What does The Economics of Attention conclude, in numbers, about “Machine-Readable Reputation: Coase in the Age of Knowledge Graphs”?
Answer: Two things are visible. When genuine candidates are scarce, checking costs dominate: at \(q = 0.2\) and \(k = 40\), a fifth of the deal's value goes on finding the right person. And cutting the cost per check, from manual vetting to records that can be verified quickly, recovers most of that value.
Scope of the numbers: The book is not business, investment or legal advice. Marked boxes separate published evidence, runnable Python calculations (28, all checked), classical sources and the author's hypotheses, each with the result that would refute it.
Data table
The numbers below are printed verbatim by the chapter's Python program and can be reproduced by running it. printed values that match the answer: 0.2, 40
| share genuine | cost per check | expected checking cost per genuine creator | net value |
|---|---|---|---|
| 0.5 | 40 | 80 | 920 |
| 0.5 | 10 | 20 | 980 |
| 0.5 | 2 | 4 | 996 |
| 0.2 | 40 | 200 | 800 |
| 0.2 | 10 | 50 | 950 |
| 0.2 | 2 | 10 | 990 |
| no checking possible: price a brand will pay = q * V | |||
| q = 0.8: | 800 | -> genuine creators with outside options above 800 leave the market | |
| q = 0.5: | 500 | -> genuine creators with outside options above 500 leave the market | |
| q = 0.2: | 200 | -> genuine creators with outside options above 200 leave the market |
Show the full program
# A brand looks for a creator whose audience is genuine. A share q of candidates is genuine.
# Checking one candidate costs k (hours of vetting, in money terms); checking reveals the truth.
# Candidates are checked one by one, so the expected number checked per genuine find is 1/q.
V = 1000.0 # value of a deal with a genuine creator
print("share genuine cost per check expected checking cost per genuine creator net value")
for q in (0.5, 0.2):
# manual vetting -> partly machine-readable -> verified data
for k in (40.0, 10.0, 2.0):
cost = k / q
print(f"{q:13.1f} {k:15.0f} {cost:44.0f} {V - cost:11.0f}")
# Without any check (Akerlof): a brand pays at most the average value q*V. A genuine creator
# whose
# own outside option is above that price leaves, which lowers q further.
print("\nno checking possible: price a brand will pay = q * V")
for q in (0.8, 0.5, 0.2):
print(f"q = {q:.1f}: {q * V:5.0f} -> genuine creators with outside options above {q * V:.0f} leave the market")Single source and citation
Fan, Y. (2026). The Economics of Attention (Version 1.0.0), Chapter 6: Machine-Readable Reputation: Coase in the Age of Knowledge Graphs. 5D Library. https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.23689302
DOI: 10.5281/zenodo.23689302 · Read the monograph · 5DL-B-006 · v1.0.0 · CC-BY-NC-ND-4.0
BibTeX
@book{fan2026006,
author = {Fan, Yafu},
title = {The Economics of Attention},
year = {2026},
publisher = {5D Library},
edition = {1.0.0},
doi = {10.5281/zenodo.23689302},
url = {https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.23689302}
}