关于「权限矩阵审计表:实证闭环与证伪方案」,《口令熵与最小权限》给出的定量结论是什么?
结论:第八章给出权限矩阵审计表与同名小工具:示意公司的加权剩余风险指数从 11.640 降到 1.017,并给出预注册检验方案与推翻条件。书中以标注框区分已发表证据、可运行的 Python 计算(19 段程序)、原典与作者假说。
数据口径:书中的公司、账户与概率参数均为示意,全部计算由书中程序生成;本书不是个性化的经营、法律、财务或合规建议,审计流程与小工具不接触任何真实口令。 第六章用最小角色覆盖与找回关系图说明,示意公司期望每年失守 0.4972 个账户,只加固主邮箱就降到 0.1899。
对照数据表
下表数字由本章 Python 程序原样打印,可重新运行复现。 程序只用 Python 标准库与结论吻合的打印值: 1.017, 11.640
| member system role factor weight flags | |
| owner mail admin device | 14 ok |
| owner bank admin device | 2 ok |
| owner cloud admin knowledge | 4 R1 A-rev |
| assistant mail admin knowledge | 14 R1 R3 A-rev A-ex2 |
| assistant store admin none | 2 R1 R2 A-ex2 |
| bookkeeper bank payer device | 1 A-ex1 |
| designer store editor none | 1 A-rev |
| developer cloud admin device | 4 A-rev A-ex2 |
| second-factor coverage by grant | 0.750 |
| weighted residual risk index | 11.640 |
| grants with a red line | 3 of 8 |
| after least roles, device factors, no sharing: | |
| coverage 1.000, risk index 1.017, 11.4 times lower |
查看完整验算程序
# Chapter 8. p81: the permission-matrix audit sheet on a sample firm.
# Each grant: member, system, role, second factor (device, knowledge,
# none), whether the login is shared, days since last review. Roles and
# needs come from p61, blast radii from p62 (mail and domain 7, cloud 2,
# others 1), residual risk per factor from p43 at automated share 0.7:
# device 0.018, knowledge 0.459, none 1.0. Weight = blast radius, doubled
# for an admin role. Red lines: admin without a device factor; a shared
# login that can move money or keys; a non-owner admin on mail or
# domain. Amber: review older than 90 days; excess permissions. All data
# illustrative; the sheet never sees a password.
import math
from itertools import combinations
ROLES = {
"bank": {"viewer": {"read"}, "payer": {"read", "pay"},
"admin": {"read", "pay", "users", "limits"}},
"store": {"viewer": {"read"}, "editor": {"read", "edit"},
"refunds": {"read", "refund"},
"admin": {"read", "edit", "refund", "users", "keys"}},
"mail": {"user": {"own"}, "delegate": {"own", "shared"},
"admin": {"own", "shared", "users", "routing"}},
"cloud": {"viewer": {"read"}, "deployer": {"read", "deploy"},
"admin": {"read", "deploy", "iam", "billing"}},
}
RADIUS = {"mail": 7, "domain": 7, "cloud": 2, "bank": 1, "store": 1}
RESID = {"device": 0.018, "knowledge": 0.459, "none": 1.0}
MONEY = {"pay", "refund", "keys", "iam", "limits"}
GRANTS = [ # member, system, role, factor, shared, days, needed perms
("owner", "mail", "admin", "device", False, 30,
{"own", "shared", "users", "routing"}),
("owner", "bank", "admin", "device", False, 30,
{"read", "pay", "users", "limits"}),
("owner", "cloud", "admin", "knowledge", False, 200,
{"read", "deploy", "iam", "billing"}),
("assistant", "mail", "admin", "knowledge", False, 120,
{"own", "shared"}),
("assistant", "store", "admin", "none", True, 45,
{"read", "edit", "refund"}),
("bookkeeper", "bank", "payer", "device", False, 60, {"read"}),
("designer", "store", "editor", "none", False, 300, {"read", "edit"}),
("developer", "cloud", "admin", "device", False, 400,
{"read", "deploy"}),
]
def perms_of(system, role):
return set().union(*(ROLES[system][x] for x in role.split("+")))
def audit(grants, review_days=90):
rows, risk, covered = [], [], 0
for m, s, r, f, shared, days, need in grants:
perms = perms_of(s, r)
w = RADIUS[s] * (2 if r == "admin" else 1)
flags = []
if r == "admin" and f != "device":
flags.append("R1")
if shared and perms & MONEY:
flags.append("R2")
if r == "admin" and m != "owner" and s in ("mail", "domain"):
flags.append("R3")
if days > review_days:
flags.append("A-rev")
if len(perms - need) > 0:
flags.append("A-ex{}".format(len(perms - need)))
covered += f != "none"
risk.append(w * RESID[f])
rows.append((m, s, r, f, w, flags))
return rows, math.fsum(risk), covered / len(grants)
def least_role(system, need):
best = None
for k in range(1, len(ROLES[system]) + 1):
for combo in combinations(sorted(ROLES[system]), k):
got = set().union(*(ROLES[system][r] for r in combo))
if need <= got:
key = (len(got), k, combo)
best = key if best is None or key < best else best
return "+".join(best[2])
def fix(grants):
out = []
for m, s, r, f, shared, days, need in grants:
r2 = least_role(s, need)
hot = r2 == "admin" or perms_of(s, r2) & MONEY or RADIUS[s] >= 2
f2 = "device" if hot else ("knowledge" if f == "none" else f)
out.append((m, s, r2, f2, False, 0, need))
return out
rows, risk, cov = audit(GRANTS)
print("member system role factor weight flags")
for m, s, r, f, w, flags in rows:
print("{:<11s} {:<6s} {:<8s} {:<9s} {:>6d} {}".format(
m, s, r, f, w, " ".join(flags) or "ok"))
red = len([x for x in rows if any(g.startswith("R") for g in x[5])])
print("second-factor coverage by grant: {:.3f}".format(cov))
print("weighted residual risk index: {:.3f}".format(risk))
print("grants with a red line: {} of {}".format(red, len(rows)))
rows2, risk2, cov2 = audit(fix(GRANTS))
print("after least roles, device factors, no sharing:")
print(" coverage {:.3f}, risk index {:.3f}, {:.1f} times lower".format(
cov2, risk2, risk / risk2))唯一数据源与引用
范雅福(Fan, Y.). (2026). 《口令熵与撞库攻击、强制改密反安全悖论与一人公司账号最小权限母典》第 8 章「权限矩阵审计表:实证闭环与证伪方案」(版本 1.0.0). 5D Library. DOI 待发布
DOI 待发布 · 专著页正式发布后上线(本站暂无专著页) · 5DL-B-218 · v1.0.0 · CC-BY-NC-ND-4.0
BibTeX
@book{fan2026218,
author = {Fan, Yafu},
title = {Password Entropy and Credential Stuffing, the Forced-Rotation Paradox and Least-Privilege Accounts for One-Person Firms},
year = {2026},
publisher = {5D Library},
edition = {1.0.0},
note = {DOI pending}
}