What does Partner Selection on the Pareto Frontier conclude, in numbers, about “Roles, Not Sexes: Asymmetric Parental Investment, Acceptance Thresholds and Overlapping Effect Sizes”?
Answer: Chapter 1 uses optimal stopping to show that choosiness is a parameter of roles: as fixed investment rises from zero to 4.0, the acceptance threshold rises from 0.8000 to 0.9106, and no sex appears in the formula; at an effect size of d = 1.00 two distributions still overlap by 0.617.
Scope of the numbers: Its populations, traits and parameters are synthetic or illustrative, and all calculations are generated by its programs. Marked boxes separate evidence, hypotheses and classical sources; the book contains 22 programs.
Data table
The numbers below are printed verbatim by the chapter's Python program and can be reproduced by running it. standard-library Python onlyprinted values that match the answer: 0.8000, 0.9106, 4.0
| look cost c = 0.02, shared benefit B = 1.0 | ||||
| F (fixed) | r (infinite) | E[looks] | r (n=12) | net value |
| 0.0 | 0.8000 | 5.00 | 0.7864 | 0.8000 |
| 0.5 | 0.8367 | 6.12 | 0.8146 | 0.7551 |
| 1.0 | 0.8586 | 7.07 | 0.8296 | 0.7172 |
| 2.0 | 0.8845 | 8.66 | 0.8453 | 0.6536 |
| 4.0 | 0.9106 | 11.18 | 0.8584 | 0.5528 |
| 8.0 | 0.9333 | 15.00 | 0.8675 | 0.4000 |
| role with F=4.0 vs F=0.5: thresholds 0.9106 vs 0.8367 | ||||
| swap the F values and the thresholds swap; no sex label enters |
Show the full program
# Chapter 1. p11: acceptance threshold rises with fixed investment
# Sequential search without recall (illustrative parameters).
# Candidate fit x ~ Uniform(0, 1). Accepting x pays (B + F) x - F:
# B is the shared benefit, F the fixed investment that is lost in
# proportion to misfit (1 - x). Each further look costs c.
# Infinite horizon: c = (B + F) E[(X - r)+] = (B + F)(1 - r)^2 / 2.
# Finite horizon (n looks): backward induction on a fine grid.
import math
B = 1.0
C = 0.02
GRID = 4000
def reservation(f, b=B, c=C):
return 1.0 - math.sqrt(2.0 * c / (b + f))
def finite_first_threshold(f, n, b=B, c=C):
xs = [(i + 0.5) / GRID for i in range(GRID)]
v = -f # value of the last look if forced: E[pay] computed below
v = math.fsum((b + f) * x - f for x in xs) / GRID - c
for _ in range(n - 1):
terms = [max((b + f) * x - f, v) for x in xs]
v = math.fsum(terms) / GRID - c
# accept the first candidate iff pay >= continuation value v
return (v + f) / (b + f)
print("look cost c = {:.2f}, shared benefit B = {:.1f}".format(C, B))
print("F (fixed) r (infinite) E[looks] r (n=12) net value")
for f in (0.0, 0.5, 1.0, 2.0, 4.0, 8.0):
r = reservation(f)
looks = 1.0 / (1.0 - r)
net = (B + f) * (1.0 + r) / 2.0 - f - C * looks
print("{:8.1f} {:12.4f} {:8.2f} {:8.4f} {:9.4f}".format(
f, r, looks, finite_first_threshold(f, 12), net))
lo, hi = reservation(0.5), reservation(4.0)
print("role with F=4.0 vs F=0.5: thresholds {:.4f} vs {:.4f}".format(hi, lo))
print("swap the F values and the thresholds swap; no sex label enters")Single source and citation
Fan, Y. (2026). Dual-Mating Multi-Objective Conflicts, Parental-Investment Asymmetry and the Pareto Frontier of Partner Selection (Version 1.0.0), Chapter 1: Roles, Not Sexes: Asymmetric Parental Investment, Acceptance Thresholds and Overlapping Effect Sizes. 5D Library. DOI pending
DOI pending · monograph page goes live after publication · 5DL-B-421 · v1.0.0 · CC-BY-NC-ND-4.0
BibTeX
@book{fan2026421,
author = {Fan, Yafu},
title = {Dual-Mating Multi-Objective Conflicts, Parental-Investment Asymmetry and the Pareto Frontier of Partner Selection},
year = {2026},
publisher = {5D Library},
edition = {1.0.0},
note = {DOI pending}
}Other chapter answers in this book
- Chapter 2 · Berkson Selection: Where the Observed Trade-off Comes From
- Chapter 3 · The Collapse of the Feasible Set: The "Impossible Triangle" as a Joint-Threshold Probability
- Chapter 4 · The Pareto Front: Why Weighted Scoring Misses the Part That Bends Inward
- Chapter 5 · Budget Constraints and Stated Preferences: Necessities, Luxuries and a Test of the "Dual-Track" Hypothesis
- Chapter 6 · Bargaining Boundaries and Stable Matching: Outside Options, Threat Points and the Single Rate of "Wanting It All"
- Chapter 7 · Classical Sources East and West: Exit Costs in "Mang", the Multi-Objective Contract of the "Meaning of the Marriage Rite" and Darwin in 1871
- Chapter 8 · Field Tools and Checker Specifications: Calculator, Checkers, Ledger and Preregistered Tests