What does Zero Trust for a One-Commander Empire conclude, in numbers, about “Blast Radius: the Cage of Least Privilege”?
Answer: Chapter 2 computes blast radius on a reachability graph: with narrowed tokens, dropped privileges and read-only roots, an intruder reaches on average 2.50 containers from any entry.
Scope of the numbers: The book is defensive only and describes no attack, intrusion, bypass or evasion technique; all hosts, domains and tokens are synthetic, parameters are illustrative, and all calculations are generated by its programs. It is general business analysis, not a security audit or legal advice, and any production change requires human review and sign-off.
Data table
The numbers below are printed verbatim by the chapter's Python program and can be reproduced by running it. standard-library Python onlyprinted values that match the answer: 2.50
| 32 containers, total value 128 | |
| config web-entry any-entry | |
| mean max mean value dbs | |
| flat net, broad tokens, escapes | 32.00 32 32.00 128.00 8.00 |
| segmented, broad tokens, escapes | 32.00 32 24.25 98.50 6.25 |
| segmented, scoped tokens, escapes | 18.00 32 13.50 56.25 3.62 |
| + caps dropped, no engine socket | 4.00 4 2.75 14.00 1.00 |
| + read-only root and volumes | 4.00 4 2.50 13.25 1.00 |
Show the full program
# Chapter 2. p21: blast radius by breadth-first search over 32 containers.
# Synthetic host-a runs 8 stacks, each with web, app, wrk (worker) and db.
# An edge u -> v means: whoever controls u can reach and take over v.
# Edge sources, all illustrative:
# net containers on one network reach each other's services;
# token a token stored in u grants rights on v;
# escape a privileged container (or one holding the engine socket)
# reaches the host, and the host controls every container;
# volume app and wrk of a stack share a writable volume.
# Blast radius = containers reachable from the entry, entry included.
# Value weights: db 10, app 3, wrk 2, web 1 (illustrative).
# Segmented layout: one bridge per stack inside 10.0.0.0/8 (synthetic).
from collections import deque
STACKS = 8
ROLES = ("web", "app", "wrk", "db")
VALUE = {"web": 1, "app": 3, "wrk": 2, "db": 10}
NODES = ["{}{}".format(r, s) for s in range(STACKS) for r in ROLES]
PRIVILEGED = ["wrk0", "wrk3", "app5", "wrk6"]
HOST = "host"
def build(flat, broad_tokens, escapes, shared_rw):
g = {n: set() for n in NODES + [HOST]}
for s in range(STACKS):
w, a, k, d = ("{}{}".format(r, s) for r in ROLES)
g[w].add(a)
g[a].update([d, k])
g[k].add(d)
if shared_rw:
g[a].add(k)
g[k].add(a)
if broad_tokens:
g[a].add(HOST)
if flat:
for u in NODES:
g[u].update(v for v in NODES if v != u)
if escapes:
for u in PRIVILEGED:
g[u].add(HOST)
g[HOST].update(NODES)
return g
def reach(g, start):
seen, todo = {start}, deque([start])
while todo:
u = todo.popleft()
for v in sorted(g[u]):
if v not in seen:
seen.add(v)
todo.append(v)
seen.discard(HOST)
return seen
def stats(g, entries):
n_size, n_val, n_db, biggest = 0, 0, 0, 0
for e in entries:
r = reach(g, e)
n_size += len(r)
biggest = max(biggest, len(r))
for n in r:
n_val += VALUE[n[:-1]]
n_db += 1 if n.startswith("db") else 0
k = len(entries)
return n_size / k, biggest, n_val / k, n_db / k
if __name__ == "__main__":
total_value = 0
for n in NODES:
total_value += VALUE[n[:-1]]
print("32 containers, total value {}".format(total_value))
configs = [("flat net, broad tokens, escapes", True, True, True, True),
("segmented, broad tokens, escapes", False, True, True, True),
("segmented, scoped tokens, escapes", False, False, True,
True),
("+ caps dropped, no engine socket", False, False, False,
True),
("+ read-only root and volumes", False, False, False, False)]
webs = [n for n in NODES if n.startswith("web")]
print("config web-entry any-entry")
print(" mean max mean value dbs")
for name, *flags in configs:
g = build(*flags)
m1, x1, _, _ = stats(g, webs)
m2, _, v2, d2 = stats(g, NODES)
print("{:<35} {:>5.2f} {:>3} {:>5.2f} {:>6.2f} {:>4.2f}".format(
name, m1, x1, m2, v2, d2))Single source and citation
Fan, Y. (2026). Zero-Trust Cybersecurity for a One-Commander Silicon Empire: Origin Cloaking, Secret Hygiene and Anti-Scraper Defense (Version 1.0.0), Chapter 2: Blast Radius: the Cage of Least Privilege. 5D Library. DOI pending
DOI pending · monograph page goes live after publication · 5DL-B-336 · v1.0.0 · CC-BY-NC-ND-4.0
BibTeX
@book{fan2026336,
author = {Fan, Yafu},
title = {Zero-Trust Cybersecurity for a One-Commander Silicon Empire: Origin Cloaking, Secret Hygiene and Anti-Scraper Defense},
year = {2026},
publisher = {5D Library},
edition = {1.0.0},
note = {DOI pending}
}Other chapter answers in this book
- Chapter 1 · The Attack Surface: Beyond the Ports, Credentials Are the Front Door
- Chapter 3 · Credential Hygiene: Format Checks and Revocation Lists
- Chapter 4 · Token Lifetime: the Exposure Window and the Ceiling on Loss
- Chapter 5 · Anti-Scraper Defence: Token Buckets and Trap Pages
- Chapter 6 · Ransomware: Common-Cause Failure and the Ten-Second Stop
- Chapter 7 · The Classics Examined: Sunzi and Kerckhoffs
- Chapter 8 · Closing the Loop: a Monthly Check-up and Pre-Registered Tests