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演化博弈、直接与间接互惠及合作涌现的数学模型
从汉密尔顿亲缘选择、阿克塞尔罗德重复囚徒困境到声誉机制与公共品惩罚的动力学及古典儒墨兼爱差等观考辨
Evolutionary Game Theory, Direct and Indirect Reciprocity and the Emergence of Cooperation: From Hamilton's Rule and Axelrod's Tournaments to Reputation and Costly Punishment, Read Beside Classical Confucian and Mohist Ethics
DOI10.5281/zenodo.23788551摘要
自然选择偏爱留下更多后代的个体,为他人付出代价的行为怎样才能存续?本书用演化博弈论考察合作在什么条件下出现、维持与瓦解。依次讨论:复制子方程 dx_i/dt = x_i[f_i(x) − f̄(x)] 与演化稳定策略,单次匿名的囚徒困境中合作者必然消失,而鹰鸽博弈中两种策略共存、猎鹿博弈中结局取决于起点,以及有限种群中的固定概率与三分之一法则;汉密尔顿法则 rb > c 作为普莱斯方程的推论(每个群体内部合作都在减少、整体却在增加的辛普森悖论),诺瓦克归纳的五个门槛(1/r、1/w、1/q、k、1 + n/m)各自的模型假设,以及包容适合度之争;阿克塞尔罗德的两次锦标赛(14 与 62 个程序),一报还一报在 1% 执行错误下陷入报复循环、长期收益降到四种结果的平均值,慷慨一报还一报的原谅概率上限 min{1 − (T − R)/(R − S), (R − P)/(T − P)}(捐献博弈中为 1 − c/b),赢定输移需要 b/c > 2,以及零行列式勒索策略在大种群中被淘汰;形象分「拒绝坏人也扣分」的漏洞与大槻—岩佐的前八规范(简单持守与严格评判的区别);诺瓦克—梅空间博弈中约 31% 的合作者,「死亡—出生」更新下的 b/c > k 规则与有限网络的精确门槛 (N − 2)/(N/k − 2),以及两项结论不同的大型人类网络实验;利他惩罚、在 15 国 16 个城市中发现的反社会惩罚、惩罚的效率代价与奥斯特罗姆的八项设计原则。
八章与《孟子·尽心上》「亲亲而仁民,仁民而爱物」及孟子对墨家兼爱的批评、《墨子·兼爱中》「夫爱人者,人必从而爱之」、《论语·宪问》「以直报怨,以德报德」并读,明确古典道德哲学与基因频率计算的界限,不说古人「早已发现」演化博弈;最后给出一份四步合作与防敲诈核查表,以及一项比较「公布二阶声誉标签」与「只公布一阶历史捐献率」的预注册整群随机对照实验方案(标签只用一个口径:简单持守规则、严格正当化,对坏声誉者不捐献为好、对好声誉者不捐献为坏、向坏人捐献不扣分,3 人小组中同组另外两人都为坏时不捐献才算正当;以 12 人线上社群为随机化单位,唯一主要结局为第 21—30 轮的社群合作维持率,每组 48 个社群可分析、招募 54 个,共 1,296 人,判定规则写成代码)。书中以标注框区分已发表的证据、可运行的 Python 计算(15 段程序,全部核对)、原典与作者的假说。本书讨论演化博弈的数学模型,不作道德说教,也不是经营建议。
关键词:演化博弈论;复制子动力学;演化稳定策略;固定概率;三分之一法则;汉密尔顿法则;普莱斯方程;亲缘选择;多层次选择;包容适合度;合作演化五规则;直接互惠;一报还一报;慷慨一报还一报;赢定输移;零行列式策略;间接互惠;形象分;前八规范;简单持守;严格评判;网络互惠;利他惩罚;反社会惩罚;奥斯特罗姆设计原则
Abstract
Natural selection favours individuals that leave more offspring; how, then, can behaviour that costs the actor and benefits others persist? This book uses evolutionary game theory to examine when cooperation emerges, is maintained and breaks down. It covers the replicator equation dx_i/dt = x_i[f_i(x) − f̄(x)] and evolutionarily stable strategies, with cooperators inevitably disappearing in the one-shot anonymous prisoner's dilemma while the two strategies coexist in the hawk–dove game and the outcome of the stag hunt depends on the starting point, together with fixation probabilities in finite populations and the one-third law; Hamilton's rule rb > c as a consequence of the Price equation (a Simpson's paradox in which cooperation falls within every group yet rises overall), the separate model assumptions behind Nowak's five thresholds (1/r, 1/w, 1/q, k, 1 + n/m), and the dispute over inclusive fitness; Axelrod's two tournaments (14 and 62 programs), tit for tat falling into retaliation cycles under 1 % execution errors so that its long-run payoff drops to the average of the four outcomes, the upper limit min{1 − (T − R)/(R − S), (R − P)/(T − P)} on generous tit for tat's forgiveness (1 − c/b in the donation game), win-stay, lose-shift needing b/c > 2, and zero-determinant extortioners losing out in large populations; the flaw in image scoring, which penalises even refusals to help bad individuals, and Ohtsuki and Iwasa's leading eight norms (with the difference between simple standing and stern judging); about 31 % cooperators in Nowak and May's spatial game, the b/c > k rule under death–birth updating with the exact threshold (N − 2)/(N/k − 2) for finite networks, and two large human network experiments with different conclusions; and altruistic punishment, the antisocial punishment found in 16 cities in 15 countries, the efficiency cost of punishment and Ostrom's eight design principles.
The eight chapters are read beside "love one's kin, and so be humane to the people; be humane to the people, and so cherish creatures" from the Mencius and Mencius's criticism of Mohist impartial care, "whoever loves others will surely be loved by others in return" from the Mozi, and "repay resentment with uprightness, repay kindness with kindness" from the Analects, stating the boundary between classical moral philosophy and the calculation of gene frequencies and never claiming that the ancients "had already discovered" evolutionary game theory. They end with a four-step checklist for cooperation and protection against extortion and a pre-registered cluster-randomised controlled experiment comparing the display of second-order reputation labels with the display of first-order contribution records only (labels under a single rule, simple standing with strict justification: withholding from someone in bad standing is good, from someone in good standing bad, and contributing to someone in bad standing costs nothing, so that in groups of three withholding is justified only when both partners are bad; online communities of 12 as the unit of randomisation, a single primary outcome of community cooperation in rounds 21–30, 48 analysable and 54 recruited communities per arm, 1,296 participants, decision rule written as code). Marked boxes separate published evidence, runnable Python calculations (15 programs, all checked), classical sources and the author's hypotheses. The book discusses mathematical models of evolutionary games; it is not moral instruction and not business advice.
Keywords: evolutionary game theory; replicator dynamics; evolutionarily stable strategy; fixation probability; one-third law; Hamilton's rule; Price equation; kin selection; multilevel selection; inclusive fitness; five rules for cooperation; direct reciprocity; tit for tat; generous tit for tat; win-stay lose-shift; zero-determinant strategies; indirect reciprocity; image scoring; leading eight; simple standing; stern judging; network reciprocity; altruistic punishment; antisocial punishment; Ostrom design principles
目录 · Contents
- 序:合作为什么没有被淘汰English 中文Preface: Why Cooperation Has Not Been Selected Away
- 第一章 复制子动力学:单次匿名博弈中合作为什么输English 中文Chapter 1 Replicator Dynamics: Why Cooperation Loses in One-Shot Anonymous Games
- 第二章 汉密尔顿法则、普莱斯方程与五种机制English 中文Chapter 2 Hamilton's Rule, the Price Equation and the Five Mechanisms
- 第三章 直接互惠:锦标赛、噪声与宽容English 中文Chapter 3 Direct Reciprocity: Tournaments, Noise and Forgiveness
- 第四章 间接互惠:形象分与二阶声誉规范English 中文Chapter 4 Indirect Reciprocity: Image Scores and Second-Order Reputation Norms
- 第五章 网络互惠:空间结构与人类网络实验English 中文Chapter 5 Network Reciprocity: Spatial Structure and Human Network Experiments
- 第六章 惩罚:利他惩罚、反社会惩罚与公共池塘的治理English 中文Chapter 6 Punishment: Altruistic Punishment, Antisocial Punishment and Governing the Commons
- 第七章 原典并读:差等之爱、兼相爱交相利与以直报怨English 中文Chapter 7 Reading the Classics: Graded Love, Impartial Care and Repaying Resentment with Uprightness
- 第八章 实践与预注册试验English 中文Chapter 8 Practice and a Pre-Registered Trial
How to cite · 引用
Fan, Y. (2026). Evolutionary Game Theory, Direct and Indirect Reciprocity and the Emergence of Cooperation: From Hamilton's Rule and Axelrod's Tournaments to Reputation and Costly Punishment, Read Beside Classical Confucian and Mohist Ethics [演化博弈、直接与间接互惠及合作涌现的数学模型] (Version 1.0.0). 5D Library. https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.23788551
BibTeX
@book{fan2026evolutionary,
title = {{Evolutionary Game Theory, Direct and Indirect Reciprocity and the Emergence of Cooperation}: From Hamilton's Rule and Axelrod's Tournaments to Reputation and Costly Punishment, Read Beside Classical Confucian and Mohist Ethics},
author = {Fan, Yafu},
year = {2026},
publisher = {5D Library},
edition = {Version 1.0.0},
doi = {10.5281/zenodo.23788551},
url = {https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.23788551},
note = {Chinese title: 演化博弈、直接与间接互惠及合作涌现的数学模型}
}
| DOI | https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.23788551 |
|---|---|
| ORCID | https://orcid.org/0009-0004-3519-1203 |
| 5D Library ID | 5DL-B-035 |
| 版本 Version | 1.0.0 · 中英双语版 Bilingual edition |
| 出版日期 Date | 2026-10-30 |
| 网址 Online | https://5dlibrary.com/books/evolutionary-cooperation-reciprocity/ |
| SHA-256 · evolutionary-cooperation-reciprocity_bilingual_v1.0.0.pdf | 7d04eb013f3326ee11b8bc67c988356ae7e76f2a05e4feb66cad36b2b9aaf098 |
| SHA-256 · evolutionary-cooperation-reciprocity_en_v1.0.0.pdf | 8d31c41dbe2c775bddb3288e9f96c6db54d86984d82486d6afa470e2f0d847e5 |
| SHA-256 · evolutionary-cooperation-reciprocity_zh_v1.0.0.pdf | 82cdaecd26b4c49cf3629ff6e7e2f8747c0bf04fc5aa3cc78bc4fc0b178dc6d2 |
| Licence · 许可 | Licensed under Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International (CC BY-NC-ND 4.0). https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ |
Disclosure. The author uses the works of 5D Library, including this book, as the methodological basis of his community courses, the 5D Ascension Cards (Dimensional Shift Card Decks) and the Yafu AI knowledge base, and therefore has a commercial interest in the subject of this book. The author also runs communities and founded and runs Asia Influencer X and Yafu Global, whose business includes community operations and influencer and brand partnerships, and therefore has a direct commercial interest in the subjects of cooperation, reputation and community governance discussed in this book. The book discusses mathematical models of evolutionary games; it is not moral instruction, promotes no course, card deck or service, and is not investment or business advice; it uses no client or community data from these communities and businesses; the Chapter 8 trial is designed to be run and analysed by researchers independent of the author's business and does not recruit from the author's community, students or customers, including the clients of these businesses; all the code and the study protocol are published openly for anyone to check.