What does Partner Selection on the Pareto Frontier conclude, in numbers, about “Bargaining Boundaries and Stable Matching: Outside Options, Threat Points and the Single Rate of "Wanting It All"”?
Answer: Chapter 6 covers the Nash and Kalai-Smorodinsky solutions and the outside option principle; the party asked to invest uses only truthful disclosure, outside options, its own floor and the right to leave, and in stable matching the single share of the all-max type reaches 0.780.
Scope of the numbers: Its populations, traits and parameters are synthetic or illustrative, and all calculations are generated by its programs. Marked boxes separate evidence, hypotheses and classical sources; the book contains 22 programs.
Data table
The numbers below are printed verbatim by the chapter's Python program and can be reproduced by running it. standard-library Python onlyprinted values that match the answer: 0.780
| side A balanced | n=150 single share 0.007 |
| side A all-max | n= 50 single share 0.780 |
| side B balanced | n=150 single share 0.000 |
| side B all-max | n= 50 single share 0.800 |
| blocking pairs in the final matching: 0 | |
| expected share meeting both floors: 0.090 |
Show the full program
# Chapter 6. p63: deferred acceptance with multi-objective preferences
# Two sides of 200 agents each (roles A and B, no sex labels). Each
# agent has traits S, E, R ~ N(0, 1) independent, and a type:
# balanced: weights (1/3, 1/3, 1/3), floors none
# all-max: same weights, but floors at the top 30% on S and E
# Preferences: weighted sum with personal noise. An agent whose floors
# are not met by anyone prefers to stay single. Gale-Shapley (1962),
# A proposing. Report single rates and blocking pairs (should be 0).
import random
from statistics import NormalDist
rng = random.Random(41631)
N = 200
CUT = NormalDist().inv_cdf(0.70)
def make(side):
out = []
for i in range(N):
tr = [rng.gauss(0.0, 1.0) for _ in range(3)]
kind = "all-max" if i % 4 == 0 else "balanced"
out.append({"tr": tr, "kind": kind, "id": side + str(i)})
return out
A, B = make("a"), make("b")
def ok(me, other):
if me["kind"] == "all-max":
return other["tr"][0] > CUT and other["tr"][1] > CUT
return True
def ranking(me, others):
sc = []
for j, o in enumerate(others):
if ok(me, o):
v = (o["tr"][0] + o["tr"][1] + o["tr"][2]) / 3.0
sc.append((-(v + rng.gauss(0.0, 0.3)), j))
sc.sort()
return [j for _, j in sc]
prefA = [ranking(a, B) for a in A]
prefB = [ranking(b, A) for b in B]
posB = [{j: k for k, j in enumerate(p)} for p in prefB]
nxt = [0] * N
holdB = [None] * N
free = list(range(N))
while free:
i = free.pop()
if nxt[i] >= len(prefA[i]):
continue
j = prefA[i][nxt[i]]
nxt[i] += 1
if i not in posB[j]:
free.append(i)
elif holdB[j] is None:
holdB[j] = i
elif posB[j][i] < posB[j][holdB[j]]:
free.append(holdB[j])
holdB[j] = i
else:
free.append(i)
mateA = [None] * N
for j, i in enumerate(holdB):
if i is not None:
mateA[i] = j
block = 0
for i in range(N):
rankA = {j: k for k, j in enumerate(prefA[i])}
for j in prefA[i]:
better_a = mateA[i] is None or rankA[j] < rankA[mateA[i]]
if not better_a or i not in posB[j]:
continue
if holdB[j] is None or posB[j][i] < posB[j][holdB[j]]:
block += 1
for side, mates, agents in (("A", mateA, A),
("B", [holdB[j] for j in range(N)], B)):
for kind in ("balanced", "all-max"):
idx = [k for k in range(N) if agents[k]["kind"] == kind]
single = [k for k in idx if mates[k] is None]
print("side {} {:<9} n={:3d} single share {:.3f}".format(
side, kind, len(idx), len(single) / len(idx)))
print("blocking pairs in the final matching: {}".format(block))
print("expected share meeting both floors: {:.3f}".format(0.3 * 0.3))Single source and citation
Fan, Y. (2026). Dual-Mating Multi-Objective Conflicts, Parental-Investment Asymmetry and the Pareto Frontier of Partner Selection (Version 1.0.0), Chapter 6: Bargaining Boundaries and Stable Matching: Outside Options, Threat Points and the Single Rate of "Wanting It All". 5D Library. DOI pending
DOI pending · monograph page goes live after publication · 5DL-B-421 · v1.0.0 · CC-BY-NC-ND-4.0
BibTeX
@book{fan2026421,
author = {Fan, Yafu},
title = {Dual-Mating Multi-Objective Conflicts, Parental-Investment Asymmetry and the Pareto Frontier of Partner Selection},
year = {2026},
publisher = {5D Library},
edition = {1.0.0},
note = {DOI pending}
}Other chapter answers in this book
- Chapter 1 · Roles, Not Sexes: Asymmetric Parental Investment, Acceptance Thresholds and Overlapping Effect Sizes
- Chapter 2 · Berkson Selection: Where the Observed Trade-off Comes From
- Chapter 3 · The Collapse of the Feasible Set: The "Impossible Triangle" as a Joint-Threshold Probability
- Chapter 4 · The Pareto Front: Why Weighted Scoring Misses the Part That Bends Inward
- Chapter 5 · Budget Constraints and Stated Preferences: Necessities, Luxuries and a Test of the "Dual-Track" Hypothesis
- Chapter 7 · Classical Sources East and West: Exit Costs in "Mang", the Multi-Objective Contract of the "Meaning of the Marriage Rite" and Darwin in 1871
- Chapter 8 · Field Tools and Checker Specifications: Calculator, Checkers, Ledger and Preregistered Tests