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Chapter 5. The Pass Mark as a Quality Filter: Static Optimum and Reputation

What a licence sells

The economics of practice licences has two classical readings. Leland treats a licence as a minimum quality standard: when clients cannot judge a practitioner’s skill in advance, poor practitioners drag the whole market down; a minimum standard stops this but also reduces supply and raises prices (Leland 1979). Shapiro showed that the premium on high-quality products is a return to reputation: sellers keep quality high because once reputation is damaged, future premiums are gone (Shapiro 1983). Kleiner and Krueger’s survey found that occupational licensing covers a large share of the US workforce and is associated with higher wages (Kleiner and Krueger 2013).

For a licence issued by a firm rather than a state, the two readings pose two computable questions: where the pass mark sits, and how the quality and size of the licensed group change with it; and whether the brand premium can make up for the licence fees turned away.

One static year

Each year 1,000 candidates finish the course with mastery equal to base mastery plus 0.08 (the course lift of Chapter 4) and sit the exam of Chapter 3 once, with pass mark TT from 10 to 20. Clients pay a licensed practitioner a session price carrying a brand premium, 80exp⁡(4(Q−0.75))80\exp(4(Q – 0.75)), where QQ is the licensed group’s mean mastery; each licensee holds 100 sessions a year; the firm takes a licence fee of 600 plus a 10% royalty. A session goes badly with probability 0.1(1−m)20.1(1-m)^2.

Calculation

# Chapter 5. [p09] The pass mark as a quality filter: a static optimum.
# 1,000 candidates a year arrive with mastery m = theta + 0.08 (theta ~
# Beta(6, 3), the post-course lift of p08), capped at 0.97. They sit
# the exam of p05 once; the pass mark T runs from 10 to 20 points.
# Certified pool: size N(T) and mean mastery Q(T), integrated on a grid.
# Clients pay a certified practitioner a session price that carries a
# brand premium, price = 80 exp(4 (Q - 0.75)); each practitioner holds
# 100 sessions a year. The firm earns a licence fee of 600 plus a 10%
# royalty. Clients' harm: a session goes badly with chance 0.1 (1-m)^2.
import math

K = 6.0

def bb_pmf(n, a, b):
    lb = lambda x, y: math.lgamma(x) + math.lgamma(y) - math.lgamma(x + y)
    return [math.exp(math.lgamma(n + 1) - math.lgamma(j + 1)
                     - math.lgamma(n - j + 1)
                     + lb(j + a, n - j + b) - lb(a, b)) for j in range(n + 1)]

def total_pmf(m):
    one = bb_pmf(4, K * m, K * (1 - m))
    tot = [1.0]
    for _ in range(5):
        nxt = [0.0] * (len(tot) + 4)
        for i, x in enumerate(tot):
            for j, y in enumerate(one):
                nxt[i + j] += x * y
        tot = nxt
    return tot

def pool(T, grid=400):
    n = q = harm = 0.0
    for i in range(grid):
        th = (i + 0.5) / grid
        w = 168 * th ** 5 * (1 - th) ** 2 / grid
        m = min(0.97, th + 0.08)
        pp = sum(total_pmf(m)[T:])
        n += w * pp
        q += w * pp * m
        harm += w * pp * 0.1 * (1 - m) ** 2
    return 1000 * n, q / n, harm / n

if __name__ == "__main__":
    print("    T   certified  mean m  price   bad/100   firm profit")
    best = None
    for T in range(10, 21):
        n, Q, h = pool(T)
        price = 80 * math.exp(4 * (Q - 0.75))
        prof = n * (600 + 0.10 * 100 * price)
        best = max(best or (prof, T), (prof, T))
        print("   {:2d} {:11.1f} {:7.4f} {:6.2f} {:9.3f} {:13.0f}".format(
            T, n, Q, price, 100 * h, prof))
    print("   profit-maximising pass mark: T = {}".format(best[1]))
    print("\nReading: in a static year the firm earns most by passing")
    print("almost everyone: the premium a stricter mark buys is too")
    print("small to offset the licences it forgoes. A static model")
    print("cannot justify the 16/20 mark; only reputation over time")
    print("can (p10).")
#     T   certified  mean m  price   bad/100   firm profit
#    10       909.4  0.7678  85.90     0.707       1326784
#    11       868.0  0.7762  88.85     0.657       1291977
#    12       815.2  0.7863  92.52     0.599       1243348
#    13       750.5  0.7981  96.99     0.537       1178226
#    14       674.0  0.8116 102.36     0.471       1094334
#    15       586.7  0.8268 108.76     0.402        990152
#    16       490.7  0.8436 116.33     0.333        865282
#    17       389.0  0.8621 125.26     0.265        720647
#    18       285.5  0.8822 135.75     0.199        558862
#    19       184.5  0.9038 147.99     0.138        383736
#    20        89.4  0.9264 162.01     0.084        198401
#    profit-maximising pass mark: T = 10
#
# Reading: in a static year the firm earns most by passing
# almost everyone: the premium a stricter mark buys is too
# small to offset the licences it forgoes. A static model
# cannot justify the 16/20 mark; only reputation over time
# can (p10).

Raising the mark from 10 to 16 shrinks the licensed group from 909.4 to 490.7, lifts its mean mastery from 0.7678 to 0.8436 and the session price from 85.90 to 116.33, and cuts bad sessions per hundred from 0.707 to 0.333. But the firm’s annual profit falls from 1326784 to 865282. In a static year the most profitable mark is 10: the premium a stricter mark buys does not make up for the licence fees it turns away.

This contradicts the author’s outline, but it is honest: unless clients’ willingness to pay responds strongly to quality, a single year’s interest of the firm is to lower the mark. A static model cannot defend 16/20.

Five years of reputation

The static model leaves something out: bad sessions get talked about. The program lets each bad session become a public incident with probability ss; each incident lowers brand reputation RR by 0.004; reputation moves each year a third of the way toward the licensed group’s mean mastery; session prices and the next year’s candidates both follow reputation. Licensees renew each year with probability 0.8. With 10% discounting, the program computes five-year net present value (NPV), averaging 50 runs for each mark.

Calculation

# Chapter 5. [p10] Reputation over five years: the pass mark and NPV.
# Year by year: candidates arrive (1,000 exp(3 (R - 0.75))), each with
# mastery m = min(0.97, theta + 0.08), theta ~ Beta(6, 3), and pass the
# p05 exam at mark T. Licensees renew with probability 0.8. Each holds
# 100 sessions; a session goes badly with chance 0.1 (1 - m)^2, and each
# bad session becomes a public scandal with chance s = 0.02. The brand's
# reputation R (in mastery units, R0 = 0.75) moves a third of the way
# toward the pool's mean mastery and loses 0.004 per scandal. Session
# price 80 exp(4 (R - 0.75)); the firm takes 600 per licence plus 10%.
# NPV at 10% over 5 years, mean of 50 runs; also R in year 5.
import math
import random

K, YEARS, RUNS = 6.0, 5, 50

def pass_prob(m, T, memo={}):
    key = (round(m, 3), T)
    if key not in memo:
        a, b = K * m, K * (1 - m)
        lb = lambda x, y: (math.lgamma(x) + math.lgamma(y)
                           - math.lgamma(x + y))
        one = [math.exp(math.lgamma(5) - math.lgamma(j + 1)
                        - math.lgamma(5 - j) + lb(j + a, 4 - j + b)
                        - lb(a, b)) for j in range(5)]
        tot = [1.0]
        for _ in range(5):
            nxt = [0.0] * (len(tot) + 4)
            for i, x in enumerate(tot):
                for j, y in enumerate(one):
                    nxt[i + j] += x * y
            tot = nxt
        memo[key] = sum(tot[T:])
    return memo[key]

def run(rng, T, s=0.02):
    R, pool, npv = 0.75, [], 0.0
    for y in range(YEARS):
        for _ in range(int(1000 * math.exp(3 * (R - 0.75)))):
            m = min(0.97, rng.betavariate(6, 3) + 0.08)
            if rng.random() < pass_prob(m, T):
                pool.append(m)
        price = 80 * math.exp(4 * (R - 0.75))
        npv += len(pool) * (600 + 10 * price) / 1.1 ** y
        scandals = 0
        for m in pool:
            lam = 100 * 0.1 * (1 - m) ** 2 * s
            scandals += rng.random() < 1 - math.exp(-lam)
        qbar = sum(pool) / len(pool) if pool else R
        R = R + (qbar - R) / 3 - 0.004 * scandals
        pool = [m for m in pool if rng.random() < 0.8]
    return npv, R

if __name__ == "__main__":
    rng = random.Random(74010)
    print("    T   NPV (mean)   R year 5   NPV with s = 0.05")
    res = {}
    for T in range(10, 21, 2):
        a = [run(rng, T) for _ in range(RUNS)]
        b = [run(rng, T, 0.05) for _ in range(RUNS)]
        nv = sum(x for x, _ in a) / len(a)
        rr = sum(r for _, r in a) / len(a)
        nb = sum(x for x, _ in b) / len(b)
        res[T] = (nv, nb)
        print("   {:2d} {:12.0f} {:10.4f} {:19.0f}".format(T, nv, rr, nb))
    print("   best T (s = 0.02): {}   best T (s = 0.05): {}".format(
        max(res, key=lambda t: res[t][0]), max(res, key=lambda t: res[t][1])))
    print("\nReading: once scandals feed back into reputation, a lax")
    print("mark erodes the brand that pays every licensee, and the")
    print("best mark moves up; how far depends on how often a bad")
    print("session goes public, which no model can supply. Within five")
    print("years 16/20 is not the NPV optimum; it is the lowest mark")
    print("shown that keeps reputation near where it started.")
#     T   NPV (mean)   R year 5   NPV with s = 0.05
#    10      7586147     0.4953             5365145
#    12      7693477     0.5609             5463101
#    14      7489253     0.6415             5584471
#    16      6625999     0.7392             5391765
#    18      4818147     0.8308             4375957
#    20      1792803     0.8974             1782396
#    best T (s = 0.02): 12   best T (s = 0.05): 14
#
# Reading: once scandals feed back into reputation, a lax
# mark erodes the brand that pays every licensee, and the
# best mark moves up; how far depends on how often a bad
# session goes public, which no model can supply. Within five
# years 16/20 is not the NPV optimum; it is the lowest mark
# shown that keeps reputation near where it started.

With s=0.02s = 0.02 the mark with the highest five-year NPV is 12 (7693477), and under a mark of 10 reputation has fallen to 0.4953 by year five; when incidents spread more easily (s=0.05s = 0.05) the optimum moves to 14 (5584471). A mark of 16 is not the five-year NPV optimum, but it is the lowest mark in the table that keeps reputation roughly at its starting value of 0.75 (0.7392 in year five).

So reputation feedback does push the best mark up, and how far depends on the probability ss that an incident spreads – a probability no model can supply. If the firm plans to operate for more than ten years, or if ss is larger than assumed here, 16/20 comes closer to the optimum; Chapter 6 shows that once the client side is added, 16/20 is almost exactly optimal.

Hypothesis · not established

The author’s interpretation (not yet tested): in the author’s business, a licensed practitioner’s mistake spreads quickly through social media (ss above 0.05), so the pass mark should be set at the level that preserves reputation, not at the level that maximises one year’s profit. What would show this wrong: if real complaint and rating data showed that licensees’ public incidents are unrelated to their exam scores, or that brand ratings do not respond to incidents, the reputation mechanism would fail and the choice of mark should go back to the static model.

Summary

Raising the pass mark from 10 to 16 makes the licensed group smaller and better and raises session prices, but lowers one year’s profit; the static optimum is 10. With reputation feedback the five-year optimum moves to 12-14, depending on how often incidents spread; 16/20 is the lowest mark that preserves reputation. Choosing a pass mark is, at bottom, choosing a time horizon and a reputation risk.

References

Kleiner, Morris M., and Alan B. Krueger. 2013. “Analyzing the Extent and Influence of Occupational Licensing on the Labor Market.” Journal of Labor Economics 31 (S1): S173–202.
Leland, Hayne E. 1979. “Quacks, Lemons, and Licensing: A Theory of Minimum Quality Standards.” Journal of Political Economy 87 (6): 1328–46.
Shapiro, Carl. 1983. “Premiums for High Quality Products as Returns to Reputations.” Quarterly Journal of Economics 98 (4): 659–80.

Fan, Y. (2026). Diagnostic-to-Pedagogy Conversion Funnels, Mastery-Gated Curriculum Architecture and Certification Network Economics: Self-Cannibalization Bounds, Spaced-Retrieval Curves and Two-Sided Practitioner Licensing [诊学一体转化漏斗、掌握度门控课程与持牌人网络经济学] (Version 1.0.0). 5D Library. https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.24090197 · Licensed under Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International (CC BY-NC-ND 4.0).