5D Library › Enterprise Bottleneck Diagnostics, SKU Cannibalization Audits and Automation Return Bounds · 中文
Chapter 6. Paying for Results: Stepped Shares, Attitudes to Risk and Measuring the Baseline
Linear, stepped or flat
Contracts that pay for results (value-based pricing) come in three common forms: a linear share; a stepped share paid only above a threshold; and a flat fee unrelated to results. They mean different things to the consultant: expected pay, the variability of that pay, and the marginal incentive (how much more pay for one more unit of expected gain).
Calculation
# Chapter 6. p11: Linear share, stepped share or a flat fee, when the
# measured monthly gain M is normal with mean 86.3 and sd 40 (RM 1k).
# linear : 8.1 + 0.214 * M
# stepped: 8.1 + 0.35 * max(M - 60, 0)
# flat : 26.6 (same expected pay as the linear contract)
# For a normal X, E[max(X - T, 0)] = (mu - T) Phi(d) + sd phi(d),
# d = (mu - T) / sd. Reported: expected pay, its sd, the incentive (pay
# per extra RM 1 of mean gain), and what a riskier plan (sd 60) is worth.
from math import erf, exp, pi, sqrt
def Phi(x):
return 0.5 * (1 + erf(x / sqrt(2)))
def phi(x):
return exp(-x * x / 2) / sqrt(2 * pi)
def call(mu, sd, t):
d = (mu - t) / sd
return (mu - t) * Phi(d) + sd * phi(d)
def call2(mu, sd, t):
"""E[max(X - T, 0)^2] for the variance of the stepped pay."""
d = (mu - t) / sd
m = mu - t
return (m * m + sd * sd) * Phi(d) + m * sd * phi(d)
def stats(kind, mu, sd):
if kind == "linear":
return 8.1 + 0.214 * mu, 0.214 * sd, 0.214
if kind == "stepped":
e1 = call(mu, sd, 60.0)
v = 0.35 ** 2 * (call2(mu, sd, 60.0) - e1 * e1)
return 8.1 + 0.35 * e1, sqrt(v), 0.35 * Phi((mu - 60.0) / sd)
return 26.6, 0.0, 0.0
if __name__ == "__main__":
print(" contract E[pay] sd(pay) incentive E[pay] if sd = 60")
for k in ("linear", "stepped", "flat"):
e, s, slope = stats(k, 86.3, 40.0)
e60 = stats(k, 86.3, 60.0)[0]
print(" {:<8} {:6.1f} {:7.1f} {:9.3f} {:6.1f} ({:+.1f})".format(
k, e, s, slope, e60, e60 - e))
for mu in (40.0, 60.0, 120.0):
print(" stepped incentive at mean gain {:.0f}: {:.3f}".format(
mu, stats("stepped", mu, 40.0)[2]))
# contract E[pay] sd(pay) incentive E[pay] if sd = 60
# linear 26.6 8.6 0.214 26.6 (+0.0)
# stepped 19.5 11.0 0.261 21.9 (+2.4)
# flat 26.6 0.0 0.000 26.6 (+0.0)
# stepped incentive at mean gain 40: 0.108
# stepped incentive at mean gain 60: 0.175
# stepped incentive at mean gain 120: 0.327With the parameters of Chapter 5 (monthly gain with mean 86.3 and standard deviation 40, in RM thousand): the linear contract has expected pay 26.6, standard deviation 8.6 and marginal incentive 0.214; the stepped contract has expected pay of only 19.5 but a standard deviation of 11.0 and a marginal incentive of 0.261; the flat fee of 26.6 has neither variability nor incentive.
The stepped contract has two side effects. First, it is convex, so it rewards variability: if the consultant picks a riskier plan that raises the standard deviation of the gain from 40 to 60 with the mean unchanged, the stepped contract’s expected pay rises from 19.5 to 21.9 (+2.4), while the linear contract’s does not change. Second, its incentive changes as the project goes: with the mean well below the threshold (40), the marginal incentive is only 0.108; at a mean of 60 it is 0.175; at 120, 0.327. Once a project looks unlikely to clear the threshold, the consultant’s incentive all but vanishes.
Note
Convex contracts reward risk-taking. If the client does not want the consultant to choose high-risk plans to clear a threshold (say, delisting many SKUs at once), a linear share is safer than a stepped one.
How to measure the gain: baseline, control and months of observation
Sharing presupposes that the gain can be measured. Monthly gross profit is noisy; comparing months before and after the change, the standard error of the estimated gain is . If a control can be found (another product line, another shop) whose monthly noise has correlation with the client’s, a difference in differences cuts the effective noise to .
Calculation
# Chapter 6. p12: How long must the gain be measured before it can be
# paid on? Monthly gross profit has noise sd 40 (RM 1k). Comparing m
# months after with m months before gives SE = sd_eff * sqrt(2 / m); a
# comparison shop or product line whose monthly noise correlates rho with
# the client's (difference in differences) cuts sd_eff to
# sd * sqrt(2 (1 - rho)). Power 0.80 at two-sided alpha 0.05 needs
# effect / SE >= 1.96 + 0.84.
from math import ceil, sqrt
SD, Z = 40.0, 1.96 + 0.84
def sd_eff(rho):
return SD if rho is None else SD * sqrt(2 * (1 - rho))
def months(effect, rho):
return ceil(2 * (Z * sd_eff(rho) / effect) ** 2)
def mde(m, rho):
return Z * sd_eff(rho) * sqrt(2 / m)
if __name__ == "__main__":
print(" comparison months each side to detect RM 30k / 60k;"
" MDE at 6")
for label, rho in (("before-after only", None), ("control rho 0.5", 0.5),
("control rho 0.8", 0.8), ("control rho 0.9", 0.9)):
print(" {:<17} {:5d} / {:3d} RM {:5.1f}k".format(
label, months(30.0, rho), months(60.0, rho), mde(6, rho)))
# comparison months each side to detect RM 30k / 60k; MDE at 6
# before-after only 28 / 7 RM 64.7k
# control rho 0.5 28 / 7 RM 64.7k
# control rho 0.8 12 / 3 RM 40.9k
# control rho 0.9 6 / 2 RM 28.9kWith a monthly noise standard deviation of 40 and a simple before-and-after comparison, detecting a gain of RM 30k a month with 80% power needs 28 months on each side; RM 60k needs 7; with 6 months on each side the minimum detectable gain is RM 64.7k. A control with a correlation of only 0.5 does not help at all (the result is the same as before and after alone); at a correlation of 0.8, RM 30k needs only 12 months and the minimum detectable gain at 6 months is RM 40.9k; at 0.9, 6 months suffice, with a minimum detectable gain of RM 28.9k.
Hypothesis · not established
The author’s hypothesis (not yet tested): sharing contracts that measure the gain by difference in differences against a control product line or shop lead to fewer settlement disputes than contracts that compare before and after only. What would show it wrong: the share of clients who dispute the settlement amount does not differ between the two kinds of contract.
Summary
A linear share gives a steady incentive; a stepped share gives its strongest incentive near the threshold, almost none below it, and rewards risk-taking. Before sharing, the gain must be measured well: a before-and-after comparison often needs more than two years, and only a control with a correlation above 0.5 really shortens the measurement period.
Fan, Y. (2026). Enterprise Bottleneck Diagnostics, SKU Cannibalization Audits and Automation Return Bounds: Theory-of-Constraints Queueing Networks, Margin Dilution Matrices and Value-Based Advisory Pricing [企业瓶颈诊断、产品线自蚕食审计与自动化改造回报边界] (Version 1.0.0). 5D Library. https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.24090217 · Licensed under Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International (CC BY-NC-ND 4.0).