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Chapter 7. “Bei nei”, the Eight Villainies, Pooled Capital and Body Shares

Why read these sources here

The earlier chapters had three themes: the danger of depending on one person; sharing the returns of a venture between those who bring capital and those who bring work; and pooling capital among partners. Chinese sources address all three. This chapter quotes what could be checked and asks which correspondences can be computed. One point comes out of the check: the “Song dynasty pooled-capital contract” often cited in popular writing could not be traced to a Song source text here, so no such text is quoted.

Han Feizi: the danger of trusting one person

Source text

Han Feizi, “Bei nei”

人主之患在於信人,信人則制於人。人臣之於其君,非有骨肉之親也,縛於勢而不得不事也。

(陈奇猷 2000)

“The ruler’s danger lies in trusting others: whoever trusts others is controlled by them. A minister is not bound to his ruler by flesh and blood; he serves because he is bound by circumstance and cannot do otherwise.” Han Fei’s chapter “Ba jian” (the eight villainies) lists the channels through which ministers gain power over a ruler, among them those who share his bed, his attendants, his relatives, and the cultivation of the people’s favour. The modern counterpart is the key person who holds every client relationship. Part (a) of p13 spreads a principal’s clients over mm managers, each of whom defects in a year with chance 0.1.

Calculation

# Chapter 7. p13: Three old arrangements as arithmetic.
# (a) Han Feizi, "Bei nei": a ruler who trusts one person is ruled by
# him. A principal's client relationships are held by m managers in
# equal parts; each defects in a year with chance 0.1, taking his part.
# Expected loss is the same for every m, but the chance of losing half
# or more is not.
# (b) Shanxi merchants: the manager holds "body shares" giving a share
# s of profit without capital; the owner holds the "silver shares".
# Manager effort e = s (theta = c = 1), profit = e, owner's take
# (1 - s) e, total surplus e - e^2 / 2.
# (c) Pooled capital ("he ben"): a voyage loses everything with chance
# 0.2, otherwise returns 1.6 times the stake. A merchant who joins n
# equal partners in n independent voyages, chance of losing over half.
from math import comb

def p_at_least(n, k, p):
    return sum(comb(n, i) * p ** i * (1 - p) ** (n - i)
               for i in range(k, n + 1))

if __name__ == "__main__":
    print("   (a) managers m   expected loss   P(lose half or more)")
    for m in (1, 2, 4, 10):
        k = (m + 1) // 2
        print("   {:16d}   {:13.3f}   {:20.4f}".format(
            m, 0.1, p_at_least(m, k, 0.1)))
    print("   (b) body share s   effort   owner's take   total surplus")
    for s in (0.1, 0.3, 0.5, 0.7, 0.9):
        print("   {:18.1f}   {:6.3f}   {:12.3f}   {:13.3f}".format(
            s, s, (1 - s) * s, s - s * s / 2))
    print("   (c) partners n   P(return below 0.5 of capital)")
    for n in (1, 2, 5, 10):
        bad = sum(comb(n, i) * 0.2 ** i * 0.8 ** (n - i)
                  for i in range(n + 1) if 1.6 * (n - i) / n < 0.5)
        print("   {:16d}   {:30.4f}".format(n, bad))
#    (a) managers m   expected loss   P(lose half or more)
#                   1           0.100                 0.1000
#                   2           0.100                 0.1900
#                   4           0.100                 0.0523
#                  10           0.100                 0.0016
#    (b) body share s   effort   owner's take   total surplus
#                   0.1    0.100          0.090           0.095
#                   0.3    0.300          0.210           0.255
#                   0.5    0.500          0.250           0.375
#                   0.7    0.700          0.210           0.455
#                   0.9    0.900          0.090           0.495
#    (c) partners n   P(return below 0.5 of capital)
#                   1                           0.2000
#                   2                           0.0400
#                   5                           0.0067
#                  10                           0.0009

The expected loss is the same, 0.100, however the clients are spread. What changes is the chance of a catastrophe. With one manager, losing half or more happens with chance 0.1000; with two, half is lost if either leaves, 0.1900; with four, 0.0523; with ten, 0.0016. Spreading relationships does not reduce what is lost on average; it removes the single point of failure that Han Fei warned about. Two managers can be worse than one, because then either of them can cost half.

Body shares: rewarding work without capital

The Shanxi merchant houses are known for giving managers “body shares” (shen gu), a share in profits without any capital, alongside the owners’ “silver shares” (yin gu) (卫聚贤 1944). Part (b) of p13 asks what share maximises the owner’s take when the manager’s effort follows the share. The owner’s take, (1−s)s(1-s)s, is largest at s=0.5s = 0.5, where it is 0.250 and total surplus is 0.375; a share of 0.7 raises total surplus to 0.455 but lowers the owner’s take to 0.210. An owner who sets the share for his own take leaves value unrealised, the same free-riding loss as in Chapter 1.

Pooled capital

Historians of Chinese business cite merchants’ pooling of capital for trading voyages as early as the Song (Shiba 1970; Zelin 2019); the term “he ben” (pooled capital) is well attested in later contracts. Part (c) of p13 shows the arithmetic behind pooling. If a voyage loses everything with chance 0.2 and otherwise returns 1.6 times its stake, a merchant with one voyage ends below half of the capital with chance 0.2000; pooled with one partner over two voyages, 0.0400; with five, 0.0067; with ten, 0.0009. Pooling turns ruin into variation. It also creates exactly the team problem of Chapter 1, which is why the old partnerships needed rules about who managed and who audited.

Hypothesis · not established

The author’s interpretation (not yet tested): the Shanxi houses set body shares below the level that maximised total surplus, so that managers’ effort fell short of the efficient level, and the houses compensated with monitoring and reputation. What would show it wrong: in surviving account books of Shanxi houses, profits in branches with larger body shares were not higher, or the houses did not combine body shares with audit and reputation mechanisms.

Summary

“Bei nei” warns against depending on one person; spreading key relationships removes the single point of failure without changing the expected loss. Body shares reward work but at the owner’s best share still leave a free-riding loss. Pooling capital reduces ruin and creates a team. The “Song pooled-capital contract” should not be quoted without a checked source.

References

Shiba, Yoshinobu. 1970. Commerce and Society in Sung China. Translated by Mark Elvin. Center for Chinese Studies, University of Michigan.
Zelin, Madeleine. 2019. “A Deep History of Chinese Shareholding.” Law and History Review 37 (2): 325 to 351.
卫聚贤. 1944. 山西票号史. 说文社.
陈奇猷. 2000. 韩非子新校注. 上海古籍出版社.

Fan, Y. (2026). Shareholder Free-Riding Games, Dynamic Vesting Mechanisms and Defection Early-Warning Models: Moral-Hazard Equity Dilution, Shotgun Buy-Sell Clauses and Behavioral Divergence Signals [股东搭便车博弈、动态股权成熟与背刺早期预警模型] (Version 1.0.0). 5D Library. https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.24090243 · Licensed under Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International (CC BY-NC-ND 4.0).