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Chapter 8. Practice: A Cap Table, a Key-Person Test and the Rule That an Alarm Is Not Proof

A cap table through one departure and one round

p14 follows three founders on four-year vesting through the departure of one of them and a seed round.

Calculation

# Chapter 8. p14: A cap table through one departure and one round.
# Founders A, B, C start with 40%, 35% and 25%, all on four-year
# monthly vesting with a one-year cliff. C leaves in month 15 as a good
# leaver: C keeps the vested part, and the firm buys back the unvested
# part at cost and cancels it. In month 18 a 10% option pool is
# created and a seed investor buys 20%, both after the buy-back
# (the pool and the investor's shares are counted in the new total).
def run(c_month=15):
    shares = {"A": 40.0, "B": 35.0, "C": 25.0}
    v = 0.0 if c_month < 12 else c_month / 48
    shares["C"] = 25.0 * v
    old = sum(shares.values())
    new_total = old / (1 - 0.10 - 0.20)
    shares["pool"] = 0.10 * new_total
    shares["seed"] = 0.20 * new_total
    return shares, new_total

if __name__ == "__main__":
    sh, tot = run()
    print("   holder   shares    stake")
    for k, x in sh.items():
        print("   {:<6} {:8.2f}   {:6.3f}".format(k, x, x / tot))
    print("   C's stake if C had held a static 25%: {:.3f}".format(
        25.0 / (100 / 0.7)))
    sh2, tot2 = run(c_month=11)
    print("   if C had left in month 11: C {:.3f}, A {:.3f}".format(
        sh2["C"] / tot2, sh2["A"] / tot2))
#    holder   shares    stake
#    A         40.00    0.338
#    B         35.00    0.296
#    C          7.81    0.066
#    pool      11.83    0.100
#    seed      23.66    0.200
#    C's stake if C had held a static 25%: 0.175
#    if C had left in month 11: C 0.000, A 0.373

After C leaves as a good leaver in month 15 and the unvested shares are bought back, and after a 10% option pool and a 20% seed investment, A holds 0.338, B 0.296 and C 0.066 of the firm, with the pool at 0.100 and the investor at 0.200. Had C held a static 25%, C would still own 0.175 of a firm C no longer works for. Had C left in month 11, before the cliff, C would hold nothing and A would hold 0.373.

How much revenue walks out with one person?

Calculation

# Chapter 8. p15: How much revenue walks out with one person? Twenty
# client accounts of unequal size (shares proportional to 1/k, k = 1
# to 20) are each held by one of four executives, assigned in turn.
# Each executive leaves to a competitor in a year with chance 0.1; a
# client follows the leaver with chance 0.6 if only the leaver knows
# them, and 0.15 if a second executive also covers the account. Expected
# revenue lost, and the chance of losing a fifth or more, with and
# without dual coverage. 50,000 years simulated, seed 93.
import random

W = [1 / k for k in range(1, 21)]
S = [w / sum(W) for w in W]
OWNER = [k % 4 for k in range(20)]

def year(rng, follow):
    gone = [rng.random() < 0.1 for _ in range(4)]
    lost = 0.0
    for k in range(20):
        if gone[OWNER[k]] and rng.random() < follow:
            lost += S[k]
    return lost

if __name__ == "__main__":
    rng = random.Random(93)
    print("   coverage        expected loss   P(loss >= 0.2)")
    for lab, f in (("single owner", 0.6), ("dual coverage", 0.15)):
        ys = [year(rng, f) for _ in range(50000)]
        print("   {:<15} {:13.4f}   {:14.4f}".format(
            lab, sum(ys) / len(ys), sum(1 for y in ys if y >= 0.2) /
            len(ys)))
    print("   largest client's share of revenue: {:.3f}".format(S[0]))
    print("   executive 0's book: {:.3f}".format(
        sum(S[k] for k in range(20) if OWNER[k] == 0)))
#    coverage        expected loss   P(loss >= 0.2)
#    single owner           0.0594           0.1099
#    dual coverage          0.0152           0.0172
#    largest client's share of revenue: 0.278
#    executive 0's book: 0.402

With twenty clients of unequal size spread over four executives, each of whom leaves in a year with chance 0.1, the expected revenue lost is 0.0594 when each client is known to only one executive, and the chance of losing a fifth or more is 0.1099. When a second executive covers every account, so that a client follows a leaver only 15% of the time, the expected loss falls to 0.0152 and the chance of losing a fifth to 0.0172. The largest client alone is 0.278 of revenue, and one executive’s book is 0.402. Dual coverage of key accounts is the cheapest armour in this book.

An alarm is not proof

Calculation

# Chapter 8. p16: An alarm is not proof. Start from a 2% base rate that
# a given partner is preparing to defect. An SPRT alarm (p09) has
# likelihood ratio (1 - beta) / alpha = 95. Each further independent
# check that comes back adverse (an audit of client records, a
# repository log, a supplier's statement) has likelihood ratio 5; one
# that comes back clean has 0.4. Belief after the alarm and after each
# result, and the number of adverse checks needed to reach 0.95.
def update(p, lr):
    o = p / (1 - p) * lr
    return o / (1 + o)

if __name__ == "__main__":
    p = update(0.02, 95)
    print("   after the alarm alone: {:.3f}".format(p))
    q = p
    for i in range(1, 4):
        q = update(q, 5)
        print("   after {} adverse check(s): {:.3f}".format(i, q))
    print("   after the alarm and one clean check: {:.3f}".format(
        update(p, 0.4)))
    n, q = 0, p
    while q < 0.95:
        q = update(q, 5)
        n += 1
    print("   adverse checks needed to reach 0.95: {}".format(n))
#    after the alarm alone: 0.660
#    after 1 adverse check(s): 0.906
#    after 2 adverse check(s): 0.980
#    after 3 adverse check(s): 0.996
#    after the alarm and one clean check: 0.437
#    adverse checks needed to reach 0.95: 2

Starting from a base rate of 2%, an alarm from the test of Chapter 5 raises the belief that a partner is preparing to defect to 0.660. One further adverse check brings it to 0.906, two to 0.980. A clean check after the alarm brings it down to 0.437. Two independent adverse findings are needed before the belief passes 0.95. The practical rule follows: an alarm triggers lawful checks and a conversation in which the person can explain, and action waits for independent evidence.

Disclosure

Statement: this book is about the mathematics of incentives, contracts and monitoring among partners. It is not legal, tax or investment advice. Shareholder agreements, vesting, leaver and restrictive clauses must be drafted and reviewed by a qualified lawyer under the governing law, and any monitoring of employees or partners must comply with privacy, data-protection and employment law.

Note

Pre-registered tests: the hypotheses of Chapter 2 on vesting and retention and of Chapter 5 on the rate of resource transfers before departures should each be registered, with data sources, definitions and analysis, before data are collected, and the results published whether positive or negative. Studies using event logs must use lawfully collected, anonymised data with ethics approval.

Summary

Vesting and buy-backs keep the cap table with the people who build the firm; dual coverage of key relationships limits what one departure can take; and an alarm is a reason to check, not to accuse.

Fan, Y. (2026). Shareholder Free-Riding Games, Dynamic Vesting Mechanisms and Defection Early-Warning Models: Moral-Hazard Equity Dilution, Shotgun Buy-Sell Clauses and Behavioral Divergence Signals [股东搭便车博弈、动态股权成熟与背刺早期预警模型] (Version 1.0.0). 5D Library. https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.24090243 · Licensed under Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International (CC BY-NC-ND 4.0).