5D Library › 诊学一体转化漏斗、掌握度门控课程与持牌人网络经济学 · English
第五章 及格线是质量过滤器:静态最优与声誉动态
牌照卖的是什么
执业牌照的经济学有两种经典解释。Leland 把牌照看作最低质量标准:当客户无法事先判断从业者的水平时,劣质从业者会把整个市场拖下去,最低标准可以阻止这一点,但也会减少供给、抬高价格 (Leland 1979)。Shapiro 则指出,高质量产品的溢价是对声誉的回报:卖家之所以维持高质量,是因为声誉一旦受损,未来的溢价就没了 (Shapiro 1983)。Kleiner 与 Krueger 的调查显示,职业牌照在美国覆盖了相当大比例的劳动力,并与更高的工资相关 (Kleiner and Krueger 2013)。
对于一张由企业而不是政府颁发的牌照,这两种解释给出两个可以计算的问题:及格线定在哪里,持牌人群体的质量与规模如何变化?品牌溢价能否补偿被拒之门外的牌照费?
静态的一年
每年 1,000 位候选人走完课程,掌握度为基础掌握度加 0.08(第四章的课程提升),考一次第三章的试,及格线 从 10 分到 20 分。客户为持牌执业者的每次服务支付带品牌溢价的价格 ,其中 是持牌群体的平均掌握度;每位持牌人每年服务 100 次;企业收 600 的牌照费外加 10% 的分成。一次服务出问题的概率设为 。
推导
# Chapter 5. [p09] The pass mark as a quality filter: a static optimum.
# 1,000 candidates a year arrive with mastery m = theta + 0.08 (theta ~
# Beta(6, 3), the post-course lift of p08), capped at 0.97. They sit
# the exam of p05 once; the pass mark T runs from 10 to 20 points.
# Certified pool: size N(T) and mean mastery Q(T), integrated on a grid.
# Clients pay a certified practitioner a session price that carries a
# brand premium, price = 80 exp(4 (Q - 0.75)); each practitioner holds
# 100 sessions a year. The firm earns a licence fee of 600 plus a 10%
# royalty. Clients' harm: a session goes badly with chance 0.1 (1-m)^2.
import math
K = 6.0
def bb_pmf(n, a, b):
lb = lambda x, y: math.lgamma(x) + math.lgamma(y) - math.lgamma(x + y)
return [math.exp(math.lgamma(n + 1) - math.lgamma(j + 1)
- math.lgamma(n - j + 1)
+ lb(j + a, n - j + b) - lb(a, b)) for j in range(n + 1)]
def total_pmf(m):
one = bb_pmf(4, K * m, K * (1 - m))
tot = [1.0]
for _ in range(5):
nxt = [0.0] * (len(tot) + 4)
for i, x in enumerate(tot):
for j, y in enumerate(one):
nxt[i + j] += x * y
tot = nxt
return tot
def pool(T, grid=400):
n = q = harm = 0.0
for i in range(grid):
th = (i + 0.5) / grid
w = 168 * th ** 5 * (1 - th) ** 2 / grid
m = min(0.97, th + 0.08)
pp = sum(total_pmf(m)[T:])
n += w * pp
q += w * pp * m
harm += w * pp * 0.1 * (1 - m) ** 2
return 1000 * n, q / n, harm / n
if __name__ == "__main__":
print(" T certified mean m price bad/100 firm profit")
best = None
for T in range(10, 21):
n, Q, h = pool(T)
price = 80 * math.exp(4 * (Q - 0.75))
prof = n * (600 + 0.10 * 100 * price)
best = max(best or (prof, T), (prof, T))
print(" {:2d} {:11.1f} {:7.4f} {:6.2f} {:9.3f} {:13.0f}".format(
T, n, Q, price, 100 * h, prof))
print(" profit-maximising pass mark: T = {}".format(best[1]))
print("\nReading: in a static year the firm earns most by passing")
print("almost everyone: the premium a stricter mark buys is too")
print("small to offset the licences it forgoes. A static model")
print("cannot justify the 16/20 mark; only reputation over time")
print("can (p10).")
# T certified mean m price bad/100 firm profit
# 10 909.4 0.7678 85.90 0.707 1326784
# 11 868.0 0.7762 88.85 0.657 1291977
# 12 815.2 0.7863 92.52 0.599 1243348
# 13 750.5 0.7981 96.99 0.537 1178226
# 14 674.0 0.8116 102.36 0.471 1094334
# 15 586.7 0.8268 108.76 0.402 990152
# 16 490.7 0.8436 116.33 0.333 865282
# 17 389.0 0.8621 125.26 0.265 720647
# 18 285.5 0.8822 135.75 0.199 558862
# 19 184.5 0.9038 147.99 0.138 383736
# 20 89.4 0.9264 162.01 0.084 198401
# profit-maximising pass mark: T = 10
#
# Reading: in a static year the firm earns most by passing
# almost everyone: the premium a stricter mark buys is too
# small to offset the licences it forgoes. A static model
# cannot justify the 16/20 mark; only reputation over time
# can (p10).及格线从 10 提到 16,持牌人从 909.4 人降到 490.7 人,平均掌握度从 0.7678 升到 0.8436,服务价格从 85.90 升到 116.33,每百次服务出问题的次数从 0.707 降到 0.333。但企业的年利润从 1326784 降到 865282。静态的一年里,利润最高的及格线是 10:更严格的及格线带来的溢价,抵不上它拒掉的牌照费。
这个结论与作者的提纲相反,但它是诚实的:只要客户的支付意愿对质量的反应不够强,单看一年,企业的利益就是放宽及格线。静态模型无法为 16/20 辩护。
五年的声誉
静态模型漏掉了一样东西:出问题的服务会传出去。程序让每次出问题的服务以概率 变成公开的负面事件,每个事件使品牌声誉 下降 0.004;声誉每年向持牌群体的平均掌握度靠拢三分之一;服务价格与下一年的候选人数都随声誉变化。持牌人每年以 0.8 的概率续期。按 10% 贴现,计算五年的净现值(NPV),每个及格线模拟 50 次取平均。
推导
# Chapter 5. [p10] Reputation over five years: the pass mark and NPV.
# Year by year: candidates arrive (1,000 exp(3 (R - 0.75))), each with
# mastery m = min(0.97, theta + 0.08), theta ~ Beta(6, 3), and pass the
# p05 exam at mark T. Licensees renew with probability 0.8. Each holds
# 100 sessions; a session goes badly with chance 0.1 (1 - m)^2, and each
# bad session becomes a public scandal with chance s = 0.02. The brand's
# reputation R (in mastery units, R0 = 0.75) moves a third of the way
# toward the pool's mean mastery and loses 0.004 per scandal. Session
# price 80 exp(4 (R - 0.75)); the firm takes 600 per licence plus 10%.
# NPV at 10% over 5 years, mean of 50 runs; also R in year 5.
import math
import random
K, YEARS, RUNS = 6.0, 5, 50
def pass_prob(m, T, memo={}):
key = (round(m, 3), T)
if key not in memo:
a, b = K * m, K * (1 - m)
lb = lambda x, y: (math.lgamma(x) + math.lgamma(y)
- math.lgamma(x + y))
one = [math.exp(math.lgamma(5) - math.lgamma(j + 1)
- math.lgamma(5 - j) + lb(j + a, 4 - j + b)
- lb(a, b)) for j in range(5)]
tot = [1.0]
for _ in range(5):
nxt = [0.0] * (len(tot) + 4)
for i, x in enumerate(tot):
for j, y in enumerate(one):
nxt[i + j] += x * y
tot = nxt
memo[key] = sum(tot[T:])
return memo[key]
def run(rng, T, s=0.02):
R, pool, npv = 0.75, [], 0.0
for y in range(YEARS):
for _ in range(int(1000 * math.exp(3 * (R - 0.75)))):
m = min(0.97, rng.betavariate(6, 3) + 0.08)
if rng.random() < pass_prob(m, T):
pool.append(m)
price = 80 * math.exp(4 * (R - 0.75))
npv += len(pool) * (600 + 10 * price) / 1.1 ** y
scandals = 0
for m in pool:
lam = 100 * 0.1 * (1 - m) ** 2 * s
scandals += rng.random() < 1 - math.exp(-lam)
qbar = sum(pool) / len(pool) if pool else R
R = R + (qbar - R) / 3 - 0.004 * scandals
pool = [m for m in pool if rng.random() < 0.8]
return npv, R
if __name__ == "__main__":
rng = random.Random(74010)
print(" T NPV (mean) R year 5 NPV with s = 0.05")
res = {}
for T in range(10, 21, 2):
a = [run(rng, T) for _ in range(RUNS)]
b = [run(rng, T, 0.05) for _ in range(RUNS)]
nv = sum(x for x, _ in a) / len(a)
rr = sum(r for _, r in a) / len(a)
nb = sum(x for x, _ in b) / len(b)
res[T] = (nv, nb)
print(" {:2d} {:12.0f} {:10.4f} {:19.0f}".format(T, nv, rr, nb))
print(" best T (s = 0.02): {} best T (s = 0.05): {}".format(
max(res, key=lambda t: res[t][0]), max(res, key=lambda t: res[t][1])))
print("\nReading: once scandals feed back into reputation, a lax")
print("mark erodes the brand that pays every licensee, and the")
print("best mark moves up; how far depends on how often a bad")
print("session goes public, which no model can supply. Within five")
print("years 16/20 is not the NPV optimum; it is the lowest mark")
print("shown that keeps reputation near where it started.")
# T NPV (mean) R year 5 NPV with s = 0.05
# 10 7586147 0.4953 5365145
# 12 7693477 0.5609 5463101
# 14 7489253 0.6415 5584471
# 16 6625999 0.7392 5391765
# 18 4818147 0.8308 4375957
# 20 1792803 0.8974 1782396
# best T (s = 0.02): 12 best T (s = 0.05): 14
#
# Reading: once scandals feed back into reputation, a lax
# mark erodes the brand that pays every licensee, and the
# best mark moves up; how far depends on how often a bad
# session goes public, which no model can supply. Within five
# years 16/20 is not the NPV optimum; it is the lowest mark
# shown that keeps reputation near where it started.当 时,五年 NPV 最高的及格线是 12(7693477),及格线 10 的第五年声誉已跌到 0.4953;当负面事件更容易传开()时,最优移到 14(5584471)。及格线 16 在五年内不是 NPV 最优,但它是表中能让声誉大致保持在起点 0.75 附近的最低及格线(第五年 0.7392)。
所以,声誉反馈确实把最优及格线往上推,推多远取决于负面事件传开的概率 ,而这个概率没有任何模型能代为给出。若企业打算经营十年以上,或者 比本书设想的更大,16/20 会更接近最优;第六章会看到,加入客户一侧之后,16/20 几乎就是最优。
假说 · 尚未验证
作者的诠释(尚未验证): 在作者的业务中,持牌执业者的一次失误会通过社交媒体迅速传开( 高于 0.05),因此及格线应当定在保持声誉的水平,而不是单年利润最高的水平。什么会证明这一判断错:若真实投诉与评价数据显示,持牌执业者的公开负面事件与其考试分数无关,或者品牌评分对负面事件不敏感,那么声誉机制不成立,及格线的选择应回到静态模型。
小结
把及格线从 10 提到 16,持牌群体变小、变好,服务价格上升,但单年利润下降;静态最优是 10。加入声誉反馈后,五年最优移到 12—14,取决于负面事件传开的概率;16/20 是能保住声誉的最低及格线。及格线的选择,本质上是对时间跨度与声誉风险的选择。
参考文献
Fan, Y. (2026). Diagnostic-to-Pedagogy Conversion Funnels, Mastery-Gated Curriculum Architecture and Certification Network Economics: Self-Cannibalization Bounds, Spaced-Retrieval Curves and Two-Sided Practitioner Licensing [诊学一体转化漏斗、掌握度门控课程与持牌人网络经济学] (Version 1.0.0). 5D Library. https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.24090197 · Licensed under Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International (CC BY-NC-ND 4.0).