Slow-Crash Liquidity Reserves, Real-Asset Option Valuation and Intergenerational Wealth Preservation: chapter answers
Does a great crash really always take thirty months? Why does a bear who is right on direction still fail to profit? When, and at what discount, can a holder of cash sensibly buy distressed assets? How much can a family fund meant to last for generations take each year? This book writes these claims as runnable arithmetic and then asks when they hold. Its model parameters are illustrative or synthetic; historical index data are used only to show the shape of declines; all calculations are generated by its programs; the book is not investment, legal or tax advice.
DOI 10.5281/zenodo.24090231 · Read the monograph · 中文版
- Chapter 1 · The Kinetics of a Slow Crash: Where Thirty Months Come From
Chapter 1 checks several famous declines: the Dow fell 89.2% from 1929 to 1932 over 34.1 months and the Nasdaq took 31.0 months from 2000 to 2002, but the S&P 500 took only 17.0 months from 2007 to 2009; a model with da… - Chapter 2 · Bear-Market Rallies, the Time Decay of Shorts, and the Timetable of Forced Sellers
Chapter 2 finds that rolling puts all the way down leaves a median cumulative result of only 0.002 after the index has halved, and that forced sales cluster in the second half of a decline. - Chapter 3 · Real Options on Distressed Assets: How Deep a Discount Before Buying
Chapter 3 uses real options to show that the discount needed depends on competition: 0.606 if an offer never goes away, only 0.163 if it is lost to someone else once a year; buying at a further 30% off in month 27 gives… - Chapter 4 · Putting a Cash Reserve to Work in Stages, and Where Distress Discounts Come From
Chapter 4 compares four rules for spending a cash reserve and shows that when industry buyers are short of cash in a crisis the discount can reach 0.443. - Chapter 5 · Ergodicity: Averages That Mislead
Chapter 5 uses Peters' coin to show an ensemble average of +0.050 a round against time-average growth of -0.0513, and shows how crash years make the Kelly leverage computed under a normal law dangerous. - Chapter 6 · The Family Fund: Merton's Rule and a Dynamic Cap on Withdrawals
Chapter 6 uses Merton's rule and a hundred-year simulation to show that a fixed withdrawal of 4 runs the fund out with chance 0.926, and that only 1.5% of the three-year average brings this down to 0.024. - Chapter 7 · Bai Gui's "Take What Others Discard", Ji Ran's "Stock Boats in Drought", the *Guanzi*'s "Four Autumns" and the Fan Clan Estate
If demand turns after one year, the yearly return is 0.905; after two years 0.348, after three 0.203, and after six only 0.074. Profit against the cycle depends mainly on how long one waits, which ties directly to the l… - Chapter 8 · Practice: The Cash Runway, Historical Stress Tests and the Problem of Too Few Cases
Chapter 8 gives a cash runway and historical stress tests, and shows that four declines can only place the typical duration between 18.7 and 39.6 months. Marked boxes separate published evidence, runnable Python calcula…
Illustrative model calculation, not a live quote