5D Library › 多阶段最后通牒议价、应收账款衰减动力学与最优施压序列 · English
第五章 可信的威胁与贯彻到底的价值
起诉的威胁何时可信?
谢林指出,威胁只有在发出威胁的人到时候真的会执行,或者已经安排得非执行不可时才起作用 (Schelling 1960)。债权人起诉的威胁,只有在债务人拒付之后起诉仍然值得时才可信。p09 把这写成一个比较:起诉成本为 ;债权人以 0.9 的机会胜诉,之后能收回判决金额的 0.7,所以只有当 时起诉才划算。
推导
# Chapter 5. p09: When is the threat to sue credible? An unpaid invoice
# of amount A. Suing costs C; the creditor wins with chance 0.9 and can
# then collect 0.7 of the judgment. Suing is worth doing after the
# debtor refuses only if 0.9 x 0.7 x A > C, so a debtor who knows the
# numbers can ignore the threat below A* = C / 0.63. Three regimes:
# ordinary litigation (C = 3,000), a small-claims track (C = 300), and
# a lawyer already paid on retainer, so that only 1,000 more is spent.
if __name__ == "__main__":
regimes = (("ordinary court", 3000), ("small claims", 300),
("retainer paid", 1000))
for lab, c in regimes:
print(" {:<15} threshold A* = {:8,.0f}".format(lab, c / 0.63))
print(" amount ordinary small claims retainer paid")
for a in (500, 2000, 5000, 20000):
row = ["credible" if 0.63 * a > c else "empty" for _, c in regimes]
print(" {:6,d} {:>8} {:>12} {:>13}".format(a, *row))
# ordinary court threshold A* = 4,762
# small claims threshold A* = 476
# retainer paid threshold A* = 1,587
# amount ordinary small claims retainer paid
# 500 empty credible empty
# 2,000 empty credible credible
# 5,000 credible credible credible
# 20,000 credible credible credible在成本 3,000 的普通诉讼里,威胁只对 4,762 以上的发票可信;欠 2,000、又清楚这些数字的债务人可以不理它。成本 300 的小额诉讼程序把门槛降到 476。律师已经按聘请费付清、只需再花 1,000 时,门槛降到 1,587。让威胁可信,主要是降低执行它的成本,或者事先已经付掉。
注
威胁必须是真的。 在美国,《公平债务催收作业法》禁止消费债务的催收者以「任何依法不能采取或并不打算采取的行动」相威胁 (United States Congress 1977);其他地方也有类似规定。在消费债务催收中,空洞的威胁不是手段,而是违法。本章的算术讨论的是哪些真实的步骤值得采取。
信誉
面对许多债务人的债权人,即使单个诉讼亏钱,贯彻到底也可能有收益,因为其他债务人会知道威胁是真的。p10 比较这类诉讼的成本与它们促成的额外付款。
推导
# Chapter 5. p10: Following through to be believed. A firm has N
# overdue invoices a year of amount 2,000 each. Suing on one costs
# 3,000 and recovers 0.63 x 2,000 on average, a loss of 1,740 per suit.
# If the firm is known to sue whenever an invoice reaches the last
# stage, the share of debtors who pay before that stage rises from 0.60
# to 0.75; it must then sue the 10 a year who still do not pay (fewer
# when N is small: 10% of N). Net yearly gain from a reputation for
# following through, by N.
if __name__ == "__main__":
loss = 3000 - 0.63 * 2000
print(" loss per suit: {:,.0f}".format(loss))
print(" invoices N extra paid suits net gain")
for n in (20, 50, 100, 300):
extra = n * 2000 * (0.75 - 0.60)
suits = min(10, 0.1 * n)
print(" {:10d} {:10,.0f} {:5.0f} {:8,.0f}".format(
n, extra, suits, extra - suits * loss))
print(" break-even N with 10 suits: {:.1f}".format(
10 * loss / (2000 * 0.15)))
# loss per suit: 1,740
# invoices N extra paid suits net gain
# 20 6,000 2 2,520
# 50 15,000 5 6,300
# 100 30,000 10 12,600
# 300 90,000 10 72,600
# break-even N with 10 suits: 58.0对一张 2,000 的发票起诉,平均亏 1,740。但如果贯彻到底的信誉,把在最后阶段之前付款的债务人比例从 0.60 提高到 0.75,一家每年有 20 张逾期发票的公司净得 2,520;100 张时 12,600;300 张时 72,600。如果不论规模大小每年都要打 10 场这样的官司,盈亏平衡点是每年 58.0 张发票。贯彻到底是对之后每一次提醒之可信度的投资;它对债务人众多、彼此会互通消息的债权人有利,对一次性的索赔则利益小得多。
假说 · 尚未验证
作者的诠释(尚未验证): 在小公司中,以把欠款追到法院立案而著称的公司,逾期发票在最后阶段之前付款的比例较高。什么会证明它错: 在一项按行业与客户群配对公司的预先登记研究中,最后阶段之前付款的比例与公司的立案记录无关。
小结
当执行威胁在执行的那一刻是划算的,威胁才可信;较低的成本与事先付出的承诺使它可信。对债务人众多的债权人而言,对不划算的案件贯彻到底,可以通过信誉得到回报;而在消费债务催收中,不打算执行的威胁根本不被允许。
参考文献
Fan, Y. (2026). Multistage Ultimatum Bargaining, Accounts-Receivable Decay Kinetics and Optimal Escalation Sequences: Ackerman Concession Curves, Credible Threat Thresholds and Default Recovery Bounds [多阶段最后通牒议价、应收账款衰减动力学与最优施压序列] (Version 1.0.0). 5D Library. https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.24090245 · Licensed under Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International (CC BY-NC-ND 4.0).