关于「限速、黑名单与哈希前缀:在线猜测的天花板」,《口令熵与最小权限》给出的定量结论是什么?
结论:不知道前缀时,攻击者只猜一次的成功率是第一名候选的概率 0.0314。知道 1 个十六进制字符的前缀后,成功率升到 0.1240,是原来的 3.9 倍;2 个字符时 0.3041,9.7 倍;3 个字符时 0.6214,19.8 倍;4 个字符时 0.9463,30.1 倍。原因在「平均桶大小」那一列:20,000 个候选分到 4,096 个桶里,每个桶平均只有 4.9 个;分到 65,536 个桶里,平均每桶 0.3 个,桶里几乎只剩一个候选,前缀就等于答案。
数据口径:书中的公司、账户与概率参数均为示意,全部计算由书中程序生成;本书不是个性化的经营、法律、财务或合规建议,审计流程与小工具不接触任何真实口令。 第六章用最小角色覆盖与找回关系图说明,示意公司期望每年失守 0.4972 个账户,只加固主邮箱就降到 0.1899。
对照数据表
下表数字由本章 Python 程序原样打印,可重新运行复现。 程序只用 Python 标准库与结论吻合的打印值: 0.0314, 0.1240, 0.3, 0.3041, 0.6214, 0.9463
| toy population N=20,000, Zipf s=0.8; one guess per account | ||||
| prefix h | buckets | mean size | lam1 given prefix | gain over lam1 |
| 1 | 16 | 1250.0 | 0.1240 | 3.9 |
| 2 | 256 | 78.1 | 0.3041 | 9.7 |
| 3 | 4,096 | 4.9 | 0.6214 | 19.8 |
| 4 | 65,536 | 0.3 | 0.9463 | 30.1 |
| no prefix: lam1 = 0.0314 | ||||
| demo prefix of sha1('cand-00001'): 5ff41 |
查看完整验算程序
# Chapter 5. p52: what a hash-prefix breach query leaks.
# A breach-checking service is sent the first h hex digits of the
# password's SHA-1 and returns every leaked hash with that prefix, so
# the password itself never leaves the device. Li et al. (2019) showed
# that the prefix still helps a guessing attacker. Toy population: 20,000
# synthetic strings "cand-00001" and so on with Zipf s = 0.8 popularity
# (illustrative; no real password is used). An attacker who sees the
# prefix guesses the most popular candidate inside that bucket.
import hashlib
import math
from collections import defaultdict
N, S = 20_000, 0.8
cands = ["cand-{:05d}".format(i) for i in range(1, N + 1)]
w = [r ** (-S) for r in range(1, N + 1)]
z = math.fsum(w)
p = [x / z for x in w]
digest = [hashlib.sha1(c.encode("ascii")).hexdigest() for c in cands]
print("toy population N=20,000, Zipf s=0.8; one guess per account")
print("prefix h buckets mean size lam1 given prefix gain over lam1")
lam1 = p[0]
for h in (1, 2, 3, 4):
best = defaultdict(float)
for d, x in zip(digest, p):
key = d[:h]
if x > best[key]:
best[key] = x
got = math.fsum(best[k] for k in sorted(best))
print("{:<8d} {:>7,d} {:>9.1f} {:>17.4f} {:>13.1f}".format(
h, 16 ** h, N / 16 ** h, got, got / lam1))
print("no prefix: lam1 = {:.4f}".format(lam1))
print("demo prefix of sha1('cand-00001'): {}".format(digest[0][:5]))唯一数据源与引用
范雅福(Fan, Y.). (2026). 《口令熵与撞库攻击、强制改密反安全悖论与一人公司账号最小权限母典》第 5 章「限速、黑名单与哈希前缀:在线猜测的天花板」(版本 1.0.0). 5D Library. DOI 待发布
DOI 待发布 · 专著页正式发布后上线(本站暂无专著页) · 5DL-B-218 · v1.0.0 · CC-BY-NC-ND-4.0
BibTeX
@book{fan2026218,
author = {Fan, Yafu},
title = {Password Entropy and Credential Stuffing, the Forced-Rotation Paradox and Least-Privilege Accounts for One-Person Firms},
year = {2026},
publisher = {5D Library},
edition = {1.0.0},
note = {DOI pending}
}