5D Library › 分拆经济学、防套利身份锁定与多阶授权阶梯 · English
第二章 廉价全通卡的蚕食与重尾估值
全通卡的价格从哪里来
第一章比较的是最优定价的套餐。现实中的「全通卡」往往不是这样定价的:它常常被定为「比一个板块贵一点」,以显得划算。第一章的程序已经给出这种卡的代价:在 indep 结构下,价格为单品均价 1.5 倍的全通卡使收入下降到分拆的大约四分之三;在 segm 结构下也是如此。只有在 pareto 结构下,这样的卡反而比分拆多赚(每位买家 38.58 对 31.05,p02),因为那里本来就应当捆绑。本章把全通卡的价格从低到高扫一遍,看损失究竟从哪里来。
蚕食:高估值客户回流
继续使用 segm 结构:92% 的消费者,8% 的工作室。四个板块的单品价保持在最优水平,再加一张价格为单品价总和 倍的全通卡,买家在「按单品买」与「买卡」之间选择剩余较大的一项。
推导
# Chapter 2. [p03] How a cheap all-access pass cannibalizes high-value
# buyers. Regime segm of p02 (92% consumers, 8% studios that value the
# business-script module B at 1,000..5,000). Separate prices are held
# at their optimum; a pass is added at a fraction f of the sum of the
# separate prices. For each f we report revenue per buyer relative to
# separate pricing, the share of studios that switch to the pass, and
# the revenue those studios used to pay that is now lost.
import math
import random
N, MODS = 8000, 4
def draw(rng):
v = [rng.uniform(0, 100) for _ in range(3)]
if rng.random() < 0.08:
return v + [rng.uniform(1000, 5000)], True
return v + [rng.uniform(0, 10)], False
def best_price(values):
s = sorted(values)
n = len(s)
top = n - n // 100
return max((s[i] * (n - i), s[i]) for i in range(top))[1]
def outcome(v, prices, pp):
sep_s = math.fsum(max(0.0, x - p) for x, p in zip(v, prices))
sep_r = math.fsum(p for x, p in zip(v, prices) if x >= p)
t = math.fsum(v)
# an indifferent buyer takes the pass; the 1e-9 keeps that tie a tie
if t >= pp and t - pp >= sep_s - 1e-9:
return pp, sep_r, True
return sep_r, sep_r, False
if __name__ == "__main__":
rng = random.Random(70)
pop = [draw(rng) for _ in range(N)]
prices = [best_price([v[j] for v, s in pop]) for j in range(MODS)]
total = math.fsum(prices)
base = math.fsum(outcome(v, prices, 1e18)[0] for v, s in pop) / N
studios = sum(1 for v, s in pop if s)
print(" separate prices sum to {:.1f}; revenue {:.2f} per buyer".format(
total, base))
print(" f pass price revenue/SEP studios on pass lost/buyer")
for f in (0.05, 0.1, 0.2, 0.3, 0.4, 0.5, 0.6, 0.8, 0.9, 1.0):
pp = f * total
rev, lost, sw = 0.0, 0.0, 0
for v, s in pop:
r, old, took = outcome(v, prices, pp)
rev += r
if s and took:
sw += 1
lost += old - r
print(" {:4.2f} {:11.1f} {:12.3f} {:16.3f} {:11.2f}".format(
f, pp, rev / N / base, sw / studios, lost / N))
print("\nReading: any pass priced below the studio price of B moves")
print("studios onto it; the loss is their consumer surplus handed")
print("back, and it is not made up by the consumers the pass adds.")
# separate prices sum to 2709.1; revenue 206.54 per buyer
# f pass price revenue/SEP studios on pass lost/buyer
# 0.05 135.5 0.413 1.000 126.88
# 0.10 270.9 0.439 1.000 115.79
# 0.20 541.8 0.547 1.000 93.61
# 0.30 812.7 0.654 1.000 71.43
# 0.40 1083.6 0.761 0.998 49.39
# 0.50 1354.5 0.836 0.936 33.87
# 0.60 1625.5 0.893 0.866 22.00
# 0.80 2167.3 0.979 0.745 4.27
# 0.90 2438.2 0.992 0.673 1.65
# 1.00 2709.1 1.000 0.078 0.00
#
# Reading: any pass priced below the studio price of B moves
# studios onto it; the loss is their consumer surplus handed
# back, and it is not made up by the consumers the pass adds.单品价总和为 2709.1。只要全通卡比工作室单买 B 板块还便宜,工作室就全部转去买卡: 在 0.30 以下时,转卡比例都是 1.000。价格为总和的十分之一时,收入只剩分拆的 0.439,每位买家平均损失 115.79;价格为总和的一半时,收入是分拆的 0.836。全通卡新吸引来的消费者,远远补不上工作室交还的剩余。只有当卡价接近单品价总和时,损失才趋于零,而那时全通卡已经不再「廉价」。
推导
蚕食的上界。 设高估值客群占比为 ,他们原本支付的单品价为 ,全通卡价为 。若 ,这一客群全部转卡,单这一项的收入损失为 ,与新增买家无关。在 segm 中 为 8%, 约为 B 的单价,于是卡价每低一元,每位买家就损失约 0.08 元,这是全通卡要靠新增销量去填的坑。
重尾估值削弱捆绑,但不翻转它
提纲的另一个判断是:估值服从重尾帕累托分布时,捆绑不如分拆。Ibragimov 与 Walden 证明,在估值的尾部极重(期望不存在)时,捆绑确实可能不如分拆 (Ibragimov and Walden 2010)。程序把四个板块的 Lomax 尾指数 从 5 调到 0.7,每个板块以 2,000 的预算封顶,并保留「每个价格至少卖给 1% 的买家」的规则。
推导
# Chapter 2. [p04] Heavy tails: when does the optimal bundle stop
# beating separate prices? Four modules with iid Lomax values (scale
# 20, tail index a), each capped at a budget of 2,000. A price must
# sell to at least 1% of buyers (as in p02). 8,000 buyers per a,
# seed 72. We also give the closed-form optimum of one uncapped
# module, p* = 20/(a - 1), which exists only for a > 1.
import random
N, MODS, CAP = 8000, 4, 2000.0
def best(values):
s = sorted(values)
n = len(s)
top = n - n // 100
return max((s[i] * (n - i), s[i]) for i in range(top))
if __name__ == "__main__":
print(" a SEP/buyer BUN/buyer SEP/BUN closed-form p*")
for a in (0.7, 0.9, 1.1, 1.5, 2.0, 3.0, 5.0):
rng = random.Random(72)
pop = [[min(CAP, 20 * ((1 - rng.random()) ** (-1 / a) - 1))
for _ in range(MODS)] for _ in range(N)]
sep = sum(best([v[j] for v in pop])[0] for j in range(MODS)) / N
bun = best([sum(v) for v in pop])[0] / N
star = "{:.1f}".format(20 / (a - 1)) if a > 1 else "none"
print(" {:3.1f} {:10.2f} {:10.2f} {:8.3f} {:>15s}".format(
a, sep, bun, sep / bun, star))
print("\nReading: for a of 1.5 or more the bundle earns about a third")
print("more than separate prices; as the tail gets heavier the edge")
print("shrinks, to about 5% at a = 0.7. Heavy tails alone do not make")
print("unbundling win; they only weaken the bundle.")
# a SEP/buyer BUN/buyer SEP/BUN closed-form p*
# 0.7 318.07 334.78 0.950 none
# 0.9 120.89 135.45 0.892 none
# 1.1 59.11 75.66 0.781 200.0
# 1.5 31.49 42.59 0.739 40.0
# 2.0 20.44 27.64 0.739 20.0
# 3.0 12.09 16.29 0.742 10.0
# 5.0 6.66 8.93 0.747 5.0
#
# Reading: for a of 1.5 or more the bundle earns about a third
# more than separate prices; as the tail gets heavier the edge
# shrinks, to about 5% at a = 0.7. Heavy tails alone do not make
# unbundling win; they only weaken the bundle.尾指数在 1.5 以上时,分拆的收入只有捆绑的 0.739 到 0.747,捆绑多赚约三分之一;尾部越重,捆绑的优势越小,尾指数 0.9 时为 0.892,0.7 时为 0.950。在本书的参数下,重尾只削弱捆绑,没有让分拆反超;要让分拆反超,需要第一章那样的数量级分离。尾指数小于 1 时,单个板块的封闭解 不存在:不封顶的话,最优价格会无限上升,价格完全由最富有的极少数买家决定。这也是本书给价格加「至少卖给 1%」约束的理由。
假说 · 尚未验证
作者的诠释(尚未验证): 作者的个人用户对单个板块的估值大致是轻尾的,而工作室对商业板块的估值是重尾的。什么会证明这一判断错:若真实意愿支付数据的尾指数估计(例如用最大似然对上尾拟合)在个人用户中也低于 1,那么个人板块的定价同样会被少数大户主导,本书第五章的菜单需要改用稳健定价。
小结
廉价全通卡的损失来自高估值客户的回流:卡价一旦低于工作室为商业板块所付的价格,工作室全部转卡;卡价为单品总和的十分之一时,收入只剩 0.439。重尾估值使捆绑的优势从约三分之一降到约 5%,但在本书参数下没有使分拆反超。
参考文献
Fan, Y. (2026). Unbundling Economics, Anti-Arbitrage Identity Locking and Multi-Tier Licensing Ladders: Orthogonal Demand Partitioning, Resale Cannibalization Bounds, Affiliate Margin Preservation and Five-Figure B2B Upsell Equilibria [分拆经济学、防套利身份锁定与多阶授权阶梯] (Version 1.0.0). 5D Library. https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.24090184 · Licensed under Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International (CC BY-NC-ND 4.0).