What does The Arithmetic of Bargaining, Collection and Escalation conclude, in numbers, about “Patience, Deadlines and Fairness”?

Answer: With equal patience of 0.9 the proposer gets 0.526; with 0.99, 0.503, almost an even split. Patience is power: a proposer with 0.95 facing an impatient side with 0.8 gets 0.833, and the reverse gives only 0.208. A risk that talks break down after a rejection acts like impatience on both sides and favours whoever moves first: with a breakdown risk of 0.05 the proposer's share rises to 0.515, with 0.2 to 0.558. In a collection or a price negotiation, the side that can afford to wait, a supplier with other customers or a debtor with no urgent need for the supplier, holds the stronger hand.

Scope of the numbers: Its parameters are illustrative or synthetic; all calculations are generated by its programs; the book is not legal, financial or employment advice, and empty or unlawful threats are not tactics it endorses. Marked boxes separate published evidence, runnable Python calculations (16 programs), classical sources and the author's hypotheses.

中文版

Data table

The numbers below are printed verbatim by the chapter's Python program and can be reproduced by running it. printed values that match the answer: 0.05, 0.208, 0.503, 0.515, 0.526, 0.558

d1 (proposer) d2 (other) proposer's share
0.900.90 0.526
0.990.99 0.503
0.950.80 0.833
0.800.95 0.208
breakdown risk b with d1 = d20.99
b0.00: proposer's share 0.503
b0.05: proposer's share 0.515
b0.20: proposer's share 0.558
Show the full program
# Chapter 2. p03: Rubinstein's alternating offers. Two sides split a
# surplus of 1, making offers in turn; each round of delay shrinks the
# value to side i by the factor d_i. In the unique subgame-perfect
# equilibrium the first proposer gets (1 - d2) / (1 - d1 d2) at once.
# With a chance b that talks break down after any rejection, each
# side's effective factor becomes d_i (1 - b).
def share(d1, d2):
    return (1 - d2) / (1 - d1 * d2)

if __name__ == "__main__":
    print("   d1 (proposer)   d2 (other)   proposer's share")
    for d1, d2 in ((0.9, 0.9), (0.99, 0.99), (0.95, 0.8), (0.8, 0.95)):
        print("   {:13.2f}   {:10.2f}   {:16.3f}".format(d1, d2,
                                                         share(d1, d2)))
    print("   breakdown risk b with d1 = d2 = 0.99")
    for b in (0.0, 0.05, 0.2):
        e = 0.99 * (1 - b)
        print("   b = {:.2f}: proposer's share {:.3f}".format(b, share(e, e)))

Single source and citation

Fan, Y. (2026). Multistage Ultimatum Bargaining, Accounts-Receivable Decay Kinetics and Optimal Escalation Sequences (Version 1.0.0), Chapter 2: Patience, Deadlines and Fairness. 5D Library. https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.24090245

DOI: 10.5281/zenodo.24090245 · Read the monograph · 5DL-B-094 · v1.0.0 · CC-BY-NC-ND-4.0

BibTeX
@book{fan2026094,
  author    = {Fan, Yafu},
  title     = {Multistage Ultimatum Bargaining, Accounts-Receivable Decay Kinetics and Optimal Escalation Sequences},
  year      = {2026},
  publisher = {5D Library},
  edition   = {1.0.0},
  doi       = {10.5281/zenodo.24090245},
  url       = {https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.24090245}
}

Other chapter answers in this book