What does Braess's Paradox and the Price of Anarchy conclude, in numbers, about “Practice and a Pre-Registered Trial”?
Answer: The sample size is therefore based on much more conservative assumptions: 60 % of control groups trapped and 30 % of arm A groups, two-sided \(\alpha = 0.05\), 90 % power. Each arm needs 56 analysable groups; allowing about 10 % of groups to be incomplete because someone drops out, each arm recruits 63 groups, that is, 378 people per arm and 756 in all; the simulated power is 0.89. If the true difference is only 25 percentage points (60 % against 35 %), each arm needs 82 groups. These parameters are assumptions and should be checked against pilot data before the trial is run.
Scope of the numbers: The models of traffic pools and recommender algorithms are schematic and describe no real platform; the book is not investment, business or marketing advice. Marked boxes separate published evidence, runnable Python calculations (16 programs, all checked), classical sources and the author's hypotheses.
Data table
The numbers below are printed verbatim by the chapter's Python program and can be reproduced by running it. standard-library Python onlyprinted values that match the answer: 0.89, 10, 378, 56, 63, 756
| bots, route times only | : trapped 77%; bridge share in rounds 31-40 87% |
| bots, plus externality points | : trapped 0%; bridge share in rounds 31-40 21% |
| bots, points, half the bots ignore them: trapped 4%; bridge share in rounds 31-40 50% | |
| assumed share trapped: control -> treatment | analysable GROUPS per arm (90 % power) |
| 0.60 -> 0.30 | 56 |
| 0.60 -> 0.35 | 82 |
| 0.70 -> 0.40 | 56 |
| 0.50 -> 0.25 | 77 |
| chosen 0.60 -> 0.30: 56 groups per arm; allowing 10 % incomplete groups, recruit | |
| 63 groups per arm = 378 participants per arm, 756 in all | |
| simulation check of power with 56 groups per arm: 0.89 |
Show the full program
# Chapter 8 trial. Part 1: the 6-player Braess game of Chapter 3 (links s->v and w->t
# cost 10 per user, v->t and s->w cost 70, bridge v->w 0) played for 40 rounds by simple
# learning BOTS: a MODEL of the hypothesis, not data about people. Control bots see
# every route's time and minimise time; treatment bots also pay congestion points equal
# to the delay they add to others, (n_e - 1) x 10 on each congested link. Primary
# outcome per group: TRAPPED = in at least 8 of rounds 31-40, five or six players took
# the bridge route. Part 2: sample size.
import math, random
from statistics import NormalDist
rng = random.Random(15)
ROUTES = {"U": ("sv", "vt"), "L": ("sw", "wt"), "Z": ("sv", "vw", "wt")}
COST = {"sv": lambda n: 10 * n, "vt": lambda n: 70, "sw": lambda n: 70,
"wt": lambda n: 10 * n, "vw": lambda n: 0}
def route_cost(others, r, points):
"""Cost of route r for a player when the other five chose 'others'."""
n = {e: sum(e in ROUTES[o] for o in others) + (e in ROUTES[r]) for e in COST}
t = sum(COST[e](n[e]) for e in ROUTES[r])
if points: t += sum((n[e] - 1) * 10 for e in ROUTES[r] if e in ("sv", "wt"))
return t
def group(points, heed=1.0, rounds=40, beta=0.2, phi=0.7):
att = [{r: -100.0 + rng.gauss(0, 10) for r in ROUTES} for _ in range(6)]
uses = [points and rng.random() < heed for _ in range(6)] # bots counting points
trap, late = 0, 0
for t in range(rounds):
ch = []
for a in att:
w = {r: math.exp(beta * (a[r] - max(a.values()))) for r in ROUTES}
u, acc = rng.random() * sum(w.values()), 0.0
for r in ROUTES:
acc += w[r]
if u <= acc: ch.append(r); break
for i, a in enumerate(att): # learn from all routes' costs this round
others = ch[:i] + ch[i + 1:]
for r in ROUTES:
a[r] = phi * a[r] - (1 - phi) * route_cost(others, r, uses[i])
if t >= rounds - 10:
trap += ch.count("Z") >= 5; late += ch.count("Z")
return trap >= 8, late / 60
for pts, heed, lab in ((False, 1, "route times only"),
(True, 1, "plus externality points"),
(True, 0.5, "points, half the bots ignore them")):
res = [group(pts, heed) for _ in range(1000)]
print(f"bots, {lab:33s}: trapped {sum(r[0] for r in res) / 1000:.0%};"
f" bridge share in rounds 31-40 {sum(r[1] for r in res) / 1000:.0%}")
def n_per_arm(p1, p2, alpha=0.05, power=0.90):
z = NormalDist().inv_cdf; pb = (p1 + p2) / 2
num = (z(1 - alpha / 2) * math.sqrt(2 * pb * (1 - pb))
+ z(power) * math.sqrt(p1 * (1 - p1) + p2 * (1 - p2)))
return math.ceil(num ** 2 / (p1 - p2) ** 2)
print("assumed share trapped: control -> treatment"
" analysable GROUPS per arm (90 % power)")
for p1, p2 in ((0.60, 0.30), (0.60, 0.35), (0.70, 0.40), (0.50, 0.25)):
print(f" {p1:.2f} -> {p2:.2f} {n_per_arm(p1, p2)}")
n = n_per_arm(0.60, 0.30); rec = math.ceil(n / 0.9)
print(f"chosen 0.60 -> 0.30: {n} groups per arm; allowing 10 % incomplete groups,"
" recruit")
print(f" {rec} groups per arm = {6 * rec} participants per arm, {12 * rec} in all")
hits = 0
for _ in range(4000):
a = sum(rng.random() < 0.60 for _ in range(n))
b = sum(rng.random() < 0.30 for _ in range(n))
pa, pb = a / n, b / n; pp = (a + b) / (2 * n)
hits += abs(pa - pb) / math.sqrt(pp * (1 - pp) * 2 / n) > 1.96
print(f"simulation check of power with {n} groups per arm: {hits / 4000:.2f}")Single source and citation
Fan, Y. (2026). Algorithmic Game Theory, Braess's Paradox and the Price of Anarchy in Traffic and Attention Networks (Version 1.0.0), Chapter 8: Practice and a Pre-Registered Trial. 5D Library. https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.23782094
DOI: 10.5281/zenodo.23782094 · Read the monograph · 5DL-B-032 · v1.0.0 · CC-BY-NC-ND-4.0
BibTeX
@book{fan2026032,
author = {Fan, Yafu},
title = {Algorithmic Game Theory, Braess's Paradox and the Price of Anarchy in Traffic and Attention Networks},
year = {2026},
publisher = {5D Library},
edition = {1.0.0},
doi = {10.5281/zenodo.23782094},
url = {https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.23782094}
}Other chapter answers in this book
- Chapter 1 · Braess's Paradox: One More Road, Everyone Slower
- Chapter 2 · The Price of Anarchy: How Much Can Selfishness Cost?
- Chapter 3 · Pigouvian Tolls and Potential Games: Pricing the Unseen Delay
- Chapter 4 · Congestion in Attention: Hot Niches, Hotelling and a Digital Braess Paradox
- Chapter 5 · Exploration and Exploitation: Bandits, the Matthew Effect and Traffic Pools in Recommendation
- Chapter 6 · Stable Matching: Deferred Acceptance, Early Contracting and Telling the Truth