What does Partner Selection on the Pareto Frontier conclude, in numbers, about “Berkson Selection: Where the Observed Trade-off Comes From”?
Answer: Chapter 2 is the core of the book: starting from two independent traits and keeping only the top 10 % by overall appeal, the correlation becomes −0.708, and market clearing produces the same trade-off.
Scope of the numbers: Its populations, traits and parameters are synthetic or illustrative, and all calculations are generated by its programs. Marked boxes separate evidence, hypotheses and classical sources; the book contains 22 programs.
Data table
The numbers below are printed verbatim by the chapter's Python program and can be reproduced by running it. standard-library Python onlyprinted values that match the answer: 10
| people per side: 2,000 | |||
| all partners: corr(T, E) = +0.004 | |||
| chooser decile | mean T | mean E | corr(T, E) among partners |
| 1 | -1.17 | -1.18 | -0.540 |
| 2 | -0.70 | -0.71 | -0.742 |
| 3 | -0.49 | -0.37 | -0.751 |
| 4 | -0.24 | -0.23 | -0.782 |
| 5 | -0.14 | +0.00 | -0.864 |
| 6 | -0.03 | +0.23 | -0.759 |
| 7 | +0.30 | +0.27 | -0.828 |
| 8 | +0.48 | +0.43 | -0.817 |
| 9 | +0.68 | +0.76 | -0.794 |
| 10 | +1.21 | +1.21 | -0.598 |
| within any band the two traits trade off; the market, not the | |||
| traits, produces the negative slope |
Show the full program
# Chapter 2. p22: market clearing makes the obtainable set trade off
# Two sides of 2000 people each. Everyone has independent traits
# T (tension signal) and E (exclusive investment), and overall
# desirability D = T + E + noise. With common preferences the stable
# matching is assortative on D (Becker 1973; Kalick and Hamilton 1986).
# A chooser in a given band of own D obtains partners whose D sits in a
# narrow band, so among those partners T and E trade off one for one.
import math
import random
rng = random.Random(41302)
N = 2000
def person():
t, e = rng.gauss(0.0, 1.0), rng.gauss(0.0, 1.0)
return (t + e + rng.gauss(0.0, 0.5), t, e)
def corr(xs, ys):
n = len(xs)
mx, my = math.fsum(xs) / n, math.fsum(ys) / n
sxy = math.fsum((x - mx) * (y - my) for x, y in zip(xs, ys))
sxx = math.fsum((x - mx) ** 2 for x in xs)
syy = math.fsum((y - my) ** 2 for y in ys)
return sxy / math.sqrt(sxx * syy)
side_a = sorted(person() for _ in range(N))
side_b = sorted(person() for _ in range(N))
pairs = list(zip(side_a, side_b)) # rank i of A with rank i of B
ta = [p[1][1] for p in pairs]
ea = [p[1][2] for p in pairs]
print("people per side: {:,}".format(N))
print("all partners: corr(T, E) = {:+.3f}".format(corr(ta, ea)))
print("chooser decile mean T mean E corr(T, E) among partners")
for dec in range(10):
blk = pairs[dec * N // 10:(dec + 1) * N // 10]
ts = [p[1][1] for p in blk]
es = [p[1][2] for p in blk]
print("{:>14} {:+.2f} {:+.2f} {:+.3f}".format(
dec + 1, round(math.fsum(ts) / len(ts), 2) + 0.0,
round(math.fsum(es) / len(es), 2) + 0.0,
corr(ts, es)))
print("within any band the two traits trade off; the market, not the")
print("traits, produces the negative slope")Single source and citation
Fan, Y. (2026). Dual-Mating Multi-Objective Conflicts, Parental-Investment Asymmetry and the Pareto Frontier of Partner Selection (Version 1.0.0), Chapter 2: Berkson Selection: Where the Observed Trade-off Comes From. 5D Library. DOI pending
DOI pending · monograph page goes live after publication · 5DL-B-421 · v1.0.0 · CC-BY-NC-ND-4.0
BibTeX
@book{fan2026421,
author = {Fan, Yafu},
title = {Dual-Mating Multi-Objective Conflicts, Parental-Investment Asymmetry and the Pareto Frontier of Partner Selection},
year = {2026},
publisher = {5D Library},
edition = {1.0.0},
note = {DOI pending}
}Other chapter answers in this book
- Chapter 1 · Roles, Not Sexes: Asymmetric Parental Investment, Acceptance Thresholds and Overlapping Effect Sizes
- Chapter 3 · The Collapse of the Feasible Set: The "Impossible Triangle" as a Joint-Threshold Probability
- Chapter 4 · The Pareto Front: Why Weighted Scoring Misses the Part That Bends Inward
- Chapter 5 · Budget Constraints and Stated Preferences: Necessities, Luxuries and a Test of the "Dual-Track" Hypothesis
- Chapter 6 · Bargaining Boundaries and Stable Matching: Outside Options, Threat Points and the Single Rate of "Wanting It All"
- Chapter 7 · Classical Sources East and West: Exit Costs in "Mang", the Multi-Objective Contract of the "Meaning of the Marriage Rite" and Darwin in 1871
- Chapter 8 · Field Tools and Checker Specifications: Calculator, Checkers, Ledger and Preregistered Tests