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Chapter 1 Inertia and the Status Quo

What Newton’s first law says

Newton’s first law states that a body on which no net force acts stays at rest or keeps moving in a straight line at constant speed (Newton 1687). It is often shortened to “bodies like to stay as they are”, but the “as they are” covers two states: rest, and motion already under way. A person already doing something also has “inertia” in continuing to do it. When this book speaks of keeping to the status quo, it means both: being slow to start something new, and being unable to stop something old.

Note also that strict Newtonian inertia has no tendency to “return to the start”: push a puck on smooth ice and it slides on indefinitely. When people say “I pushed, and it went straight back”, they describe a different kind of system: one with a resting point, a restoring force that pulls it back after any displacement, and damping that soaks up the extra motion. A ball on a spring and a marble in a bowl behave this way. When keeping to the status quo is compared with inertia, the closer model is this kind of damped restoring system, not pure inertia.

Evidence for status quo bias

Evidence

In a set of experiments published in 1988, Samuelson and Zeckhauser asked people to make hypothetical choices among options such as investment portfolios; when one option was described as the status quo, it was chosen markedly more often than when it was not. They also analysed the health-plan choices of Harvard University employees and the retirement allocations of TIAA-CREF participants, and found that incumbents rarely changed their original choices: after new plans were introduced, new employees chose them markedly more often than incumbents facing the same options (Samuelson and Zeckhauser 1988). Kahneman, Knetsch and Thaler linked the tendency to loss aversion and the endowment effect: leaving the status quo means giving up something already held, and losses weigh more than equal gains (Kahneman et al. 1991).

Evidence

The power of defaults is most visible in organ donation. Comparing European countries, Johnson and Goldstein found effective consent rates of roughly 86 % to almost 100 % in countries with an opt-out (presumed consent) system, and roughly 4 % to 28 % in countries where people had to opt in (Johnson and Goldstein 2003). A meta-analysis of 58 studies estimated an average default effect of about d = 0.68, with large differences between studies; defaults work not only because changing them takes effort, but also because people read a default as a recommendation and treat the default option as something they already own (Jachimowicz et al. 2019).

Both findings show that the status quo carries weight of its own. The second also reminds us that keeping to it is not just “not bothering to move”: a default carries information (“the experts presumably recommend this”) and shifts the reference point. The two models below capture only part of this.

Model 1: a hard push versus a steady force

Calculation

Picture a state variable xx whose old resting point is x0=0x_0 = 0. It obeys the damped restoring equation

mẍ+cẋ+kx=F(t),m\ddot{x} + c\dot{x} + kx = F(t),

where mm stands for “inertia”, cc is the damping, kk is the coefficient of the restoring force that pulls the state back to the origin, and F(t)F(t) is the outside force. This is a simplified model; xx is not something that can be measured in a person. The program compares three forces: a short hard push, a three-time-unit “weekend burst”, and a small but steady force.

# A damped "state" variable x pulled back to its old set point x0 = 0 (status quo).
#   m x'' + c x' + k x = F(t)
# A short push, however hard, decays away; only a force that is sustained shifts the resting point.
# Cross-disciplinary analogy / simplified model: x is not a measured psychological quantity.
m, c, k = 1.0, 0.8, 1.0
dt = 0.001

def run(force, t_end=40.0):
    x = v = 0.0
    t = 0.0
    peak = 0.0
    while t < t_end:
        a = (force(t) - c * v - k * x) / m
        v += a * dt
        x += v * dt
        peak = max(peak, x)
        t += dt
    return peak, x

cases = [("short hard push   (F = 5 for 0.5)", lambda t: 5.0 if t < 0.5 else 0.0),
         ("weekend burst     (F = 1 for 3)",   lambda t: 1.0 if t < 3.0 else 0.0),
         ("small but steady  (F = 0.5 always)", lambda t: 0.5)]
for label, f in cases:
    peak, end = run(f)
    print(f"{label}: peak displacement {peak:4.2f}, position after 40 time units {end:5.2f}")
print("steady state under a constant force F is x = F/k: the set point moves only while the force lasts")
# short hard push   (F = 5 for 0.5): peak displacement 1.49, position after 40 time units -0.00
# weekend burst     (F = 1 for 3): peak displacement 1.23, position after 40 time units -0.00
# small but steady  (F = 0.5 always): peak displacement 0.63, position after 40 time units  0.50
# steady state under a constant force F is x = F/k: the set point moves only while the force lasts

The meaning is simple. The hard push and the weekend burst both move the state well away from the origin, but once the force stops, restoring force and damping pull it back; after forty time units it is at zero again. Only the small steady force changes the final position, and as long as it acts, the resting point sits at F/kF/k. In this model, what moves the resting point is persistence, not intensity.

The conclusion holds only under the model’s assumption that the restoring coefficient kk stays the same. Real habits change: sustained practice may reshape the “bowl” itself, which is what the double-well model of Chapter 3 deals with.

Model 2: switching cost and defaults

Calculation

The second model describes keeping to the status quo directly. Let the advantage dd of option B over option A differ from person to person, normally distributed with mean 0.3 and standard deviation 1: on average B is slightly better. A person leaves the default only when the advantage exceeds the cost cc of deciding and acting. The program computes the share who end up with B when A is the default and when B is the default.

# Status-quo choice with a switching (activation) cost. Simplified model.
# Option B's advantage over option A, d, varies across people: d ~ Normal(0.3, 1).
# A person leaves whichever option is the default only if the gain exceeds the cost c
# of deciding and acting. Without a cost, the default would not matter at all.
from statistics import NormalDist

D = NormalDist(0.3, 1.0)
print("cost c   chose B when A was default   chose B when B was default   gap")
for c in (0.0, 0.25, 0.5, 1.0, 1.5):
    b_if_a_default = 1 - D.cdf(c)      # switch A -> B only if d > c
    b_if_b_default = 1 - D.cdf(-c)     # switch B -> A only if -d > c, so B kept if d > -c
    gap = b_if_b_default - b_if_a_default
    print(f"{c:6.2f}   {100*b_if_a_default:22.1f} %   {100*b_if_b_default:24.1f} %   {100*gap:4.1f} points")
# cost c   chose B when A was default   chose B when B was default   gap
#   0.00                     61.8 %                       61.8 %    0.0 points
#   0.25                     52.0 %                       70.9 %   18.9 points
#   0.50                     42.1 %                       78.8 %   36.7 points
#   1.00                     24.2 %                       90.3 %   66.1 points
#   1.50                     11.5 %                       96.4 %   84.9 points

With no switching cost, the default makes no difference at all: 61.8 % choose B in both framings. As soon as there is a cost, the same people with the same preferences differ by tens of percentage points according to which option is the default. With a cost of one standard deviation, the gap reaches 66 points. A fairly small start-up cost is enough to give the status quo an overwhelming advantage across a population, without assuming any special love of the status quo.

Note

The model uses only one route, the switching cost. The meta-analysis shows that default effects also come from their implied recommendation and from the shift in reference point (Jachimowicz et al. 2019), neither of which is in the model. Cutting the switching cost to zero therefore need not remove the default effect.

Limits of the analogy

The inertia analogy has two limits that are easy to overlook. First, a body does not judge whether a force is worth yielding to, but a person does: sometimes a person keeps to the status quo precisely because, having considered it, they judge it better, and calling that a “bias” is unfair. Samuelson and Zeckhauser themselves noted that part of the tendency is rational, since gathering information and deciding both have costs (Samuelson and Zeckhauser 1988). Second, mass in physics is a fixed number, while a person’s “inertia” varies greatly with circumstances: “breaks” such as moving house, changing jobs or a new year temporarily loosen the hold of old habits, which behavioural science calls the habit discontinuity hypothesis, supported by a field experiment (Verplanken and Roy 2016).

Hypothesis · not established

Not established. In default-option experiments, if keeping to the status quo comes mainly from switching cost, then cutting the practical cost of switching to almost nothing (for example, one-click switching with full information about both options shown in advance) should shrink the default effect to less than half its original size. If, under conditions where an independent measure confirms that the switching cost has fallen sharply, the default effect is not clearly smaller than in the original condition, the hypothesis is refuted, and the recommendation or reference-point routes dominate.

Summary

The inertia analogy has one useful lesson: a short burst rarely changes a system with a restoring force, while a steady force, however small, moves the resting point. It also has something that must be said plainly: people are not passive bodies, keeping to the status quo is sometimes a reasonable choice, and the power of defaults does not come only from “not bothering to move”. The next chapter takes up another physical effect tied directly to starting: static friction.

References

Jachimowicz, Jon M., Shannon Duncan, Elke U. Weber, and Eric J. Johnson. 2019. “When and Why Defaults Influence Decisions: A Meta-Analysis of Default Effects.” Behavioural Public Policy 3 (2): 159–86.
Johnson, Eric J., and Daniel Goldstein. 2003. “Do Defaults Save Lives?” Science 302 (5649): 1338–39.
Kahneman, Daniel, Jack L. Knetsch, and Richard H. Thaler. 1991. “Anomalies: The Endowment Effect, Loss Aversion, and Status Quo Bias.” Journal of Economic Perspectives 5 (1): 193–206.
Newton, Isaac. 1687. Philosophiæ Naturalis Principia Mathematica. Royal Society.
Samuelson, William, and Richard Zeckhauser. 1988. “Status Quo Bias in Decision Making.” Journal of Risk and Uncertainty 1 (1): 7–59.
Verplanken, Bas, and Deborah Roy. 2016. “Empowering Interventions to Promote Sustainable Lifestyles: Testing the Habit Discontinuity Hypothesis in a Field Experiment.” Journal of Environmental Psychology 45: 127–34.

Fan, Y. (2026). Classical and Statistical Mechanics of Human Action: Psychological Inertia, Static Friction Thresholds, Kramers Escape Rate in Double-Well Potentials and Habit Phase Transitions, Read Beside East Asian Philosophy of Practice [行动的经典与统计力学] (Version 1.0.0). 5D Library. https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.23738774 · Licensed under Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International (CC BY-NC-ND 4.0).