What does Braess's Paradox and the Price of Anarchy conclude, in numbers, about “Congestion in Attention: Hot Niches, Hotelling and a Digital Braess Paradox”?
Answer: Hotelling's linear city predicts clustering when prices are fixed, but under price competition the sellers move apart, because moving towards a rival only invites a price war. In the niche congestion game the equilibrium crowds too many sellers into the hot niche, about 4 % below the optimal total; entering the hot niche imposes twice the loss on others as entering an edge niche, and charging that loss makes the equilibrium optimal. A "digital Braess paradox" requires two linked congestible stages and is an analogy awaiting test. The next chapter turns to how recommender systems allocate exposure.
Scope of the numbers: The models of traffic pools and recommender algorithms are schematic and describe no real platform; the book is not investment, business or marketing advice. Marked boxes separate published evidence, runnable Python calculations (16 programs, all checked), classical sources and the author's hypotheses.
Data table
The numbers below are printed verbatim by the chapter's Python program and can be reproduced by running it. standard-library Python only
| fixed prices, two sellers: best replies end at 0.50 and 0.50 | |
| fixed prices, three sellers on an 11-point grid | 0 location equilibria |
| linear cost, sellers at a and 1 - a: undercutting profit (vs 0.50), equilibrium? | |
| a | 0.00: 0.00 yes a = 0.10: 0.20 yes a = 0.20: 0.40 yes |
| a | 0.25: 0.50 yes a = 0.30: 0.60 no a = 0.40: 0.80 no |
| quadratic cost, sellers at a and 1 - a: a price profit formula (1 - 2a)/2 | |
| 0.00 | 1.000 0.500 0.500 |
| 0.10 | 0.800 0.400 0.400 |
| 0.20 | 0.600 0.300 0.300 |
| 0.30 | 0.400 0.200 0.200 |
| 0.40 | 0.200 0.100 0.100 |
| 0.45 | 0.100 0.050 0.050 |
| seller 2 at 0.70; seller 1's equilibrium profit by its location: | |
| 0.0 | 0.283, 0.1: 0.261, 0.2: 0.234, 0.3: 0.200, 0.4: 0.160, 0.5: 0.114, 0.6: 0.060 |
Show the full program
# Hotelling's line and its correction. Consumers spread uniformly on [0, 1] buy one unit
# from the seller with the lowest price + travel cost. (1) Fixed, equal prices: sellers
# choose locations only. (2) Linear travel cost t|d| with price competition: Hotelling's
# candidate prices fail when sellers are close (d'Aspremont, Gabszewicz & Thisse 1979).
# (3) Quadratic travel cost t d^2: price equilibria exist for all locations, and sellers
# move APART. t = 1 throughout.
import itertools
G = [i / 20 for i in range(21)] # grid of locations
def shares_fixed(locs): # equal prices: buyers go to the nearest seller
pts = sorted(set(locs)); cut = [0] + [(u + v) / 2 for u, v in zip(pts, pts[1:])] + [1]
turf = {x: cut[k + 1] - cut[k] for k, x in enumerate(pts)}
return [turf[x] / locs.count(x) for x in locs]
a, b = 0.1, 0.9
for _ in range(20): # two sellers take turns to best-respond
a = max(G, key=lambda x: (shares_fixed([x, b])[0], -abs(x - a)))
b = max(G, key=lambda x: (shares_fixed([a, x])[1], -abs(x - b)))
print(f"fixed prices, two sellers: best replies end at {a:.2f} and {b:.2f}")
G3 = [i / 10 for i in range(11)]
ne = 0
for locs in itertools.combinations_with_replacement(G3, 3):
s = shares_fixed(list(locs))
dev = lambda i, x: shares_fixed(list(locs[:i]) + [x] + list(locs[i + 1:]))[i]
if all(s[i] >= max(dev(i, x) for x in G3) - 1e-9 for i in range(3)):
ne += 1
print(f"fixed prices, three sellers on an 11-point grid: {ne} location equilibria")
# Linear cost, sellers at a and 1 - a: Hotelling's prices are 1 each (profit 0.5);
# undercutting to the rival's price minus the travel cost between them, 1 - (1 - 2a),
# takes the whole market.
print("linear cost, sellers at a and 1 - a: undercutting profit (vs 0.50), equilibrium?")
for row in ((0.0, 0.1, 0.2), (0.25, 0.3, 0.4)):
print(" " + " ".join(f"a = {a:.2f}: {2 * a:.2f} {'yes' if 2 * a <= 0.5 else 'no'}"
for a in row))
def demand1(p1, p2, x1, x2): # quadratic cost, x1 < x2
y = (p2 - p1 + x2 * x2 - x1 * x1) / (2 * (x2 - x1))
return min(1.0, max(0.0, y))
def best_price(p_other, x1, x2, first=True):
lo, hi = 0.0, 3.0
f = (lambda p: p * demand1(p, p_other, x1, x2)) if first else \
(lambda p: p * (1 - demand1(p_other, p, x1, x2)))
for _ in range(100): # golden-section search
m1, m2 = lo + (hi - lo) * 0.382, lo + (hi - lo) * 0.618
if f(m1) < f(m2): lo = m1
else: hi = m2
return (lo + hi) / 2
def equilibrium(x1, x2):
p1 = p2 = 0.5
for _ in range(200):
p1 = best_price(p2, x1, x2); p2 = best_price(p1, x1, x2, first=False)
d = demand1(p1, p2, x1, x2)
return p1, p2, p1 * d, p2 * (1 - d)
print("quadratic cost, sellers at a and 1 - a: a price profit formula (1 - 2a)/2")
for a in (0.0, 0.1, 0.2, 0.3, 0.4, 0.45):
p1, _, f1, _ = equilibrium(a, 1 - a)
print(f"{'':40s}{a:.2f} {p1:.3f} {f1:.3f} {(1 - 2 * a) / 2:.3f}")
prof = [(x, equilibrium(x, 0.7)[2]) for x in (0.0, 0.1, 0.2, 0.3, 0.4, 0.5, 0.6)]
print("seller 2 at 0.70; seller 1's equilibrium profit by its location:")
print(" " + ", ".join(f"{x:.1f}: {f:.3f}" for x, f in prof))Single source and citation
Fan, Y. (2026). Algorithmic Game Theory, Braess's Paradox and the Price of Anarchy in Traffic and Attention Networks (Version 1.0.0), Chapter 4: Congestion in Attention: Hot Niches, Hotelling and a Digital Braess Paradox. 5D Library. https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.23782094
DOI: 10.5281/zenodo.23782094 · Read the monograph · 5DL-B-032 · v1.0.0 · CC-BY-NC-ND-4.0
BibTeX
@book{fan2026032,
author = {Fan, Yafu},
title = {Algorithmic Game Theory, Braess's Paradox and the Price of Anarchy in Traffic and Attention Networks},
year = {2026},
publisher = {5D Library},
edition = {1.0.0},
doi = {10.5281/zenodo.23782094},
url = {https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.23782094}
}Other chapter answers in this book
- Chapter 1 · Braess's Paradox: One More Road, Everyone Slower
- Chapter 2 · The Price of Anarchy: How Much Can Selfishness Cost?
- Chapter 3 · Pigouvian Tolls and Potential Games: Pricing the Unseen Delay
- Chapter 5 · Exploration and Exploitation: Bandits, the Matthew Effect and Traffic Pools in Recommendation
- Chapter 6 · Stable Matching: Deferred Acceptance, Early Contracting and Telling the Truth
- Chapter 8 · Practice and a Pre-Registered Trial