What does Partner Selection on the Pareto Frontier conclude, in numbers, about “Roles, Not Sexes: Asymmetric Parental Investment, Acceptance Thresholds and Overlapping Effect Sizes”?

Answer: Chapter 1 uses optimal stopping to show that choosiness is a parameter of roles: as fixed investment rises from zero to 4.0, the acceptance threshold rises from 0.8000 to 0.9106, and no sex appears in the formula; at an effect size of d = 1.00 two distributions still overlap by 0.617.

Scope of the numbers: Its populations, traits and parameters are synthetic or illustrative, and all calculations are generated by its programs. Marked boxes separate evidence, hypotheses and classical sources; the book contains 22 programs.

中文版

Data table

The numbers below are printed verbatim by the chapter's Python program and can be reproduced by running it. standard-library Python onlyprinted values that match the answer: 0.8000, 0.9106, 4.0

look cost c = 0.02, shared benefit B = 1.0
F (fixed)r (infinite)E[looks]r (n=12)net value
0.00.80005.000.78640.8000
0.50.83676.120.81460.7551
1.00.85867.070.82960.7172
2.00.88458.660.84530.6536
4.00.910611.180.85840.5528
8.00.933315.000.86750.4000
role with F=4.0 vs F=0.5: thresholds 0.9106 vs 0.8367
swap the F values and the thresholds swap; no sex label enters
Show the full program
# Chapter 1. p11: acceptance threshold rises with fixed investment
# Sequential search without recall (illustrative parameters).
# Candidate fit x ~ Uniform(0, 1). Accepting x pays (B + F) x - F:
# B is the shared benefit, F the fixed investment that is lost in
# proportion to misfit (1 - x). Each further look costs c.
# Infinite horizon: c = (B + F) E[(X - r)+] = (B + F)(1 - r)^2 / 2.
# Finite horizon (n looks): backward induction on a fine grid.
import math

B = 1.0
C = 0.02
GRID = 4000


def reservation(f, b=B, c=C):
    return 1.0 - math.sqrt(2.0 * c / (b + f))


def finite_first_threshold(f, n, b=B, c=C):
    xs = [(i + 0.5) / GRID for i in range(GRID)]
    v = -f  # value of the last look if forced: E[pay] computed below
    v = math.fsum((b + f) * x - f for x in xs) / GRID - c
    for _ in range(n - 1):
        terms = [max((b + f) * x - f, v) for x in xs]
        v = math.fsum(terms) / GRID - c
    # accept the first candidate iff pay >= continuation value v
    return (v + f) / (b + f)


print("look cost c = {:.2f}, shared benefit B = {:.1f}".format(C, B))
print("F (fixed)  r (infinite)  E[looks]  r (n=12)  net value")
for f in (0.0, 0.5, 1.0, 2.0, 4.0, 8.0):
    r = reservation(f)
    looks = 1.0 / (1.0 - r)
    net = (B + f) * (1.0 + r) / 2.0 - f - C * looks
    print("{:8.1f}  {:12.4f}  {:8.2f}  {:8.4f}  {:9.4f}".format(
        f, r, looks, finite_first_threshold(f, 12), net))
lo, hi = reservation(0.5), reservation(4.0)
print("role with F=4.0 vs F=0.5: thresholds {:.4f} vs {:.4f}".format(hi, lo))
print("swap the F values and the thresholds swap; no sex label enters")

Single source and citation

Fan, Y. (2026). Dual-Mating Multi-Objective Conflicts, Parental-Investment Asymmetry and the Pareto Frontier of Partner Selection (Version 1.0.0), Chapter 1: Roles, Not Sexes: Asymmetric Parental Investment, Acceptance Thresholds and Overlapping Effect Sizes. 5D Library. DOI pending

DOI pending · monograph page goes live after publication · 5DL-B-421 · v1.0.0 · CC-BY-NC-ND-4.0

BibTeX
@book{fan2026421,
  author    = {Fan, Yafu},
  title     = {Dual-Mating Multi-Objective Conflicts, Parental-Investment Asymmetry and the Pareto Frontier of Partner Selection},
  year      = {2026},
  publisher = {5D Library},
  edition   = {1.0.0},
  note      = {DOI pending}
}

Other chapter answers in this book