What does Limited-Edition Scarcity Pricing conclude, in numbers, about “Practice: Moontide's 500 Numbered Card Sets, from Pricing, Ladder and Allocation to Resale Monitoring”?
Answer: Chapter 8 takes Moontide through the whole method: on the same buyers, a uniform-price auction collects RM 16,297 more than a lottery at list price; under the registered prior, the three-step ladder is expected to earn RM 4,416 less and pays only if soft demand has a probability above 0.715; ordering by speed sends RM 4,795 of the early-bird discount to resale accounts, and identity checks with a random order cut that to RM 903; the day-ninety median resale premium is 0.184, and weekly readings flicker, so actions wait for the registered decision point; over the long run, the auction stops paying once it lowers repurchase by 0.0414, a gap that takes several sales to measure. Marked boxes separate evidence, calculations, sources and hypotheses, each hypothesis stating what would refute it; the classical source is the Han Feizi parable of buying the casket and returning the pearl, read as a lesson on packaging premiums.
Scope of the numbers: Legal rules on such claims are described only in general terms, not as legal advice. Marked boxes separate evidence, calculations, sources and hypotheses, each hypothesis stating what would refute it; the classical source is the Han Feizi parable of buying the casket and returning the pearl, read as a lesson on packaging premiums.
Data table
The numbers below are printed verbatim by the chapter's Python program and can be reproduced by running it. standard-library Python onlyprinted values that match the answer: 0.715, 4416
| scenario design sets revenue gross margin P(90% sold) median day to 90% | |
| soft flat 289 | 312.7 90381 60149 0.000 never |
| soft ladder 249/269/289 | 362.1 97649 62854 0.000 never |
| soft gentle 269/289 | 335.4 93926 61594 0.000 never |
| base flat 289 | 500.0 144500 96165 1.000 7.69 |
| base ladder 249/269/289 | 500.0 137500 89375 1.000 6.02 |
| base gentle 269/289 | 500.0 141500 93255 1.000 6.85 |
| strong flat 289 | 500.0 144500 96165 1.000 3.19 |
| strong ladder 249/269/289 | 500.0 137500 89375 1.000 2.72 |
| strong gentle 269/289 | 500.0 141500 93255 1.000 2.98 |
| ladder discount if every set sells: RM 7,000 | |
| expected gross margin under the prior soft/base/strong | 0.25/0.50/0.25: |
| flat 289 RM 87,161 | |
| ladder 249/269/289 RM 82,745 | |
| gentle 269/289 RM 85,340 | |
| expected cost of the ladder versus flat under the prior: RM 4,416 | |
| ladder gains RM 2,705 when soft, loses RM 6,790 otherwise; it pays only if P(soft) > 0.715 |
Show the full program
# Chapter 8. p81: Should Moontide run its early-bird ladder? Three designs under three demand scenarios.
# Collectors only (resale accounts are handled in p82). WTP lognormal, median RM 260, sigma 0.40 (p10).
# ASSUMPTIONS: each collector visits once, on a day drawn from an exponential with mean 5 days; a visit
# after day 21 (end of the sale window) is lost; a visitor buys one set if WTP >= the current step price.
# Scenarios: soft 800, base 1,440, strong 2,400 collectors. 300 replications each, seeds 8100 onwards.
import math
import random
EDITION, COST, FEE, WINDOW, REPS = 500, 88, 0.03, 21.0, 300
DESIGNS = {"flat 289": [(500, 289)],
"ladder 249/269/289": [(100, 249), (150, 269), (250, 289)],
"gentle 269/289": [(150, 269), (350, 289)]}
SCEN = [("soft", 800), ("base", 1440), ("strong", 2400)]
PRIOR = {"soft": 0.25, "base": 0.50, "strong": 0.25} # Moontide's stated prior over scenarios
def price_at(steps, sold):
k = sold
for n, p in steps:
if k < n:
return p
k -= n
return None
def run(steps, n, seed):
rng = random.Random(seed)
vis = sorted((rng.expovariate(1 / 5.0), rng.lognormvariate(math.log(260), 0.40)) for _ in range(n))
sold, rev, gm, below, t90 = 0, [], [], 0, None
for day, v in vis:
if day > WINDOW or sold >= EDITION:
break
p = price_at(steps, sold)
if v >= p:
sold += 1
rev.append(p)
gm.append(p * (1 - FEE) - COST)
below += p < 289
if sold == int(0.9 * EDITION):
t90 = day
return sold, math.fsum(rev), math.fsum(gm), below, t90
print("scenario design sets revenue gross margin P(90% sold) median day to 90%")
ev, gms = {}, {}
for sname, n in SCEN:
for dname, steps in DESIGNS.items():
res = [run(steps, n, 8100 + r) for r in range(REPS)]
sets = math.fsum(r[0] for r in res) / REPS
rv = math.fsum(r[1] for r in res) / REPS
g = math.fsum(r[2] for r in res) / REPS
days = sorted(r[4] for r in res if r[4] is not None)
p90 = len(days) / REPS
med = "{:.2f}".format(days[len(days) // 2]) if days else "never"
ev[dname] = ev.get(dname, 0.0) + PRIOR[sname] * g
gms[(sname, dname)] = g
print("{:<8} {:<19} {:5.1f} {:8.0f} {:12.0f} {:11.3f} {:>17}".format(
sname, dname, sets, rv, g, p90, med))
full = sum(n * (289 - p) for n, p in DESIGNS["ladder 249/269/289"])
print("ladder discount if every set sells: RM {:,}".format(full))
print("expected gross margin under the prior soft/base/strong = 0.25/0.50/0.25:")
for dname, v in ev.items():
print(" {:<19} RM {:,.0f}".format(dname, v))
print("expected cost of the ladder versus flat under the prior: RM {:,.0f}".format(
ev["flat 289"] - ev["ladder 249/269/289"]))
gain = gms[("soft", "ladder 249/269/289")] - gms[("soft", "flat 289")]
loss = gms[("base", "flat 289")] - gms[("base", "ladder 249/269/289")]
print("ladder gains RM {:,.0f} when soft, loses RM {:,.0f} otherwise; it pays only if P(soft) > {:.3f}"
.format(gain, loss, loss / (gain + loss)))Single source and citation
Fan, Y. (2026). Luxury Scarcity Allocation Auctions, Early-Bird Price-Ladder Dynamics and Limited-Edition Physical Premiums (Version 0.1.0), Chapter 8: Practice: Moontide's 500 Numbered Card Sets, from Pricing, Ladder and Allocation to Resale Monitoring. 5D Library. DOI pending
DOI pending · monograph page goes live after publication · 5DL-B-136 · v0.1.0 · CC-BY-NC-ND-4.0
BibTeX
@book{fan2026136,
author = {Fan, Yafu},
title = {Luxury Scarcity Allocation Auctions, Early-Bird Price-Ladder Dynamics and Limited-Edition Physical Premiums},
year = {2026},
publisher = {5D Library},
edition = {0.1.0},
note = {DOI pending}
}Other chapter answers in this book
- Chapter 1 · Method: Three Sources of a Scarcity Premium, Four Indicators, Evidence Grades and "Buying the Casket, Returning the Pearl"
- Chapter 2 · The Coase Conjecture and Commitment Devices: A Limit Must First Bind the Seller
- Chapter 3 · Early-Bird Ladder Dynamics: Tiers, Steps, Slopes and Honest Announcement
- Chapter 4 · Who Gets the Allocation: First Come, Queues, Lotteries and Three Auctions
- Chapter 5 · Scarcity Psychology: Evidence, Replication Status, Bandwagons and Snobs, and the Modern Casket
- Chapter 6 · Secondary-Market Premiums, Name Binding, Transfer Fees, Anti-Bot Defences and the Compliance Edge of "Limited" Claims
- Chapter 7 · The Limited-Edition Playbook: Numbered Decks, Workshop Seats, Numbered Prints, Boutique Quotas and the Distillation Spec for the Four Kits