What does Partner Selection on the Pareto Frontier conclude, in numbers, about “Bargaining Boundaries and Stable Matching: Outside Options, Threat Points and the Single Rate of "Wanting It All"”?

Answer: Chapter 6 covers the Nash and Kalai-Smorodinsky solutions and the outside option principle; the party asked to invest uses only truthful disclosure, outside options, its own floor and the right to leave, and in stable matching the single share of the all-max type reaches 0.780.

Scope of the numbers: Its populations, traits and parameters are synthetic or illustrative, and all calculations are generated by its programs. Marked boxes separate evidence, hypotheses and classical sources; the book contains 22 programs.

中文版

Data table

The numbers below are printed verbatim by the chapter's Python program and can be reproduced by running it. standard-library Python onlyprinted values that match the answer: 0.780

side A balancedn=150 single share 0.007
side A all-maxn= 50 single share 0.780
side B balancedn=150 single share 0.000
side B all-maxn= 50 single share 0.800
blocking pairs in the final matching: 0
expected share meeting both floors: 0.090
Show the full program
# Chapter 6. p63: deferred acceptance with multi-objective preferences
# Two sides of 200 agents each (roles A and B, no sex labels). Each
# agent has traits S, E, R ~ N(0, 1) independent, and a type:
#   balanced: weights (1/3, 1/3, 1/3), floors none
#   all-max:  same weights, but floors at the top 30% on S and E
# Preferences: weighted sum with personal noise. An agent whose floors
# are not met by anyone prefers to stay single. Gale-Shapley (1962),
# A proposing. Report single rates and blocking pairs (should be 0).
import random
from statistics import NormalDist

rng = random.Random(41631)
N = 200
CUT = NormalDist().inv_cdf(0.70)


def make(side):
    out = []
    for i in range(N):
        tr = [rng.gauss(0.0, 1.0) for _ in range(3)]
        kind = "all-max" if i % 4 == 0 else "balanced"
        out.append({"tr": tr, "kind": kind, "id": side + str(i)})
    return out


A, B = make("a"), make("b")


def ok(me, other):
    if me["kind"] == "all-max":
        return other["tr"][0] > CUT and other["tr"][1] > CUT
    return True


def ranking(me, others):
    sc = []
    for j, o in enumerate(others):
        if ok(me, o):
            v = (o["tr"][0] + o["tr"][1] + o["tr"][2]) / 3.0
            sc.append((-(v + rng.gauss(0.0, 0.3)), j))
    sc.sort()
    return [j for _, j in sc]


prefA = [ranking(a, B) for a in A]
prefB = [ranking(b, A) for b in B]
posB = [{j: k for k, j in enumerate(p)} for p in prefB]
nxt = [0] * N
holdB = [None] * N
free = list(range(N))
while free:
    i = free.pop()
    if nxt[i] >= len(prefA[i]):
        continue
    j = prefA[i][nxt[i]]
    nxt[i] += 1
    if i not in posB[j]:
        free.append(i)
    elif holdB[j] is None:
        holdB[j] = i
    elif posB[j][i] < posB[j][holdB[j]]:
        free.append(holdB[j])
        holdB[j] = i
    else:
        free.append(i)
mateA = [None] * N
for j, i in enumerate(holdB):
    if i is not None:
        mateA[i] = j
block = 0
for i in range(N):
    rankA = {j: k for k, j in enumerate(prefA[i])}
    for j in prefA[i]:
        better_a = mateA[i] is None or rankA[j] < rankA[mateA[i]]
        if not better_a or i not in posB[j]:
            continue
        if holdB[j] is None or posB[j][i] < posB[j][holdB[j]]:
            block += 1
for side, mates, agents in (("A", mateA, A),
                            ("B", [holdB[j] for j in range(N)], B)):
    for kind in ("balanced", "all-max"):
        idx = [k for k in range(N) if agents[k]["kind"] == kind]
        single = [k for k in idx if mates[k] is None]
        print("side {} {:<9} n={:3d} single share {:.3f}".format(
            side, kind, len(idx), len(single) / len(idx)))
print("blocking pairs in the final matching: {}".format(block))
print("expected share meeting both floors: {:.3f}".format(0.3 * 0.3))

Single source and citation

Fan, Y. (2026). Dual-Mating Multi-Objective Conflicts, Parental-Investment Asymmetry and the Pareto Frontier of Partner Selection (Version 1.0.0), Chapter 6: Bargaining Boundaries and Stable Matching: Outside Options, Threat Points and the Single Rate of "Wanting It All". 5D Library. DOI pending

DOI pending · monograph page goes live after publication · 5DL-B-421 · v1.0.0 · CC-BY-NC-ND-4.0

BibTeX
@book{fan2026421,
  author    = {Fan, Yafu},
  title     = {Dual-Mating Multi-Objective Conflicts, Parental-Investment Asymmetry and the Pareto Frontier of Partner Selection},
  year      = {2026},
  publisher = {5D Library},
  edition   = {1.0.0},
  note      = {DOI pending}
}

Other chapter answers in this book