What does Braess's Paradox and the Price of Anarchy conclude, in numbers, about “Braess's Paradox: One More Road, Everyone Slower”?
Answer: The user equilibrium requires all used routes to be equally fast; the system optimum requires total cost to be as low as possible; the two differ by the marginal delay each person adds for others. In Braess's diamond network a zero-delay shortcut, weakly dominant for each person, raises everyone's travel time from 1.5 to 2.0, while the optimum ignores it; the paradox appears only in a range of demand. The same conditions describe springs and strings and direct-current circuits. The next chapter asks how much worse than the optimum selfish choices can be.
Scope of the numbers: The models of traffic pools and recommender algorithms are schematic and describe no real platform; the book is not investment, business or marketing advice. Marked boxes separate published evidence, runnable Python calculations (16 programs, all checked), classical sources and the author's hypotheses.
Data table
The numbers below are printed verbatim by the chapter's Python program and can be reproduced by running it.
| no shortcut, UE path flows 0.500 0.500 average time 1.500 | |
| shortcut, UE path flows 0.000 0.000 1.000 average time 2.000 | |
| shortcut, SO path flows 0.500 0.500 0.000 average time 1.500 | |
| shortcut never worse in 441 of 441 load pairs; strictly better in 400 | |
| (ties only when x_sv | 1 or x_wt = 1) |
| demand no shortcut shortcut (UE) shortcut (SO) | |
| 0.500 | 1.250 1.000 1.000 |
| 0.667 | 1.333 1.333 1.250 |
| 1.000 | 1.500 2.000 1.500 |
| 1.500 | 1.750 2.000 1.750 |
| 2.000 | 2.000 2.000 2.000 |
| 2.500 | 2.250 2.250 2.250 |
| classic example, demand 6 | 83.0 -> 92.0 |
| the added link hurts for demand between 2.58 and 8.89 |
Show the full program
# Wardrop user equilibrium (UE) versus system optimum (SO) on Braess networks.
# Path-based equilibration: repeatedly shift flow from the costliest used path to the
# cheapest path until their costs are equal. Edge latency c(x) = b + a x^d; for SO the
# "cost" is the marginal cost c(x) + x c'(x) = b + (d + 1) a x^d. Nonatomic users: each
# is an infinitesimal share of flow.
def lat(e, x, marginal=False):
a, b, d = e
return b + (d + 1 if marginal else 1) * a * x ** d
def path_costs(net, paths, f, marginal=False):
load = {k: 0.0 for k in net}
for p, q in zip(paths, f):
for k in p: load[k] += q
return [sum(lat(net[k], load[k], marginal) for k in p) for p in paths], load
def solve(net, paths, demand, marginal=False, iters=4000):
f = [demand / len(paths)] * len(paths)
for _ in range(iters):
c, _ = path_costs(net, paths, f, marginal)
used = [i for i in range(len(paths)) if f[i] > 1e-13]
hi, lo = max(used, key=lambda i: c[i]), min(range(len(paths)), key=lambda i: c[i])
if c[hi] - c[lo] < 1e-11: break
s, t = 0.0, f[hi] # bisection on the amount shifted
for _ in range(60):
m = (s + t) / 2; g = f[:]; g[hi] -= m; g[lo] += m
cc, _ = path_costs(net, paths, g, marginal)
if cc[hi] > cc[lo]: s = m
else: t = m
f[hi] -= s; f[lo] += s
return f
def total(net, paths, f):
c, _ = path_costs(net, paths, f)
return sum(q * x for q, x in zip(f, c))
# Simplified Braess network: s->v (x), v->t (1), s->w (1), w->t (x); shortcut v->w (0).
NET = {"sv": (1, 0, 1), "vt": (0, 1, 1), "sw": (0, 1, 1), "wt": (1, 0, 1),
"vw": (0, 0, 1)}
TWO = [("sv", "vt"), ("sw", "wt")]
THREE = TWO + [("sv", "vw", "wt")]
def avg_cost(net, paths, d, marginal=False):
return total(net, paths, solve(net, paths, d, marginal)) / d
if __name__ == "__main__":
for lab, ps, m in (("no shortcut, UE", TWO, False), ("shortcut, UE", THREE, False),
("shortcut, SO", THREE, True)):
f = solve(NET, ps, 1.0, m)
print(f"{lab:16s} path flows " + " ".join(f"{q:.3f}" for q in f)
+ f" average time {total(NET, ps, f):.3f}")
grid = [(u / 20, w / 20) for u in range(21) for w in range(21)] # loads x_sv, x_wt
adv = [min(1 + w, 1 + u) - (u + w) for u, w in grid] # best other route - shortcut
print(f"shortcut never worse in {sum(a >= 0 for a in adv)} of {len(adv)} load pairs; "
f"strictly better in {sum(a > 0 for a in adv)}"
"\n (ties only when x_sv = 1 or x_wt = 1)")
print("demand no shortcut shortcut (UE) shortcut (SO)")
for d in (0.5, 2 / 3, 1.0, 1.5, 2.0, 2.5):
a, b, c = (avg_cost(NET, TWO, d), avg_cost(NET, THREE, d),
avg_cost(NET, THREE, d, True))
print(f" {d:5.3f} {a:6.3f} {b:6.3f} {c:6.3f}")
# Braess's own 1968 example (10x, x + 50, new link x + 10): demand 6, time 83 -> 92.
BIG = {"a": (10, 0, 1), "b": (1, 50, 1), "c": (1, 50, 1), "d": (10, 0, 1),
"e": (1, 10, 1)}
P2, P3 = [("a", "c"), ("b", "d")], [("a", "c"), ("b", "d"), ("a", "e", "d")]
print(f"classic example, demand 6: {avg_cost(BIG, P2, 6):.1f} -> "
f"{avg_cost(BIG, P3, 6):.1f}")
hurt = lambda d: avg_cost(BIG, P3, d) - avg_cost(BIG, P2, d) > 1e-7
def edge(lo, hi): # bisection for where "hurt" switches
for _ in range(30):
m = (lo + hi) / 2
if hurt(m) == hurt(lo): lo = m
else: hi = m
return (lo + hi) / 2
print(f" the added link hurts for demand between {edge(1, 6):.2f} and "
f"{edge(6, 12):.2f}")Single source and citation
Fan, Y. (2026). Algorithmic Game Theory, Braess's Paradox and the Price of Anarchy in Traffic and Attention Networks (Version 1.0.0), Chapter 1: Braess's Paradox: One More Road, Everyone Slower. 5D Library. https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.23782094
DOI: 10.5281/zenodo.23782094 · Read the monograph · 5DL-B-032 · v1.0.0 · CC-BY-NC-ND-4.0
BibTeX
@book{fan2026032,
author = {Fan, Yafu},
title = {Algorithmic Game Theory, Braess's Paradox and the Price of Anarchy in Traffic and Attention Networks},
year = {2026},
publisher = {5D Library},
edition = {1.0.0},
doi = {10.5281/zenodo.23782094},
url = {https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.23782094}
}Other chapter answers in this book
- Chapter 2 · The Price of Anarchy: How Much Can Selfishness Cost?
- Chapter 3 · Pigouvian Tolls and Potential Games: Pricing the Unseen Delay
- Chapter 4 · Congestion in Attention: Hot Niches, Hotelling and a Digital Braess Paradox
- Chapter 5 · Exploration and Exploitation: Bandits, the Matthew Effect and Traffic Pools in Recommendation
- Chapter 6 · Stable Matching: Deferred Acceptance, Early Contracting and Telling the Truth
- Chapter 8 · Practice and a Pre-Registered Trial