5D Library › 演化博弈、直接与间接互惠及合作涌现的数学模型 · English
第八章 实践与预注册试验
注
本章的核查表是一个思考工具,不是管理规范、法律意见、经营或投资建议,也不是道德说教。 示例是一个虚构的「启明创客合作社」,所有名称、合作方、规则与数字都是编造的,只用来演示计算方法,不来自任何真实的组织、社群或客户。任何真实合伙契约与社群规则的制定,都需要依据自己的情况,并在必要时咨询法律与相关专业人员。
第一部分 四步合作与防敲诈核查表
前六章的模型可以整理成四个问题。它们帮助一个合伙关系或社群检查:自己的合作建立在什么机制上,这个机制的条件是否成立,以及在出错与有人搭便车时会发生什么。
- 未来互动概率 与一次性交易识别。 这段关系再继续一轮的概率有多大?它是否超过代价与收益之比 (第二、三章)?哪些交易实际上是一次性的、或已知最后一轮的?这类交易不能指望互惠,需要合同、押金或第三方托管。
- 带执行噪声时的纠错宽容度。 交付偶尔会因意外而出错。双方约定的回应规则是「每错必罚」(一报还一报)、「宽容一定比例」(慷慨一报还一报,原谅不超过 ),还是「出错后双方一起回到原状」(赢定输移,需要 )(第三章)?有没有可能被一方利用来勒索:表面上对等,实际上把剩余按固定比例偏向自己?
- 二阶声誉规则审计。 社群的公开记录或「标记」规则,是否区分了「无故不帮」与「对违规者正当不帮」?帮助一个已被标记的违规者算不算违规(第四章)?标记信息是否公开、一致,还是各人私下判断?
- 奥斯特罗姆的分级监督与退出机制。 谁有权参与、谁负责监督、监督者对谁负责?制裁是否分级、是否区分无心之失与故意违规、记录在多久之后清除?有没有低成本的申辩与调解渠道,以及清楚的退出与除名程序(第六章)?
推导
把核查表用在虚构的「启明创客合作社」上。第 1 步:合作社与几类合作方往来,一次诚实的交付使交付方付出 ,使对方得到 ,所以门槛为 。比较四种关系的 。第 2 步:交付有 3% 的概率因意外出错,比较四种回应规则在 40 个季度中的平均收益与双方都合作的季度比例。第 3 步:用第四章第二段程序的模型(85% 鉴别者、15% 搭便车者)检查合作社考虑过的三种标记规则。第 4 步:比较「累计三次违规即除名」与「警告、罚款、除名逐级升级,连续 12 个月无违规清除一次记录」两种规则下,三类成员三年内被除名的概率:偶尔疏忽的守规成员(每月 2%,一经发生必被发现)、偶尔偷懒者(每月 10%,被发现的概率 60%)与经常搭便车者(每月 50%,被发现的概率 60%)。
推导
# The four-step checklist of Chapter 8 applied to a FICTIONAL makers' co-operative and its
# partners. All names, numbers and rules are invented to show the calculations.
import importlib.util, io, contextlib, pathlib, random
HERE = pathlib.Path(__file__).resolve().parent
def load(name):
spec = importlib.util.spec_from_file_location(name, HERE / f"{name}.py")
m = importlib.util.module_from_spec(spec)
with contextlib.redirect_stdout(io.StringIO()):
spec.loader.exec_module(m)
return m
p06, p09 = load("p06_markov_noise"), load("p09_norm_dynamics")
rng = random.Random(13)
# Step 1. Shadow of the future: honest delivery costs c = 2 and is worth b = 5 to the
# other side; reciprocity can carry a relationship only if w = P(another round) > c/b =
# 0.4.
print("step 1: w vs c/b = 0.40")
for name, w in (("raw-material supplier (renews 9 times in 10)", 0.9),
("shared market stall (half of seasons renewed)", 0.5),
("one-off bulk buyer", 0.1),
("fixed 3-year contract, last year", 0.0)):
print(f" {name:46s} w = {w:.1f}: " + ("reciprocity can carry it" if w > 0.4
else "needs contract or deposit"))
# Step 2. Noise: 3 % of deliveries go wrong by accident. 40 quarters, both start
# cooperating.
def finite(p, q, eps, rounds, D):
tot = cc = 0.0
p, q = p06.flip(p, eps), p06.flip(q, eps); qs = (q[0], q[2], q[1], q[3])
M = [[a * b, a * (1 - b), (1 - a) * b, (1 - a) * (1 - b)] for a, b in zip(p, qs)]
v = [(1 - eps) ** 2, (1 - eps) * eps, eps * (1 - eps), eps * eps]
for _ in range(rounds):
tot += sum(x * y for x, y in zip(v, D)); cc += v[0]
v = [sum(v[i] * M[i][j] for i in range(4)) for j in range(4)]
return tot / rounds, cc / rounds
D = (3.0, -2.0, 5.0, 0.0) # R = b - c, S = -c, T = b, P = 0
print("step 2: 3 % accidental failures, 40 quarters; payoff per quarter, share CC")
for name, st in (("tit for tat", (1, 0, 1, 0)),
("forgive 1 in 2 (q = 0.5)", (1, .5, 1, .5)),
("forgive at the bound q = 1 - c/b = 0.6", (1, .6, 1, .6)),
("win-stay, lose-shift", (1, 0, 0, 1))):
pay, cc = finite(st, st, 0.03, 40, D)
print(f" {name:38s} {pay:.2f} {cc:.2f}")
# Step 3. Second-order reputation audit of the co-op's flagging rules, with the p09 model
# (85 % discriminators, 15 % free riders, errors as in p08).
RULES = {"A: refusing anyone's request earns a flag": "image scoring",
"B: as A, but refusing a flagged member is exempt": "simple standing",
"C: as B, and helping a flagged member earns a flag": "stern judging"}
print("step 3: rule | justified refusal stays Good? | helping a flagged member is Bad?"
" |\n share of discriminators Good")
for rule, norm in RULES.items():
nm = p09.NORMS[norm]
gd, _, _ = p09.reputations([0.85, 0.0, 0.15], nm)
print(f" {rule:50s} {'yes' if nm[('D', 'B')] else 'no ':3s} "
f"{'yes' if not nm[('C', 'B')] else 'no ':3s} {gd:.2f}")
# Step 4. Graduated sanctions with forgiveness vs "three strikes, ever". An honest member
# slips (misses a duty) with prob. 0.02 per month; a free rider skips with prob. 0.5 and a
# skip is detected with prob. 0.6. Rule X: the 3rd detected lapse ever means exit.
# Rule Y: warning, then fine, then exit, but 12 clean months wipe one strike.
def p_exit(lapse, detect, rule, months=36, runs=20000):
out = 0
for _ in range(runs):
strikes, clean = 0, 0
for _ in range(months):
if rng.random() < lapse and rng.random() < detect:
strikes += 1; clean = 0
else:
clean += 1
if rule == "Y" and clean == 12 and strikes: strikes -= 1; clean = 0
if strikes >= 3: out += 1; break
return out / runs
print("step 4: probability of exit within 3 years")
for who, lapse, det in (("honest member, slips 2 %/month", 0.02, 1.0),
("occasional shirker, 10 %/month", 0.10, 0.6),
("free rider, 50 %/month", 0.50, 0.6)):
print(f" {who:32s} three strikes ever {p_exit(lapse, det, 'X'):.3f};"
f" graduated {p_exit(lapse, det, 'Y'):.3f}")
# step 1: w vs c/b = 0.40
# raw-material supplier (renews 9 times in 10) w = 0.9: reciprocity can carry it
# shared market stall (half of seasons renewed) w = 0.5: reciprocity can carry it
# one-off bulk buyer w = 0.1: needs contract or deposit
# fixed 3-year contract, last year w = 0.0: needs contract or deposit
# step 2: 3 % accidental failures, 40 quarters; payoff per quarter, share CC
# tit for tat 2.04 0.48
# forgive 1 in 2 (q = 0.5) 2.83 0.89
# forgive at the bound q = 1 - c/b = 0.6 2.86 0.91
# win-stay, lose-shift 2.75 0.89
# step 3: rule | justified refusal stays Good? | helping a flagged member is Bad? |
# share of discriminators Good
# A: refusing anyone's request earns a flag no no 0.06
# B: as A, but refusing a flagged member is exempt yes no 0.97
# C: as B, and helping a flagged member earns a flag yes yes 0.97
# step 4: probability of exit within 3 years
# honest member, slips 2 %/month three strikes ever 0.035; graduated 0.019
# occasional shirker, 10 %/month three strikes ever 0.367; graduated 0.251
# free rider, 50 %/month three strikes ever 1.000; graduated 0.998第 1 步:原料供应商每轮续约的概率为 0.9、共用摊位为 0.5,都超过 0.4,互惠可以支撑这两种关系;一次性的大宗买家(0.1)与已知是最后一年的固定合同(0)不能靠互惠,需要合同、押金或托管等其他机制。最后一轮已知的情形尤其值得注意:理论上,在已知终点的有限重复囚徒困境中,从最后一轮倒推,合作会逐轮瓦解。
第 2 步:3% 的意外失误下,一报还一报的平均收益只有 2.04,双方都合作的季度只占 48%:一次失误引发的报复循环要等下一次失误才能打破。原谅一半的背叛()使收益升到 2.83、合作季度升到 89%;原谅到上限 时为 2.86 与 91%,只多一点,但离被一次性背叛者利用的边界更近。赢定输移为 2.75 与 89%,这里 ,它的条件成立。
第 3 步:规则 A(「拒绝任何人的请求都记一次标记」)相当于形象分,在有 15% 搭便车者时,鉴别者中只有 6% 保持良好记录,合作瓦解;规则 B(「拒绝已被标记者的请求不记标记」)相当于简单持守,规则 C(再加上「帮助已被标记者也记标记」)相当于严格评判,两者都使 97% 的鉴别者保持良好记录。B 与 C 的区别在于是否惩罚对违规者的无条件帮助;第四章说明,C 能阻止无条件合作者的增加,但对因误判而被标记的人更严厉。选择哪一种,取决于社群对误判的容忍程度,应当事先公开说明。
第 4 步:「累计三次即除名」规则下,偶尔疏忽的守规成员三年内被除名的概率为 3.5%,分级并定期清除记录的规则下为 1.9%;偶尔偷懒者为 36.7% 与 25.1%;经常搭便车者在两种规则下都几乎必然被除名(1.000 与 0.998)。在这个虚构的例子中,分级加清除使守规成员被误伤的概率减少约一半,而对经常搭便车者的威慑几乎不变;代价是偶尔偷懒者更多地留了下来。这是一个需要事先权衡并公开的取舍。所有参数都是示意值。
第二部分 预注册随机对照试验方案
问题
在多轮的线上公共品博弈中,向参与者公布同伴的二阶声誉标签(区分「对合作者不捐献」与「对背叛者正当不捐献」),与只公布同伴的一阶历史捐献率相比,能否提高群体合作的维持率?
证据
已有的研究。 间接互惠的实验显示,人们会根据他人过去的给予来决定是否帮助他们 (Wedekind and Milinski 2000),把声誉与公共品博弈结合可以维持较高的捐献 (Milinski et al. 2002)。第四章的模型预测,当声誉规则区分正当的拒绝时,制裁者不会因制裁而失去声誉,合作更容易维持 (Ohtsuki and Iwasa 2006; Panchanathan and Boyd 2003)。但评价是否公开、一致对模型的结论有决定性影响 (Hilbe et al. 2018)。本试验检验的是这一预测在人类公共品博弈中的一个具体版本。
设计
公共品捐献是对整组的,不能只针对某一个人,所以「对背叛者正当不捐献」需要一个可以操作的定义。本方案把每个社群每轮随机分成若干 3 人小组:只有当同组另外两人在本轮开始时都被标为「坏」时,不捐献才算正当。
| 要素 | 规定 |
|---|---|
| 设计 | 两组平行、以 12 人线上社群为单位随机化的整群随机对照试验,按实施批次分层,1:1 分配;报告遵循整群随机试验的 CONSORT 扩展 (Campbell et al. 2012) |
| 参与者 | 年满 18 岁的成年人,通过大学与研究机构的公开招募或学术研究用的在线被试库参加,按实验经济学惯例获得与收益挂钩的报酬;不从作者的社群、学员或客户(包括作者企业的客户)中招募 |
| 排除 | 曾参加过公共品或声誉博弈实验者;曾参加本研究预试验者;未通过规则理解测验者(在随机化之前测验) |
| 任务 | 30 轮。每轮社群被随机分成 4 个 3 人小组;每人有 10 个代币,选择全部投入或全部保留;小组公共池乘以 2,平分给 3 人。规则在开始前以书面与示例说明,两组相同 |
| A 组(二阶标签) | 每轮决定之前,显示两位同组者的标签「好」或「坏」:捐献者为好;同组至少有一人为好时不捐献为坏;同组另外两人都为坏时不捐献为好(正当)。第 1 轮所有人为好;之后每人的标签只由自己上一轮的决定与当时两位同组者的标签决定。标签由程序按此规则计算,规则全文对参与者公开 |
| B 组(一阶记录) | 每轮决定之前,显示两位同组者到目前为止的捐献率(百分比) |
| 两组共同 | 每轮结束后显示本组的捐献与自己的收益;不显示其他小组的信息;没有惩罚选项;没有欺骗 |
| 盲法 | 参与者知道自己的界面,但不知道研究假设与另一组的界面;主要结局由程序自动计算;分析人员在分析计划锁定前不知道组别代码 |
| 主要结局 | 社群合作维持率:第 21—30 轮中,社群全部 120 个决定里「投入」所占的比例。每个社群一个数值 |
| 次要结局 | 30 轮的总体投入比例;投入比例随轮次的斜率;A 组中两位同组者都为「坏」时的不捐献比例(正当不捐献);收益;规则理解与公平感(由不知组别的评分者编码开放回答) |
| 分析 | 社群水平的线性回归:主要结局 ~ 组别 + 批次分层,报告组间差及其 95% 置信区间;双侧 |
主要结局只设一项。
A 组只用这一个口径,事先锁定:第四章的简单持守(simple standing)规则,取最严格的正当化。对坏声誉者不捐献为好,对好声誉者不捐献为坏,向坏人捐献不扣分。它不是形象分(形象分不区分正当与不正当的不捐献),也不是严格评判。
样本量
推导
# Sample size for the Chapter 8 cluster-randomised trial. Unit of randomisation: an
# online COMMUNITY of 12 people who play 30 rounds of a public goods game in re-matched
# groups of 3. Primary outcome, one number per community: the share of "contribute"
# decisions in rounds 21-30. The analysis is at community level, so the sample size
# needs the SD of community means (sigma_g), which depends on the intra-cluster
# correlation (ICC) of individual rates. All parameter values are assumptions, to be
# checked against pilot data.
# Arm A labels: one fixed rule, simple standing with strict justification (see p15).
import math, random
from statistics import NormalDist, mean, pstdev
rng = random.Random(14)
z = NormalDist().inv_cdf
ALPHA, POWER, M = 0.05, 0.90, 12
def n_per_arm(sd, delta):
return math.ceil(2 * (z(1 - ALPHA / 2) + z(POWER)) ** 2 * sd ** 2 / delta ** 2)
print("communities per arm (alpha 0.05 two-sided, 90 % power)")
print(" SD of community means delta 0.08 delta 0.10 delta 0.12")
for sd in (0.12, 0.15, 0.18):
print(f" {sd:.2f} " + " ".join(
f"{n_per_arm(sd, d):3d}" for d in (0.08, 0.10, 0.12)))
# A generative model for individuals: person j in community g contributes in each of the
# 10 scored rounds with probability p = base + u_g + e_j (clipped to 0..1), where
# u_g ~ N(0, 0.13^2) is shared by the community and e_j ~ N(0, 0.25^2) is personal.
def community(base, tau=0.13, s_e=0.25):
u = rng.gauss(0, tau); rates = []
for _ in range(M):
p = min(1.0, max(0.0, base + u + rng.gauss(0, s_e)))
rates.append(sum(rng.random() < p for _ in range(10)) / 10)
return rates
cs = [community(0.40) for _ in range(3000)]
means = [mean(c) for c in cs]
sd_g = pstdev(means)
within = mean(pstdev(c) ** 2 * M / (M - 1) for c in cs)
icc = (sd_g ** 2 - within / M) / (sd_g ** 2 - within / M + within)
print(f"model: SD of community means {sd_g:.3f}; SD of individual rates"
f" {math.sqrt(within + sd_g ** 2 - within / M):.3f}; ICC {icc:.2f}")
print(f" design effect if analysed per person: 1 + (m - 1) ICC ="
f" {1 + (M - 1) * icc:.2f}")
SD, DELTA = 0.15, 0.10
n = n_per_arm(SD, DELTA); rec = math.ceil(n / 0.9)
print(f"chosen: SD 0.15, delta 0.10 (control 0.40 -> 0.50): {n} communities per arm"
f" analysable;")
print(f" allowing 10 % incomplete communities, recruit {rec} per arm =\n "
f" {rec * M} people per arm, {2 * rec * M} in all")
# What the decision rule (p15) will say if the true effect equals the smallest effect of
# interest (0.10): 95 % CI of the difference from a two-sample t-type interval.
def trial(true_delta, n):
a = [rng.gauss(0.40, SD) for _ in range(n)]; b = [rng.gauss(0.40 + true_delta, SD)
for _ in range(n)]
d = mean(b) - mean(a)
se = math.sqrt((pstdev(a) ** 2 + pstdev(b) ** 2) * n / (n - 1) / n)
return d - 1.96 * se, d + 1.96 * se
for td in (0.10, 0.15, 0.20):
res = [trial(td, n) for _ in range(4000)]
benefit = sum(lo > 0 for lo, hi in res) / 4000
strong = sum(lo >= 0.10 for lo, hi in res) / 4000
print(f"true effect {td:.2f}: some benefit shown {benefit:.3f};"
f" 'at least 0.10' shown {strong:.3f}")
# communities per arm (alpha 0.05 two-sided, 90 % power)
# SD of community means delta 0.08 delta 0.10 delta 0.12
# 0.12 48 31 22
# 0.15 74 48 33
# 0.18 107 69 48
# model: SD of community means 0.138; SD of individual rates 0.291; ICC 0.15
# design effect if analysed per person: 1 + (m - 1) ICC = 2.70
# chosen: SD 0.15, delta 0.10 (control 0.40 -> 0.50): 48 communities per arm analysable;
# allowing 10 % incomplete communities, recruit 54 per arm =
# 648 people per arm, 1296 in all
# true effect 0.10: some benefit shown 0.905; 'at least 0.10' shown 0.027
# true effect 0.15: some benefit shown 1.000; 'at least 0.10' shown 0.383
# true effect 0.20: some benefit shown 1.000; 'at least 0.10' shown 0.902主要结局在社群水平上定义、在社群水平上分析,每个社群只贡献一个数值,所以分析中不需要组内相关系数(ICC)与设计效应;样本量计算需要的是「社群平均值的标准差」。这个标准差与 ICC 有关,程序用一个示意性的个体模型说明这一关系:社群共享的波动标准差 0.13、个人差异标准差 0.25 时,社群平均值的标准差为 0.138,个人捐献率的 ICC 约为 0.15;如果改为按个人分析,设计效应为 ,即需要的人数是忽略整群结构时的 2.7 倍。
按社群平均值的标准差 0.15(比上面的示意模型略保守)、最小关注差异 0.10(对照组 0.40,A 组 0.50)、双侧 、把握度 90% 计算,每组需要 48 个可分析的社群(正态近似;若按 t 分布校正,约多需 1 个);考虑约 10% 的社群因有人中途退出而不完整,每组招募 54 个社群,即每组 648 人,共 1,296 人。若标准差为 0.18,每组需要 69 个社群;若最小关注差异为 0.08,需要 74 个。这些参数都是假设值,正式实施前应当用预试验的数据核对。
- 「90% 把握度」的含义。 程序最后三行显示:当真实效应恰好等于最小关注差异 0.10 时,判定规则得出某种「获益」结论(置信区间下限大于 0)的概率约为 90%(模拟为 0.905),而得出最强结论「至少提高 0.10」(置信区间下限不低于 0.10)的概率只有约 2.5%(模拟为 0.027)。真实效应为 0.15 时,最强结论的概率为 38%;为 0.20 时为 90%。这与第 33 本的说明一致:90% 指的是得到某种获益结论的把握度,不是得到最强结论的把握度。
判定规则
推导
# Decision rule for the Chapter 8 trial, fixed before any data are collected.
# diff = (share of contribute decisions in rounds 21-30, second-order label arm) minus
# (same, first-order record arm), one value per community; 95 % CI from the
# pre-specified community-level linear model (arm + batch stratum). Smallest difference
# of interest 0.10.
# Arm A labels follow ONE rule fixed in advance: simple standing, strict justification.
# Contributing is always Good; withholding is Good only if BOTH group partners were Bad
# at the start of the round, otherwise Bad. Everyone is Good in round 1. This is not
# image scoring (no justified withholding) and not stern judging (helping Bad is fine).
# Fidelity: in the label arm, labels must have been computed and shown as specified in at
# least 95 % of community-rounds; label comprehension check passed by >= 80 % of people.
SESOI = 0.10
def verdict(diff, lo, hi, fidelity, understood):
if fidelity < 0.95 or understood < 0.80:
return (f"diff {diff:+.2f}: NOT INTERPRETABLE - labels as specified"
f" {fidelity:.0%}, understood by {understood:.0%}")
if lo >= SESOI: v = "labels raise cooperation by at least 0.10"
elif lo > 0: v = "labels raise cooperation; 0.10 or more not shown"
elif hi < 0: v = "labels LOWER cooperation"
elif lo > -SESOI and hi < SESOI: v = "no difference worth acting on"
else: v = "unclear: the interval is too wide to decide"
return f"diff {diff:+.2f} ({lo:+.2f} to {hi:+.2f}): {v}"
for case in ((0.17, 0.11, 0.23, 0.98, 0.91), (0.09, 0.03, 0.15, 0.97, 0.88),
(0.01, -0.05, 0.07, 0.99, 0.90), (-0.08, -0.14, -0.02, 0.96, 0.86),
(0.15, 0.09, 0.21, 0.91, 0.90), (0.04, -0.07, 0.15, 0.97, 0.85),
(0.12, 0.06, 0.18, 0.98, 0.71)):
print(verdict(*case))
# diff +0.17 (+0.11 to +0.23): labels raise cooperation by at least 0.10
# diff +0.09 (+0.03 to +0.15): labels raise cooperation; 0.10 or more not shown
# diff +0.01 (-0.05 to +0.07): no difference worth acting on
# diff -0.08 (-0.14 to -0.02): labels LOWER cooperation
# diff +0.15: NOT INTERPRETABLE - labels as specified 91%, understood by 90%
# diff +0.04 (-0.07 to +0.15): unclear: the interval is too wide to decide
# diff +0.12: NOT INTERPRETABLE - labels as specified 98%, understood by 71%示例结果是编造的。A 组标签没有按规定计算与显示的社群轮次超过 5%,或者参与者通过标签理解测验的比例低于 80% 时,无论结果如何,报告都写「不可解释」。只有当组间差的 95% 置信区间下限不低于 0.10 时,报告才写「标签使合作至少提高了最小关注的幅度」;下限大于 0 但低于 0.10 时,写「标签提高了合作,但未显示达到 0.10」。次要结局只报告估计与区间,不用来推翻主要结论。
这项试验不能说明什么
第一,A 组与 B 组的差别不只在「一阶与二阶」:A 组看到的是一个由规则计算出的二元标签,B 组看到的是一个连续的百分比;标签的简洁本身可能影响行为。阳性结果不能区分是「二阶信息」还是「标签形式」起了作用。本方案只设两组,不设「一阶二元标签」组(捐献为好、不捐献为坏),这一区分只能留给以后的试验。第二,「正当不捐献」只用一个事先锁定的口径(简单持守、严格正当化:同组另外两人都为坏),结论只适用于这一口径,不能推广到其他评价规则(例如第四章的严格评判)。第三,这是 30 轮、每组 12 人的线上实验,没有惩罚、没有沟通、标签由程序公正计算;真实社群中的声誉是由人私下、不完整地评价的(第四章的注),结论不能直接外推到任何真实的社群规则或平台设计。第四,参与者多为大学生或在线被试库的成员。第五,只用了一组收益参数(公共池乘以 2)。第六,主要结局只看第 21—30 轮,换一个时间窗口结论可能不同,因此次要结局会报告全部轮次的曲线。
伦理与利益冲突
这是一项低风险研究:任务是计算机上的投资游戏,不涉及任何健康干预,也不收集健康信息,可预见的不适只是被标为「坏」或收益较少时的不快。即便如此,试验仍须经独立伦理委员会审查批准,每位参与者签署知情同意,并在第一个社群入组之前登记方案与分析计划 (Nosek et al. 2018)。标签规则对参与者完全公开,不使用欺骗;不告知研究假设属于信息保留,任务结束后向所有人说明研究目的。标签只在实验内显示,不与参与者的真实身份关联;报酬规则事先公布;任何人可随时退出而无需说明理由,并获得已完成部分的报酬,该社群记为不完整。数据匿名保存。无论结果正负,都将发表。
利益披露
作者以 5D Library 的著作(包括本书)作为其社群课程、升维牌卡(5D Ascension Cards,Dimensional Shift Card Decks)与 Yafu AI 知识库的方法论基础,因此与本书主题有商业利益关系。作者还从事社群运营,并创办和经营 Asia Influencer X 与 Yafu Global,业务涉及社群运营、网红与品牌合作,与本书讨论的合作、声誉与社群治理主题有直接的商业利益。本书讨论演化博弈的数学模型,不作道德说教,不推销任何课程、牌卡或服务,也不是投资或经营建议;书中不使用上述社群与企业的客户或社群数据;第八章的试验设计为由独立于作者企业的研究人员实施和分析,不从作者的社群、学员或客户(包括上述企业的客户)中招募;书中所有代码与研究方案均公开,供任何人检验。
参考文献
Fan, Y. (2026). Evolutionary Game Theory, Direct and Indirect Reciprocity and the Emergence of Cooperation: From Hamilton's Rule and Axelrod's Tournaments to Reputation and Costly Punishment, Read Beside Classical Confucian and Mohist Ethics [演化博弈、直接与间接互惠及合作涌现的数学模型] (Version 1.0.0). 5D Library. https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.23788551 · Licensed under Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International (CC BY-NC-ND 4.0).