What does The Economics of Attention conclude, in numbers, about “Machine-Readable Reputation: Coase in the Age of Knowledge Graphs”?

Answer: Two things are visible. When genuine candidates are scarce, checking costs dominate: at \(q = 0.2\) and \(k = 40\), a fifth of the deal's value goes on finding the right person. And cutting the cost per check, from manual vetting to records that can be verified quickly, recovers most of that value.

Scope of the numbers: The book is not business, investment or legal advice. Marked boxes separate published evidence, runnable Python calculations (28, all checked), classical sources and the author's hypotheses, each with the result that would refute it.

中文版

Data table

The numbers below are printed verbatim by the chapter's Python program and can be reproduced by running it. printed values that match the answer: 0.2, 40

share genuinecost per checkexpected checking cost per genuine creatornet value
0.54080920
0.51020980
0.524996
0.240200800
0.21050950
0.2210990
no checking possible: price a brand will pay = q * V
q = 0.8:800-> genuine creators with outside options above 800 leave the market
q = 0.5:500-> genuine creators with outside options above 500 leave the market
q = 0.2:200-> genuine creators with outside options above 200 leave the market
Show the full program
# A brand looks for a creator whose audience is genuine. A share q of candidates is genuine.
# Checking one candidate costs k (hours of vetting, in money terms); checking reveals the truth.
# Candidates are checked one by one, so the expected number checked per genuine find is 1/q.
V = 1000.0                                  # value of a deal with a genuine creator
print("share genuine  cost per check   expected checking cost per genuine creator   net value")
for q in (0.5, 0.2):
    # manual vetting -> partly machine-readable -> verified data
    for k in (40.0, 10.0, 2.0):
        cost = k / q
        print(f"{q:13.1f} {k:15.0f} {cost:44.0f} {V - cost:11.0f}")

# Without any check (Akerlof): a brand pays at most the average value q*V. A genuine creator
# whose
# own outside option is above that price leaves, which lowers q further.
print("\nno checking possible: price a brand will pay = q * V")
for q in (0.8, 0.5, 0.2):
    print(f"q = {q:.1f}: {q * V:5.0f}  -> genuine creators with outside options above {q * V:.0f} leave the market")

Single source and citation

Fan, Y. (2026). The Economics of Attention (Version 1.0.0), Chapter 6: Machine-Readable Reputation: Coase in the Age of Knowledge Graphs. 5D Library. https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.23689302

DOI: 10.5281/zenodo.23689302 · Read the monograph · 5DL-B-006 · v1.0.0 · CC-BY-NC-ND-4.0

BibTeX
@book{fan2026006,
  author    = {Fan, Yafu},
  title     = {The Economics of Attention},
  year      = {2026},
  publisher = {5D Library},
  edition   = {1.0.0},
  doi       = {10.5281/zenodo.23689302},
  url       = {https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.23689302}
}

Other chapter answers in this book