin under the prior soft/base/strong = 0.25/0.50/0.25:")
for dname, v in ev.items():
    print("  {:<19}  RM {:,.0f}".format(dname, v))
print("expected cost of the ladder versus flat under the prior: RM {:,.0f}".format(
    ev["flat 289"] - ev["ladder 249/269/289"]))
gain = gms[("soft", "ladder 249/269/289")] - gms[("soft", "flat 289")]
loss = gms[("base", "flat 289")] - gms[("base", "ladder 249/269/289")]
print("ladder gains RM {:,.0f} when soft, loses RM {:,.0f} otherwise; it pays only if P(soft) > {:.3f}"
      .format(gain, loss, loss / (gain + loss)))

Single source and citation

Fan, Y. (2026). Luxury Scarcity Allocation Auctions, Early-Bird Price-Ladder Dynamics and Limited-Edition Physical Premiums (Version 0.1.0), Chapter 8: Practice: Moontide's 500 Numbered Card Sets, from Pricing, Ladder and Allocation to Resale Monitoring. 5D Library. DOI pending

DOI pending · monograph page goes live after publication · 5DL-B-136 · v0.1.0 · CC-BY-NC-ND-4.0

BibTeX
@book{fan2026136,
  author    = {Fan, Yafu},
  title     = {Luxury Scarcity Allocation Auctions, Early-Bird Price-Ladder Dynamics and Limited-Edition Physical Premiums},
  year      = {2026},
  publisher = {5D Library},
  edition   = {0.1.0},
  note      = {DOI pending}
}

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