5D Library › 股东搭便车博弈、动态股权成熟与背刺早期预警模型 · English

第一章 努力无法核实时的搭便车

团队问题

几个人一起生产,又没有人看得出每个人贡献了多少时,每个人都会倾向于让别人多干。阿尔奇安与德姆塞茨认为这正是企业要有负责监督的所有者的原因 (Alchian and Demsetz 1972);霍姆斯特罗姆证明,在个人努力无法核实的团队里,任何恰好把产出分完的规则都不能让每个人得到正确的激励 (Holmström 1982)。持有固定均等股份的联合创始人,正是这样的团队。

p01 写出最简单的版本。每位创始人选择努力 eie_i,成本 cei2/2c e_i^2/2;公司价值为 θ∑iei\theta \sum_i e_i。持股 sis_i 的创始人每多付出一单位努力得到 siθs_i \theta,于是选择 ei=siθ/ce_i = s_i \theta / c,而使创造价值最大的努力对每个人都是 θ/c\theta / c。

推导

# Chapter 1. p01: Free riding when effort cannot be verified. N founders
# each choose effort e_i at cost c e_i^2 / 2; the firm's value is
# theta * (e_1 + ... + e_N). Founder i owns share s_i and so chooses
# e_i = s_i theta / c (Nash), while the value-maximising effort is
# theta / c for everyone. Efficiency = value created net of effort cost,
# relative to the first best. theta = c = 1. Equal splits for N = 1 to
# 5, and some unequal splits for N = 2.
def efficiency(shares):
    es = [s for s in shares]                  # e_i = s_i theta / c
    w = sum(es) - sum(e * e for e in es) / 2
    fb = len(shares) - len(shares) / 2
    return w / fb

if __name__ == "__main__":
    print("   founders N   equal shares   efficiency   (2N - 1) / N^2")
    for n in range(1, 6):
        print("   {:10d}   {:12.3f}   {:10.3f}   {:14.3f}".format(
            n, 1 / n, efficiency([1 / n] * n), (2 * n - 1) / n ** 2))
    print("   two founders, unequal splits")
    for a in (0.5, 0.6, 0.7, 0.9):
        print("   {:.1f} / {:.1f}   efficiency {:.3f}".format(
            a, 1 - a, efficiency([a, 1 - a])))
#    founders N   equal shares   efficiency   (2N - 1) / N^2
#             1          1.000        1.000            1.000
#             2          0.500        0.750            0.750
#             3          0.333        0.556            0.556
#             4          0.250        0.438            0.438
#             5          0.200        0.360            0.360
#    two founders, unequal splits
#    0.5 / 0.5   efficiency 0.750
#    0.6 / 0.4   efficiency 0.740
#    0.7 / 0.3   efficiency 0.710
#    0.9 / 0.1   efficiency 0.590

均分时效率是 (2N−1)/N2(2N-1)/N^2:两位创始人 0.750,三位 0.556,四位 0.438,五位 0.360。创始人能力相同时,不均分也没有帮助:六四分是 0.740,七三分 0.710,九一分只有 0.590,因为小股东努力的下降超过大股东努力的上升。这个损失不是哪一方的品德问题,而是努力看不见、回报被分享时每个人的自然做法。

霍姆斯特罗姆的团队目标

霍姆斯特罗姆的出路是:只有当产出达到最优水平时才把份额付给团队,没达到时由团队以外的人(通常是投资人)留下产出。在没有噪声的世界里,全力努力就成为均衡:谁松懈,谁就毁掉自己的份额。p02 给产出加上噪声。

推导

# Chapter 1. p02: A group target with noisy output. Holmstrom showed
# that a rule paying the team its shares only if output reaches a
# target can restore first-best effort, but someone outside the team
# (an investor, the "budget breaker") must keep the output when the
# target is missed. Two founders, theta = c = 1: output
# Y = e_1 + e_2 + noise (sd sigma). Each founder gets Y / 2 if Y >= 2
# (the first-best output), else nothing. Symmetric Nash efforts are the
# fixed points of the best response on a grid (step 0.0025, within one
# step). Reported:
# the highest one, the chance the target is missed although both make
# that effort, and the share of expected output the founders forfeit.
from math import erf, exp, pi, sqrt

def Phi(x):
    return 0.5 * (1 + erf(x / sqrt(2)))

def phi(x):
    return exp(-x * x / 2) / sqrt(2 * pi)

def paid(mu, sigma, t=2.0):
    # E[Y 1{Y >= t}] for Y ~ normal(mu, sigma)
    if sigma == 0:
        return mu if mu >= t - 1e-9 else 0.0
    z = (t - mu) / sigma
    return mu * (1 - Phi(z)) + sigma * phi(z)

GRID = [i / 400 for i in range(0, 601)]

def best(other, sigma):
    return max(GRID, key=lambda e: 0.5 * paid(e + other, sigma) - e * e / 2)

def equilibria(sigma):
    return [e for e in GRID if abs(best(e, sigma) - e) <= 0.0025]

if __name__ == "__main__":
    print("   noise sd   effort   target missed   output forfeited"
          "   efficiency")
    for sigma in (0.0, 0.1, 0.3, 0.6):
        e = max(equilibria(sigma))
        mu = 2 * e
        miss = (0.0 if mu >= 2 else 1.0) if sigma == 0 else \
            1 - Phi((mu - 2) / sigma)
        lost = 1 - paid(mu, sigma) / mu
        print("   {:8.1f}   {:6.3f}   {:13.3f}   {:16.3f}   {:10.3f}".format(
            sigma, e, miss, lost, 2 * e - e * e))
    print("   equal shares, no target: effort 0.500, efficiency 0.750")
    print("   zero effort is also an equilibrium at sd 0.0: {}".format(
        0.0 in equilibria(0.0)))
#    noise sd   effort   target missed   output forfeited   efficiency
#         0.0    1.000           0.000              0.000        1.000
#         0.1    1.097           0.026              0.023        0.990
#         0.3    1.165           0.136              0.108        0.973
#         0.6    0.005           1.000              0.902        0.010
#    equal shares, no target: effort 0.500, efficiency 0.750
#    zero effort is also an equilibrium at sd 0.0: True

没有噪声时,这条规则恢复全力努力(效率 1.000),不过零努力也是一个均衡。噪声小时(标准差 0.1),创始人为了确保达标,各自努力 1.097,超过最优,仍有 0.026 的机会达不到;效率 0.990。噪声为 0.3 时,各自努力 1.165,有 0.136 的机会达不到,损失预期产出的 0.108,效率 0.973。噪声为 0.6 时,好的均衡消失:目标太不确定,努力保证不了它,创始人干脆放弃,效率跌到 0.010,远低于单纯均分的 0.750。集体惩罚对能掌控结果的团队是有力的工具,对不能掌控结果的团队则很危险。

假说 · 尚未验证

作者的诠释(尚未验证): 在创始人持有固定均等股份的初创公司里,创始人自报的工作时数与产出,低于股权与业绩挂钩的创始人,而且差距随创始人人数增加而扩大。什么会证明它错: 在一项对可比初创公司的预先登记调查中,把公司阶段与融资固定之后,创始人的努力与股权结构无关,或者差距不随创始人人数增加。

小结

努力无法核实时,固定均分让两位创始人损失四分之一的价值,人数越多损失越大;调整比例没有帮助。如果结果主要取决于努力,团队目标可以恢复努力;但在大噪声下,它可能把努力摧毁。

参考文献

Alchian, Armen A., and Harold Demsetz. 1972. “Production, Information Costs, and Economic Organization.” The American Economic Review 62 (5): 777 to 795.
Holmström, Bengt. 1982. “Moral Hazard in Teams.” The Bell Journal of Economics 13 (2): 324 to 340.

Fan, Y. (2026). Shareholder Free-Riding Games, Dynamic Vesting Mechanisms and Defection Early-Warning Models: Moral-Hazard Equity Dilution, Shotgun Buy-Sell Clauses and Behavioral Divergence Signals [股东搭便车博弈、动态股权成熟与背刺早期预警模型] (Version 1.0.0). 5D Library. https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.24090243 · Licensed under Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International (CC BY-NC-ND 4.0).