What does The Arithmetic of Bargaining, Collection and Escalation conclude, in numbers, about “What a Pattern of Concessions Tells the Other Side”?

Answer: Chapter 1 reads a sequence of concessions as evidence about the buyer's limit: after 65, 85 and 95 the seller's estimate is 110.9, against 115.8 after equal steps, and a precise final number raises the belief that an offer is final from 0.333 to 0.750.

Scope of the numbers: Its parameters are illustrative or synthetic; all calculations are generated by its programs; the book is not legal, financial or employment advice, and empty or unlawful threats are not tactics it endorses. Marked boxes separate published evidence, runnable Python calculations (16 programs), classical sources and the author's hypotheses.

中文版

Data table

The numbers below are printed verbatim by the chapter's Python program and can be reproduced by running it. standard-library Python onlyprinted values that match the answer: 110.9, 115.8, 65, 85, 95

planoffers so farE[R]P(R <= 105)P(R > 120)
Ackerman65, 85, 95110.90.3890.185
equal steps65, 77, 89115.80.2060.360
noise-free limit implied by 65, 85, 95: 105.0

Key formula

\[o_{n+1} - o_n = k\,(R - o_n) + \varepsilon.\]
Show the full program
# Chapter 1. p01: What a concession pattern tells the other side. A
# buyer with target price 100 makes four offers. Ackerman plan: 65, 85,
# 95, 100 (shrinking steps). Equal steps: 65, 77, 89, 100. The seller
# reads the steps with a simple model: each offer closes a fixed part
# k of the gap to the buyer's true limit R, plus noise (sd 2):
#   o(n+1) - o(n) = k (R - o(n)) + e.
# Prior: R uniform on 95 to 160, k uniform on 0.2 to 0.8 (grid). The
# seller's posterior for R after the first three offers: its mean, the
# chance that R is at most 105 and the chance that R is above 120.
from math import exp

def posterior(offers, sd=2.0):
    rs = [95 + i * 0.5 for i in range(131)]
    ks = [0.2 + j * 0.01 for j in range(61)]
    post = []
    for r in rs:
        w = 0.0
        for k in ks:
            ll = 0.0
            for a, b in zip(offers, offers[1:]):
                ll += -((b - a) - k * (r - a)) ** 2 / (2 * sd * sd)
            w += exp(ll)
        post.append(w)
    z = sum(post)
    return rs, [p / z for p in post]

if __name__ == "__main__":
    print("   plan             offers so far   E[R]    P(R <= 105)"
          "  P(R > 120)")
    for lab, offers in (("Ackerman", (65, 85, 95)),
                        ("equal steps", (65, 77, 89))):
        rs, p = posterior(offers)
        mean = sum(r * w for r, w in zip(rs, p))
        lo = sum(w for r, w in zip(rs, p) if r <= 105)
        hi = sum(w for r, w in zip(rs, p) if r > 120)
        print("   {:<15}  {:<14} {:6.1f}   {:10.3f}  {:10.3f}".format(
            lab, ", ".join(map(str, offers)), mean, lo, hi))
    o1, o2, o3 = 65, 85, 95
    print("   noise-free limit implied by 65, 85, 95: {:.1f}".format(
        (o2 * o2 - o1 * o3) / (2 * o2 - o1 - o3)))

Single source and citation

Fan, Y. (2026). Multistage Ultimatum Bargaining, Accounts-Receivable Decay Kinetics and Optimal Escalation Sequences (Version 1.0.0), Chapter 1: What a Pattern of Concessions Tells the Other Side. 5D Library. https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.24090245

DOI: 10.5281/zenodo.24090245 · Read the monograph · 5DL-B-094 · v1.0.0 · CC-BY-NC-ND-4.0

BibTeX
@book{fan2026094,
  author    = {Fan, Yafu},
  title     = {Multistage Ultimatum Bargaining, Accounts-Receivable Decay Kinetics and Optimal Escalation Sequences},
  year      = {2026},
  publisher = {5D Library},
  edition   = {1.0.0},
  doi       = {10.5281/zenodo.24090245},
  url       = {https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.24090245}
}

Other chapter answers in this book