What does Performatives and Focal-Point Framing conclude, in numbers, about “Schelling Focal Points: How Minds Meet among Many Equilibria, and When They Stop Meeting”?
Answer: Chapter 2 discusses Schelling's focal points, reports the published fall in coordination from 0.82 to 0.52 found by Crawford and colleagues, and shows in a model how a sliver of payoff asymmetry drops coordination from 0.889 to 0.497.
Scope of the numbers: All dialogues are synthetic, all parameters illustrative, and every calculation is generated by the book's programs. The book is general business guidance, not individual advice and not legal advice; commissions appear only at a single level, paid to the direct referrer.
Data table
The numbers below are printed verbatim by the chapter's Python program and can be reproduced by running it. standard-library Python onlyprinted values that match the answer: 0.497, 0.52, 0.82, 0.889
| eps P1 picks X P2 picks X coordination | |
| 0.00 | 0.941 0.941 0.889 |
| 0.01 | 0.459 0.541 0.497 |
| 0.05 | 0.460 0.540 0.497 |
| 0.10 | 0.461 0.539 0.497 |
| 0.50 | 0.474 0.526 0.499 |
| 1.00 | 0.510 0.490 0.500 |
| split the surplus first (eps | 0): coordination 0.889 |
| published coordination rates (2008): | |
| sym 100/100 (hypothetical) | 0.82 |
| asym 100/101 (hypothetical) | 0.52 |
| X-Y sym 5/5 (paid) | 0.64 |
| X-Y asym 5/5.1 (paid) | 0.38 |
Show the full program
# Chapter 2. p22: a minute payoff asymmetry breaks a focal point.
# Two labels X (salient) and Y. Matching on X pays player 1 the amount
# 1 + eps and player 2 the amount 1; matching on Y pays the reverse.
# Level-k account in the spirit of Crawford, Gneezy and Rottenstreich
# (2008): when eps = 0 the naive level-0 player follows label salience
# (picks X with 0.5 + sig); as soon as eps > 0, level-0 follows payoff
# salience instead (own favourite with 0.5 + pi). Level-1 and level-2
# players give logit best responses (precision lam) to the level below.
# Population: shares f0, f1, f2 of levels 0, 1, 2. Model parameters are
# illustrative; the published rates are copied from the 2008 paper.
import math
SIG, PI, LAM = 0.25, 0.25, 8.0
F0, F1, F2 = 0.2, 0.5, 0.3
PUBLISHED = [("sym 100/100 (hypothetical)", 0.82),
("asym 100/101 (hypothetical)", 0.52),
("X-Y sym 5/5 (paid)", 0.64),
("X-Y asym 5/5.1 (paid)", 0.38)]
def logit_x(ux, uy):
return 1.0 / (1.0 + math.exp(-LAM * (ux - uy)))
def level0(eps, me):
# probability that player `me` (1 or 2) picks X at level 0
if eps == 0:
return 0.5 + SIG
return 0.5 + PI if me == 1 else 0.5 - PI
def best(eps, me, q_other_x):
# payoffs of matching on X / Y for player `me`
px, py = (1 + eps, 1.0) if me == 1 else (1.0, 1 + eps)
return logit_x(q_other_x * px, (1 - q_other_x) * py)
def rates(eps):
l1 = {m: best(eps, m, level0(eps, 3 - m)) for m in (1, 2)}
l2 = {m: best(eps, m, l1[3 - m]) for m in (1, 2)}
mix = {m: math.fsum([F0 * level0(eps, m), F1 * l1[m], F2 * l2[m]])
for m in (1, 2)}
return mix[1] * mix[2] + (1 - mix[1]) * (1 - mix[2]), mix
print("eps P1 picks X P2 picks X coordination")
for eps in (0.0, 0.01, 0.05, 0.10, 0.50, 1.00):
c, mix = rates(eps)
print("%.2f %.3f %.3f %.3f" % (eps, mix[1], mix[2], c))
c_fix, _ = rates(0.0)
print("split the surplus first (eps -> 0): coordination %.3f" % c_fix)
print("published coordination rates (2008):")
for name, r in PUBLISHED:
print(" %-28s %.2f" % (name, r))Single source and citation
Fan, Y. (2026). Performative Speech Acts, Schelling Focal-Point Framing and Verbal Reality-Collapse in High-Stakes Negotiation (Version 1.0.0), Chapter 2: Schelling Focal Points: How Minds Meet among Many Equilibria, and When They Stop Meeting. 5D Library. DOI pending
DOI pending · monograph page goes live after publication · 5DL-B-428 · v1.0.0 · CC-BY-NC-ND-4.0
BibTeX
@book{fan2026428,
author = {Fan, Yafu},
title = {Performative Speech Acts, Schelling Focal-Point Framing and Verbal Reality-Collapse in High-Stakes Negotiation},
year = {2026},
publisher = {5D Library},
edition = {1.0.0},
note = {DOI pending}
}Other chapter answers in this book
- Chapter 1 · Performative Utterances and Felicity Conditions: When Saying Is Doing
- Chapter 3 · First Offers as Anchors: How Heavy the First Number Is, and How High Is Too High
- Chapter 4 · Cheap Talk: When Costless Words Are Still Believed
- Chapter 5 · Credible Commitment: Audience Costs, Keeping Records and Repeated Relationships
- Chapter 6 · Voice, Confidence and Calibration: When Certainty Is an Asset and When It Is a Liability
- Chapter 7 · Classical Sources East and West: Correct Names, Names and Realities, Character and Performatives
- Chapter 8 · Field Tools and Checker Specifications: The Framing Ledger, the Calculator and Pre-Registered Tests