5D Library › Enterprise Bottleneck Diagnostics, SKU Cannibalization Audits and Automation Return Bounds · 中文
Chapter 5. A Fixed Base Fee plus a Share of the Gain: Contracts under Double Moral Hazard
Why share the gain, and why not all of it
An outside architecture consultant who diagnoses a company’s bottlenecks and restructures its product line is often paid “a fixed base fee plus a share of the incremental profit”. The share gives the consultant a reason to deliver a real improvement; but whether the improvement lands also depends on the company’s own effort in carrying it out. Either side may shirk, and because the result is masked by noise, neither can prove that the other did: this is double moral hazard (Bhattacharyya and Lafontaine 1995).
Let the monthly incremental gross profit (RM thousand) be , where is the consultant’s effort and the company’s own implementation effort, each costing , and the noise has standard deviation . The consultant is risk averse (absolute risk aversion ) and is paid . The consultant chooses , the company . With a linear contract and normal noise (Holmström and Milgrom 1987), the share that maximises the sum of the two certainty equivalents is
The share trades off three things: the effect of the consultant’s effort , the effect of the company’s effort , and the risk the noise imposes on the consultant, .
Calculation
# Chapter 5. p09: Fixed base fee plus a share beta of the measured gain,
# with moral hazard on BOTH sides (Bhattacharyya-Lafontaine). Monthly
# gain G = a*e_c + b*e_f + noise (RM thousand), noise sd sigma; the
# consultant's effort e_c and the client's own implementation effort e_f
# each cost e^2/2; the consultant is risk averse (CARA, r per RM 1k).
# The consultant picks e_c = beta*a, the client e_f = (1 - beta)*b, and
# the joint certainty-equivalent surplus is maximised at
# beta* = a^2 / (a^2 + b^2 + r*sigma^2).
# The base fee F then gives the consultant a certainty equivalent of 25.
A, B, R, CE = 6.0, 10.0, 0.02, 25.0
def surplus(beta, sigma):
ec, ef = beta * A, (1 - beta) * B
return A * ec + B * ef - ec ** 2 / 2 - ef ** 2 / 2 \
- R * beta ** 2 * sigma ** 2 / 2
def base_fee(beta, sigma):
ec, ef = beta * A, (1 - beta) * B
gain = A * ec + B * ef
return CE - beta * gain + ec ** 2 / 2 + R * beta ** 2 * sigma ** 2 / 2
def best(sigma):
return A ** 2 / (A ** 2 + B ** 2 + R * sigma ** 2)
if __name__ == "__main__":
print(" noise sd beta* surplus at: beta* 0.20 0.50 fee only")
for sigma in (10.0, 40.0, 80.0):
b = best(sigma)
print(" {:7.0f} {:6.3f} {:16.1f} {:5.1f} {:5.1f} {:7.1f}"
.format(sigma, b, surplus(b, sigma), surplus(0.2, sigma),
surplus(0.5, sigma), surplus(0.0, sigma)))
s = 40.0
b = best(s)
print(" at sigma 40: base fee RM {:.1f}k + {:.1%} of gain;".format(
base_fee(b, s), b))
print(" expected gain RM {:.1f}k/month, client keeps RM {:.1f}k".format(
A * b * A + B * (1 - b) * B,
A * b * A + B * (1 - b) * B - base_fee(b, s)
- b * (A * b * A + B * (1 - b) * B) - ((1 - b) * B) ** 2 / 2))
# noise sd beta* surplus at: beta* 0.20 0.50 fee only
# 10 0.261 54.7 54.4 50.8 50.0
# 40 0.214 53.9 53.8 47.0 50.0
# 80 0.136 52.5 51.9 35.0 50.0
# at sigma 40: base fee RM 8.1k + 21.4% of gain;
# expected gain RM 86.3k/month, client keeps RM 28.9kWith illustrative parameters (consultant effect 6, company effect 10, risk aversion 0.02) and a noise standard deviation of 40, the best share is 0.214, with a joint surplus of 53.9; at a share of 0.50 the surplus falls to 47.0, and with a fixed fee only it is 50.0. With noise of 80 the best share falls to 0.136; with noise of 10 it rises to 0.261. At noise 40 the base fee is about RM 8.1k plus 21.4% of the incremental gross profit; the expected gain is RM 86.3k a month, and after the consultant’s fees and its own effort the company keeps RM 28.9k a month.
Note
Too high a share hurts the company’s own effort. At a share of 0.50 the joint surplus is below that of a fixed fee alone, because a company that knows half of the improvement must be handed over puts less into carrying it out. In projects where the company’s execution matters more, the consultant’s share should be lower.
Hiding the gain: audit probability and penalties
The other risk in a sharing contract is that the company under-reports the gain: each it hides saves in fees. If an audit happens with probability , and a shortfall found must be paid with a further penalty of times, hiding pays only when (Becker 1968). Verification is costly, so audits should be triggered by a rule rather than run every month (Townsend 1979).
Calculation
# Chapter 5. p10: Keeping the client honest about the measured gain.
# A client that under-reports the gain by d saves beta*d of fees. If an
# audit happens with probability q and a found shortfall costs the fee
# owed plus a penalty k times it, hiding pays only when q < 1 / (1 + k).
# Trigger rule: audit when the reported gain falls more than z noise sd
# below the agreed forecast. Monthly gain sd is RM 40k; hiding 30% of an
# expected RM 86.3k gain is RM 25.9k. Summing 12 months shrinks the noise
# by sqrt(12) while a steady shortfall grows twelvefold.
from math import erf, sqrt
def phi(x):
return 0.5 * (1 + erf(x / sqrt(2)))
SD, HIDE = 40.0, 0.30 * 86.3
if __name__ == "__main__":
print(" penalty k audit probability needed 1/(1+k)")
for k in (0.0, 1.0, 2.0, 3.0):
print(" {:9.0f} {:.3f}".format(k, 1 / (1 + k)))
print(" trigger z honest audited cheat audited (monthly)"
" (annual)")
for z in (0.5, 1.0, 1.5, 2.0):
fa = phi(-z)
dm = phi(-z + HIDE / SD)
da = phi(-z + 12 * HIDE / (SD * sqrt(12)))
print(" {:9.1f} {:14.3f} {:13.3f} {:16.3f}".format(
z, fa, dm, da))
print(" hidden shortfall = {:.2f} monthly sd, {:.2f} annual sd".format(
HIDE / SD, 12 * HIDE / (SD * sqrt(12))))
# penalty k audit probability needed 1/(1+k)
# 0 1.000
# 1 0.500
# 2 0.333
# 3 0.250
# trigger z honest audited cheat audited (monthly) (annual)
# 0.5 0.309 0.559 0.959
# 1.0 0.159 0.362 0.893
# 1.5 0.067 0.197 0.771
# 2.0 0.023 0.088 0.596
# hidden shortfall = 0.65 monthly sd, 2.24 annual sdWith a penalty of one times, the audit probability needed is 0.500; with three times, 0.250. Suppose the rule is “audit when the reported gain falls more than standard deviations below the agreed forecast”. The monthly noise in the gain has a standard deviation of RM 40k, and hiding 30% of the gain is only 0.65 monthly standard deviations. At an honest company is audited in a month with probability 0.159, and a hiding one only with 0.362: not enough to deter. Reconciled on annual totals instead, the hidden amount is 2.24 annual standard deviations, and under the same rule a hiding company is audited with probability 0.893.
Hypothesis · not established
The author’s hypothesis (not yet tested): in consulting contracts with a base fee plus a share, contracts that specify “reconcile on annual totals, audit on a trigger, repay any shortfall with a one-times penalty” show a smaller gap between the gain the company reports and the gain found by independent accounting than contracts that only specify “monthly reporting”. What would show it wrong: across many clients’ contracts, the gap between reported and audited gain does not differ between the two kinds of clause.
Summary
Under double moral hazard the best share is : the more the company’s execution matters and the noisier the result, the lower the share. With illustrative parameters it is about a fifth, with a small base fee. Hiding the gain must be deterred by audits and penalties; month-by-month checks hardly catch modest under-reporting, while reconciling annual totals does.
References
Fan, Y. (2026). Enterprise Bottleneck Diagnostics, SKU Cannibalization Audits and Automation Return Bounds: Theory-of-Constraints Queueing Networks, Margin Dilution Matrices and Value-Based Advisory Pricing [企业瓶颈诊断、产品线自蚕食审计与自动化改造回报边界] (Version 1.0.0). 5D Library. https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.24090217 · Licensed under Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International (CC BY-NC-ND 4.0).