What does Limited-Edition Scarcity Pricing conclude, in numbers, about “Who Gets the Allocation: First Come, Queues, Lotteries and Three Auctions”?
Answer: The design does not change how many sets there are; it changes three things: how much the brand collects, whose hands the sets reach, and what the community remembers. In this chapter's pool, the uniform-price auction earns RM 15,161 more than the fixed RM 289; the pay-as-bid auction earns almost the same in equilibrium but is harder to explain; the Vickrey auction differs from the uniform price only when one person takes several sets. First come hands the allocation to scripts, a queue burns the gap as time, and a lottery leaves the gap to the winners and the resale market. ID checks cut lottery resale from 108.1 sets to 32.4, and two tickets for members lift the core collectors' chance to 0.865. For a low-price ID lottery to beat the auction, each marginal collector it serves must bring back RM 129.57 of margin in the future, about two thirds of a set's margin; that is a bet on repeat buying, written here as a hypothesis and handed to the Chapter 8 launch to test.
Scope of the numbers: Legal rules on such claims are described only in general terms, not as legal advice. Marked boxes separate evidence, calculations, sources and hypotheses, each hypothesis stating what would refute it; the classical source is the Han Feizi parable of buying the casket and returning the pearl, read as a lesson on packaging premiums.
Data table
The numbers below are printed verbatim by the chapter's Python program and can be reproduced by running it. standard-library Python onlyprinted values that match the answer: 0.865, 108.1, 289, 32.4
| lottery at RM 289; brand revenue RM 144,500; 578 willing collectors; means over 400 draws | |||||||||
| design | coll | core resale | res p res marg | surplus P core | P mem | P non | |||
| open, 160 accounts | 391.9 | 204.8 | 108.1 | 346.08 | 6,159 | 50,896 | 0.678 | 0.678 | 0.679 |
| one entry per verified ID | 467.6 | 244.3 | 32.4 | 412.62 | 3,986 | 51,156 | 0.809 | 0.808 | 0.810 |
| ID + members x2 tickets | 472.1 | 261.4 | 27.9 | 414.80 | 3,493 | 51,690 | 0.865 | 0.908 | 0.696 |
| ID + members x4 tickets | 475.4 | 273.5 | 24.6 | 416.58 | 3,121 | 52,101 | 0.906 | 0.978 | 0.617 |
| closed form: open 500 x 160 / 738 = 108.4 resale units; per ID 500 x 40 / 618 = 32.4 |
Show the full program
# Chapter 4. p43: Lotteries at RM 289: open accounts, one entry per verified ID, member-weighted tickets.
# Pool as in p40 (assumed). Entrants are collectors willing at 289 plus resale entries (160 accounts, or
# 40 people under ID checks). Weighted draws without replacement use keys u ** (1 / weight) (Efraimidis
# and Spirakis 2006); 400 draws, random.Random(43). Unserved collectors then meet resale as in p41.
import math
import random
COLL, PEOPLE, ACCTS, UNITS, PRICE = 1440, 40, 4, 500, 289
def build_pool(seed=136):
rng = random.Random(seed)
fans = []
for _ in range(COLL):
za, zb = rng.gauss(0, 1), rng.gauss(0, 1)
core = za >= 0.5244
fans.append({"v": 260 * math.exp(0.40 * (0.6 * za + 0.8 * zb)), "za": za, "core": core,
"member": rng.random() < (0.8 if core else 0.3)})
resellers = [0.9 * rng.uniform(330, 380) for _ in range(PEOPLE)]
return fans, resellers
def resale(unserved, s):
vals = sorted((v for v in unserved if v >= PRICE), reverse=True)
s = min(s, len(vals))
if s == 0:
return 0.0, 0.0, 0
p = vals[s] if s < len(vals) else PRICE
return p, math.fsum(v - p for v in vals[:s]), s
def draw(fans, entries, weight, rng):
willing = [f for f in fans if f["v"] >= PRICE]
keyed = [(rng.random() ** (1 / (weight if f["member"] else 1)), f) for f in willing]
keyed += [(rng.random(), None) for _ in range(entries)]
keyed.sort(key=lambda x: -x[0])
got = [x[1] for x in keyed[:UNITS] if x[1]]
ids = {id(f) for f in got}
p_r, s_surp, sold = resale([f["v"] for f in willing if id(f) not in ids], UNITS - len(got))
mem = [f for f in willing if f["member"]]
non = [f for f in willing if not f["member"]]
return {"coll": len(got), "core": sum(f["core"] for f in got), "resale": UNITS - len(got), "p_r": p_r,
"margin": sold * (p_r - PRICE), "surplus": math.fsum(f["v"] - PRICE for f in got) + s_surp,
"p_core": sum(f["core"] for f in got) / sum(f["core"] for f in willing),
"p_mem": sum(1 for f in got if f["member"]) / len(mem),
"p_non": sum(1 for f in got if not f["member"]) / len(non)}
if __name__ == "__main__":
fans, res = build_pool()
rng = random.Random(43)
willing = [f for f in fans if f["v"] >= PRICE]
print("lottery at RM {}; brand revenue RM {:,}; {} willing collectors; means over 400 draws".format(
PRICE, UNITS * PRICE, len(willing)))
print("{:<26} {:>6} {:>6} {:>6} {:>7} {:>8} {:>8} {:>6} {:>6} {:>6}".format(
"design", "coll", "core", "resale", "res p", "res marg", "surplus", "P core", "P mem", "P non"))
designs = (("open, 160 accounts", PEOPLE * ACCTS, 1), ("one entry per verified ID", PEOPLE, 1),
("ID + members x2 tickets", PEOPLE, 2), ("ID + members x4 tickets", PEOPLE, 4))
for name, entries, w in designs:
reps = [draw(fans, entries, w, rng) for _ in range(400)]
m = {k: math.fsum(r[k] for r in reps) / len(reps) for k in reps[0]}
fmt = "{:<26} {:>6.1f} {:>6.1f} {:>6.1f} {:>7.2f} {:>8,.0f} {:>8,.0f} {:>6.3f} {:>6.3f} {:>6.3f}"
print(fmt.format(
name, m["coll"], m["core"], m["resale"], m["p_r"], m["margin"], m["surplus"], m["p_core"],
m["p_mem"], m["p_non"]))
n = len(willing)
print("closed form: open {} x 160 / {} = {:.1f} resale units; per ID {} x 40 / {} = {:.1f}".format(
UNITS, n + 160, UNITS * 160 / (n + 160), UNITS, n + 40, UNITS * 40 / (n + 40)))Single source and citation
Fan, Y. (2026). Luxury Scarcity Allocation Auctions, Early-Bird Price-Ladder Dynamics and Limited-Edition Physical Premiums (Version 0.1.0), Chapter 4: Who Gets the Allocation: First Come, Queues, Lotteries and Three Auctions. 5D Library. DOI pending
DOI pending · monograph page goes live after publication · 5DL-B-136 · v0.1.0 · CC-BY-NC-ND-4.0
BibTeX
@book{fan2026136,
author = {Fan, Yafu},
title = {Luxury Scarcity Allocation Auctions, Early-Bird Price-Ladder Dynamics and Limited-Edition Physical Premiums},
year = {2026},
publisher = {5D Library},
edition = {0.1.0},
note = {DOI pending}
}Other chapter answers in this book
- Chapter 1 · Method: Three Sources of a Scarcity Premium, Four Indicators, Evidence Grades and "Buying the Casket, Returning the Pearl"
- Chapter 2 · The Coase Conjecture and Commitment Devices: A Limit Must First Bind the Seller
- Chapter 3 · Early-Bird Ladder Dynamics: Tiers, Steps, Slopes and Honest Announcement
- Chapter 5 · Scarcity Psychology: Evidence, Replication Status, Bandwagons and Snobs, and the Modern Casket
- Chapter 6 · Secondary-Market Premiums, Name Binding, Transfer Fees, Anti-Bot Defences and the Compliance Edge of "Limited" Claims
- Chapter 7 · The Limited-Edition Playbook: Numbered Decks, Workshop Seats, Numbered Prints, Boutique Quotas and the Distillation Spec for the Four Kits
- Chapter 8 · Practice: Moontide's 500 Numbered Card Sets, from Pricing, Ladder and Allocation to Resale Monitoring