What does The Economics of Attention conclude, in numbers, about “Two-Sided Markets and the Commission Game”?

Answer: The table carries three lessons for agencies. An intermediary that adds nothing and takes its profit-maximising cut halves the business and leaves the creator with a quarter of what they earned alone. An agency that genuinely raises productivity can create value for everyone, but only if its cut leaves the creator enough incentive: with a 40 per cent productivity gain and a 50 per cent cut, the creator is still worse off than alone; with the same gain and a 20 per cent cut, the creator, the platform and total sales are all better off, and the agency earns less than its narrow optimum but more than nothing. And the platform gains from moderate agency cuts, which helps explain why platforms often set rules or caps on how intermediaries are paid.

Scope of the numbers: The book is not business, investment or legal advice. Marked boxes separate published evidence, runnable Python calculations (28, all checked), classical sources and the author's hypotheses, each with the result that would refute it.

中文版

Data table

The numbers below are printed verbatim by the chapter's Python program and can be reproduced by running it. printed values that match the answer: 20, 40

platform's best commission: 0.50(theory: 1 - b = 0.50)
creator works...MCN cutGMVplatformMCNcreator (net)
alone0.0025.012.50.06.2
with an MCN that adds nothing0.5012.56.23.11.6
with an MCN that lifts A by 40%0.5024.512.26.13.1
same MCN, cut capped at 20%0.2039.219.63.97.8

Key formula

\[p_B = \text{(对品牌的加价)} - \alpha_C\,n_C, \qquad p_C = \text{(对创作者的加价)} - \alpha_B\,n_B 。\]
Show the full program
# Commission chain: the platform keeps c of GMV, the MCN keeps m of what is left, the creator
# keeps the rest.
# GMV = A * e**b rises with the creator's effort e (b < 1: diminishing returns); effort costs e.
# The creator picks e to maximise (1-c)(1-m) * A * e**b - e. An MCN may also raise A (training,
# brand deals).
b = 0.5

def outcome(c, m, A):
    keep = (1 - c) * (1 - m)
    e = (b * keep * A) ** (1 / (1 - b))          # creator's best effort
    gmv = A * e ** b
    return gmv, c * gmv, (1 - c) * m * gmv, keep * gmv - e

def best(f):                                      # grid search on a share from 0 to 0.99
    return max((i / 100 for i in range(100)), key=f)

c = best(lambda c: outcome(c, 0, 10)[1])          # the platform's own best commission
print(f"platform's best commission: {c:.2f}  (theory: 1 - b = {1 - b:.2f})")
print("creator works...                     MCN cut    GMV   platform   MCN   creator (net)")
cases = (("alone", 10.0, 0.0), ("with an MCN that adds nothing", 10.0, None),
         ("with an MCN that lifts A by 40%", 14.0, None), ("same MCN, cut capped at 20%", 14.0, 0.20))
for name, A, m in cases:
    if m is None:
        m = best(lambda m: outcome(c, m, A)[2])   # the MCN sets its own best cut
    g, p, n, k = outcome(c, m, A)
    print(f"{name:36s} {m:7.2f} {g:6.1f} {p:9.1f} {n:6.1f} {k:9.1f}")

Single source and citation

Fan, Y. (2026). The Economics of Attention (Version 1.0.0), Chapter 5: Two-Sided Markets and the Commission Game. 5D Library. https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.23689302

DOI: 10.5281/zenodo.23689302 · Read the monograph · 5DL-B-006 · v1.0.0 · CC-BY-NC-ND-4.0

BibTeX
@book{fan2026006,
  author    = {Fan, Yafu},
  title     = {The Economics of Attention},
  year      = {2026},
  publisher = {5D Library},
  edition   = {1.0.0},
  doi       = {10.5281/zenodo.23689302},
  url       = {https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.23689302}
}

Other chapter answers in this book