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Chapter 3. Information Cascades: Why a Room Explodes or Stays Empty

Following the crowd can be rational

A viewer scrolls into a live stream. Two thousand people are watching and the comments are moving fast; she stays. Another stream selling the same product has eleven viewers; she leaves. She may know nothing else about either seller. Is she being foolish?

In 1992, Sushil Bikhchandani, David Hirshleifer and Ivo Welch, and independently Abhijit Banerjee, showed that following others can be perfectly rational, and that this rationality can still lead whole populations astray (Bikhchandani et al. 1992; Banerjee 1992).

The model

The state of the world is either good (the product is worth buying) or bad. Each person receives a private signal that points the right way with probability p>1/2p > 1/2, observes the choices, but not the signals, of everyone before them, and then decides. The first person follows her own signal. The second can infer the first’s signal from her choice and combines it with his own. But once the choices so far lean two ways more to one side than the other, a new person’s single signal can no longer outweigh the evidence of the choices she sees. From that moment she ignores her own signal and copies the crowd, and so does everyone after her, because her choice reveals nothing new. This is an information cascade.

The arithmetic is short. Signals arrive in pairs that either agree, pushing the count two steps to one side and starting a cascade, or disagree, cancelling out. The probability that a cascade, once it starts, is the correct one is

P(correct cascade)=p2p2+(1−p)2.P(\text{correct cascade}) = \frac{p^2}{p^2 + (1-p)^2} .

Calculation

A simulation of 100,000 sequences of 20 viewers each, in a world where the product really is good, for four levels of signal accuracy.

import random

def run(p, n, rng):
    """Bikhchandani-Hirshleifer-Welch: the true state is 'good'. Each viewer gets a private signal that is
    right with probability p, sees all earlier choices, and buys if the evidence favours 'good'.
    Ties follow the own signal. Once earlier buys outnumber skips by 2 (or the reverse), every later viewer
    ignores their own signal: a cascade."""
    # buys minus skips among the choices that still carried a signal
    d = 0
    for _ in range(n):
        if d >= 2:  return "buy cascade"
        if d <= -2: return "skip cascade"
        signal_good = rng.random() < p
        d += 1 if signal_good else -1
    return "no cascade yet"

rng = random.Random(3)
print("signal accuracy   buy cascade   skip cascade (wrong)   none after 20")
for p in (0.55, 0.6, 0.7, 0.8):
    res = [run(p, 20, rng) for _ in range(100000)]
    f = lambda k: res.count(k) / len(res)
    print(f"{p:15.2f} {f('buy cascade'):13.1%} {f('skip cascade'):22.1%} {f('no cascade yet'):15.2%}")
# signal accuracy   buy cascade   skip cascade (wrong)   none after 20
#            0.55         59.7%                  40.1%           0.18%
#            0.60         68.9%                  30.9%           0.14%
#            0.70         84.5%                  15.5%           0.04%
#            0.80         94.0%                   6.0%           0.00%

With signals that are right 60 per cent of the time, almost every sequence locks into a cascade within the first few viewers, and about 31 per cent lock into the wrong one, as the formula predicts (0.36/0.52=0.690.36/0.52 = 0.69 correct). Three features of the model match what creators and sellers see. Cascades form fast, after very few people. They can be wrong. And they are fragile: since they rest on the choices of the first few, a small piece of public information, such as a credible review or a visible return rate, can overturn them.

Evidence

Lisa Anderson and Charles Holt reproduced information cascades in the laboratory with urns and coloured balls: participants regularly followed the choices of those before them even when their own draw pointed the other way, as the model predicts (Anderson and Holt 1997). In a large field experiment on a news-aggregation website, Lev Muchnik, Sinan Aral and Sean Taylor randomly gave some new comments a single up-vote. Those comments were 32 per cent more likely to receive a further up-vote from the first viewer, and ended with mean ratings 25 per cent higher than controls, while down-votes were largely corrected by later viewers (Muchnik et al. 2013).

Thresholds and the phase transition

The cascade model explains why the first few viewers matter. A second model explains why a room can go from almost empty to packed with no change in what is being sold.

Mark Granovetter proposed that each person has a threshold: the share of others who must already be taking part before they will join (Granovetter 1978). A few people with very low thresholds join anyway. If enough others have thresholds just above them, they join next, and so on. Whether this chain reaction runs to the whole population or stops after a handful depends on the whole distribution of thresholds, and it can switch abruptly.

Calculation

A population whose thresholds are normally distributed with standard deviation 0.12; 2 per cent join regardless. The final share that joins is shown for different mean thresholds.

from statistics import NormalDist

def final_share(mu, sigma=0.12, seed=0.02):
    """Granovetter threshold model: each viewer joins once the share already joined reaches their threshold.
    Thresholds ~ Normal(mu, sigma); a seed share joins anyway. Iterate r -> seed + (1 - seed) * F(r)."""
    F = NormalDist(mu, sigma).cdf
    r = seed
    for _ in range(2000):
        r = seed + (1 - seed) * F(r)
    return r

print("mean threshold   final share joined")
for mu in (0.20, 0.24, 0.25, 0.26, 0.265, 0.27, 0.28, 0.30, 0.35):
    print(f"{mu:14.3f} {final_share(mu):18.1%}")
# mean threshold   final share joined
#          0.200             100.0%
#          0.240             100.0%
#          0.250             100.0%
#          0.260             100.0%
#          0.265             100.0%
#          0.270               5.8%
#          0.280               4.4%
#          0.300               3.3%
#          0.350               2.3%
Final share of viewers who join, against the mean threshold. Between 0.265 and 0.27 the outcome jumps from nearly everyone to almost no one: a phase transition.

A change in the average threshold of half a percentage point, from 0.265 to 0.270, moves the outcome from almost everyone to under 6 per cent. Nothing about the product changed. Duncan Watts showed the same kind of discontinuity for cascades on random networks: global cascades occur only within a window of network connectivity, and when they occur they are rare and large (Watts 2002).

Note

These are models of mechanisms, with invented parameters. They show why outcomes in creator commerce can be bimodal, either a burst or nothing, without implying that any real stream sits near a particular threshold.

What this means for creators and sellers

The first minutes of a live stream, and the first few hundred impressions of a video, carry far more weight than later ones, because they decide which side of a cascade or threshold the room falls on. That is why sellers try to start streams with an audience already present and why platforms test new content on small audiences first.

Hypothesis · not established

Not established. Live-commerce rooms show a phase transition in early concurrent viewers: below a threshold that depends on the category, rooms rarely grow; above it, they grow quickly. The hypothesis predicts a bimodal distribution of peak viewers across rooms with similar products and hosts, and a sharp rise in the probability of growth around a particular early-viewer count. It would be refuted if peak viewers rose smoothly and proportionally with early viewers.

Note

Manufactured social proof, such as bought viewers, fake comments or invented reviews, exploits exactly the mechanism described here. It also breaks platform rules and, in many jurisdictions, consumer-protection law, and it corrupts the signal that makes cascades informative in the first place. This book does not recommend it in any form.

References

Anderson, Lisa R., and Charles A. Holt. 1997. “Information Cascades in the Laboratory.” American Economic Review 87 (5): 847–62.
Banerjee, Abhijit V. 1992. “A Simple Model of Herd Behavior.” Quarterly Journal of Economics 107 (3): 797–817.
Bikhchandani, Sushil, David Hirshleifer, and Ivo Welch. 1992. “A Theory of Fads, Fashion, Custom, and Cultural Change as Informational Cascades.” Journal of Political Economy 100 (5): 992–1026.
Granovetter, Mark. 1978. “Threshold Models of Collective Behavior.” American Journal of Sociology 83 (6): 1420–43.
Muchnik, Lev, Sinan Aral, and Sean J. Taylor. 2013. “Social Influence Bias: A Randomized Experiment.” Science 341 (6146): 647–51.
Watts, Duncan J. 2002. “A Simple Model of Global Cascades on Random Networks.” Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences 99 (9): 5766–71.

Fan, Y. (2026). The Economics of Attention: Simon's Scarcity Law, Power-Law Networks and Conversion Funnels in Creator Commerce [注意力的经济学] (Version 1.0.0). 5D Library. https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.23689302 · Licensed under Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International (CC BY-NC-ND 4.0).