Zero-Trust Cybersecurity for a One-Commander Silicon Empire: Origin Cloaking, Secret Hygiene and Anti-Scraper Defense: chapter answers
For a one-person business running a few dozen containers, the popular advice is to hide the origin behind a tunnel and open no public port. This book falsifies that advice: for small operators the largest attack surface is usually not a port but a credential. Using the structure of the attack surface metric, a tunnel removes 0.286 of the surface, but the credential dimension does not move, and its share of what remains rises to between 0.549 and 0.630. A large measurement of public repositories found secret leakage pervasive and persistent: a pushed string became searchable after a median of…
DOI pending · monograph page goes live after publication · 5DL-B-336 · 中文版
- Chapter 1 · The Attack Surface: Beyond the Ports, Credentials Are the Front Door
Now let tokens leak. With a yearly leak probability of 0.05, the open layout totals 33.600 and the tunnel layout 24.350, and the token share rises from 0.415 to 0.572. With a leak probability of 0.20, the totals are 37.… - Chapter 2 · Blast Radius: the Cage of Least Privilege
Chapter 2 computes blast radius on a reachability graph: with narrowed tokens, dropped privileges and read-only roots, an intruder reaches on average 2.50 containers from any entry. - Chapter 3 · Credential Hygiene: Format Checks and Revocation Lists
Chapter 3 shows that entropy cannot separate hexadecimal keys from commit hashes, while a format with a check value raises 1.5 alarms a month, and compresses revocation lists into a Bloom filter. - Chapter 4 · Token Lifetime: the Exposure Window and the Ceiling on Loss
The second half of p42 uses a burst of 20 and a rate of 60 per hour. With a lifetime of one hour, the worst case is 80 requests and the average 50. With six hours, 380 and 195. With one day, 1,460 and 666. With one week… - Chapter 5 · Anti-Scraper Defence: Token Buckets and Trap Pages
With ten canaries, a leaked copy of 1,000 records contains at least one with probability 0.0956; a copy of 10,000, 0.6513; a copy of 50,000, 0.9990. With fifty canaries, a copy of 1,000 records gives 0.3951 and a copy o… - Chapter 6 · Ransomware: Common-Cause Failure and the Ten-Second Stop
Chapter 6 shows that copies sharing a credential count as one, that a backup drilled once a year is broken at the moment of an incident with probability 0.7331, and that scripting the first three stop-bleed steps cuts 1… - Chapter 7 · The Classics Examined: Sunzi and Kerckhoffs
Three example rows follow. With an attack probability of 0.02, hoping costs 2.0 in expectation and preparing 5.2, so not preparing is cheaper; yet the chance of at least one attack within ten years is already 0.1829. Wi… - Chapter 8 · Closing the Loop: a Monthly Check-up and Pre-Registered Tests
Test one needs 67 incidents under the normal approximation, with the null hypothesis rejected if at least 41 have a credential as root cause. But the exact binomial power at that size is only 0.7841, short of 0.8. Searc…
Illustrative model calculation, not a live quote