What does The Arithmetic of Bargaining, Collection and Escalation conclude, in numbers, about “What a Pattern of Concessions Tells the Other Side”?
Answer: Chapter 1 reads a sequence of concessions as evidence about the buyer's limit: after 65, 85 and 95 the seller's estimate is 110.9, against 115.8 after equal steps, and a precise final number raises the belief that an offer is final from 0.333 to 0.750.
Scope of the numbers: Its parameters are illustrative or synthetic; all calculations are generated by its programs; the book is not legal, financial or employment advice, and empty or unlawful threats are not tactics it endorses. Marked boxes separate published evidence, runnable Python calculations (16 programs), classical sources and the author's hypotheses.
Data table
The numbers below are printed verbatim by the chapter's Python program and can be reproduced by running it. standard-library Python onlyprinted values that match the answer: 110.9, 115.8, 65, 85, 95
| plan | offers so far | E[R] | P(R <= 105) | P(R > 120) |
| Ackerman | 65, 85, 95 | 110.9 | 0.389 | 0.185 |
| equal steps | 65, 77, 89 | 115.8 | 0.206 | 0.360 |
| noise-free limit implied by 65, 85, 95: 105.0 |
Key formula
Show the full program
# Chapter 1. p01: What a concession pattern tells the other side. A
# buyer with target price 100 makes four offers. Ackerman plan: 65, 85,
# 95, 100 (shrinking steps). Equal steps: 65, 77, 89, 100. The seller
# reads the steps with a simple model: each offer closes a fixed part
# k of the gap to the buyer's true limit R, plus noise (sd 2):
# o(n+1) - o(n) = k (R - o(n)) + e.
# Prior: R uniform on 95 to 160, k uniform on 0.2 to 0.8 (grid). The
# seller's posterior for R after the first three offers: its mean, the
# chance that R is at most 105 and the chance that R is above 120.
from math import exp
def posterior(offers, sd=2.0):
rs = [95 + i * 0.5 for i in range(131)]
ks = [0.2 + j * 0.01 for j in range(61)]
post = []
for r in rs:
w = 0.0
for k in ks:
ll = 0.0
for a, b in zip(offers, offers[1:]):
ll += -((b - a) - k * (r - a)) ** 2 / (2 * sd * sd)
w += exp(ll)
post.append(w)
z = sum(post)
return rs, [p / z for p in post]
if __name__ == "__main__":
print(" plan offers so far E[R] P(R <= 105)"
" P(R > 120)")
for lab, offers in (("Ackerman", (65, 85, 95)),
("equal steps", (65, 77, 89))):
rs, p = posterior(offers)
mean = sum(r * w for r, w in zip(rs, p))
lo = sum(w for r, w in zip(rs, p) if r <= 105)
hi = sum(w for r, w in zip(rs, p) if r > 120)
print(" {:<15} {:<14} {:6.1f} {:10.3f} {:10.3f}".format(
lab, ", ".join(map(str, offers)), mean, lo, hi))
o1, o2, o3 = 65, 85, 95
print(" noise-free limit implied by 65, 85, 95: {:.1f}".format(
(o2 * o2 - o1 * o3) / (2 * o2 - o1 - o3)))Single source and citation
Fan, Y. (2026). Multistage Ultimatum Bargaining, Accounts-Receivable Decay Kinetics and Optimal Escalation Sequences (Version 1.0.0), Chapter 1: What a Pattern of Concessions Tells the Other Side. 5D Library. https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.24090245
DOI: 10.5281/zenodo.24090245 · Read the monograph · 5DL-B-094 · v1.0.0 · CC-BY-NC-ND-4.0
BibTeX
@book{fan2026094,
author = {Fan, Yafu},
title = {Multistage Ultimatum Bargaining, Accounts-Receivable Decay Kinetics and Optimal Escalation Sequences},
year = {2026},
publisher = {5D Library},
edition = {1.0.0},
doi = {10.5281/zenodo.24090245},
url = {https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.24090245}
}Other chapter answers in this book
- Chapter 2 · Patience, Deadlines and Fairness
- Chapter 3 · Why Overdue Invoices Look Less Collectible Every Month
- Chapter 4 · When to Escalate
- Chapter 5 · Credible Threats and the Value of Following Through
- Chapter 6 · Raises and Price Increases: Building the Alternative
- Chapter 7 · Zhu Zhiwu, "Mou gong" and the Tang Code's Ladder for Unpaid Debt
- Chapter 8 · Practice: A Collection Playbook, an Opening Offer and Knowing a Client