5D Library › 分拆经济学、防套利身份锁定与多阶授权阶梯 · English

第一章 捆绑何时有利:从两个板块到四个板块

捆绑定理说了什么

多产品定价的经典结论来自 Adams 与 Yellen:当买家对两件商品的估值负相关时,把它们捆在一起出售,可以把买家之间估值的差异「抹平」,从而抽取更多的消费者剩余;同时提供单品与套餐(混合捆绑)往往比只卖套餐更好 (Adams and Yellen 1976)。McAfee、McMillan 与 Whinston 进一步证明,只要估值相互独立,在单品最优价格的基础上加一个略有折扣的套餐,总是有利可图的;捆绑不需要负相关 (McAfee et al. 1989)。Bakos 与 Brynjolfsson 则把这一结论推到大量信息产品:零边际成本、估值独立时,套餐中的产品越多,买家对套餐的总估值越集中,卖家几乎可以抽走全部剩余 (Bakos and Brynjolfsson 1999)。

证据

三条已发表的结论。 (1)负相关估值下,纯捆绑与混合捆绑优于分拆 (Adams and Yellen 1976)。(2)独立估值下,在单品最优价上加一个折扣套餐,收入严格提高 (McAfee et al. 1989)。(3)零边际成本、独立估值、产品数量很大时,捆绑的收入趋于全部消费者剩余 (Bakos and Brynjolfsson 1999)。三条都是关于最优定价的套餐;它们没有说任意价格的套餐都有利。

因此,作者提纲中「分拆击败廉价全包」的命题需要拆成两半:分拆能不能击败最优定价的全包?分拆能不能击败便宜的全通卡?本章先回答前一半。

两个板块:教科书的例子

设五位买家对周期测算板块(C)与声学干预板块(A)的估值负相关。程序在所有可能的价格上精确搜索。

推导

# Chapter 1. [p01] Adams-Yellen on two modules: components, bundle, mixed.
# Five buyers value the cycle module (C) and the acoustic module (A).
# Values are negatively correlated, the textbook case for bundling.
# Marginal cost is zero (digital goods). Every candidate price is a
# buyer's value or a sum of values, so the search below is exact.
from itertools import product

BUYERS = ((100, 10), (80, 40), (60, 60), (40, 80), (10, 100))

def revenue_separate(pc, pa):
    return sum((pc if c >= pc else 0) + (pa if a >= pa else 0)
               for c, a in BUYERS)

def revenue_bundle(pb):
    return sum(pb for c, a in BUYERS if c + a >= pb)

def choice(c, a, pc, pa, pb):
    """the option with the largest surplus; ties go to more product"""
    opts = [(0, 0, "none"), (c - pc, pc, "C"), (a - pa, pa, "A"),
            (c + a - pb, pb, "C+A")]
    best = max(opts, key=lambda o: (o[0], o[1]))
    return best if best[0] >= 0 else (0, 0, "none")

def revenue_mixed(pc, pa, pb):
    return sum(choice(c, a, pc, pa, pb)[1] for c, a in BUYERS)

if __name__ == "__main__":
    vals = sorted({c for c, a in BUYERS} | {a for c, a in BUYERS})
    sums = sorted({c + a for c, a in BUYERS})
    sep = max((revenue_separate(pc, pa), pc, pa)
              for pc, pa in product(vals, vals))
    bun = max((revenue_bundle(pb), pb) for pb in sums)
    mix = max((revenue_mixed(pc, pa, pb), pc, pa, pb)
              for pc, pa, pb in product(vals, vals, sums))
    print("   pure components: pC={} pA={}  revenue {}".format(
        sep[1], sep[2], sep[0]))
    print("   pure bundle    : pCA={}        revenue {}".format(
        bun[1], bun[0]))
    print("   mixed bundling : pC={} pA={} pCA={}  revenue {}".format(
        mix[1], mix[2], mix[3], mix[0]))
    for c, a in BUYERS:
        print("     buyer ({:3d},{:3d}) chooses {}".format(
            c, a, choice(c, a, *mix[1:])[2]))
    print("\nReading: with negatively correlated values the bundle")
    print("beats separate prices and mixed bundling beats both. This is")
    print("the case FOR bundling; Chapter 2 asks when it fails.")
#    pure components: pC=60 pA=60  revenue 360
#    pure bundle    : pCA=110        revenue 550
#    mixed bundling : pC=100 pA=100 pCA=120  revenue 560
#      buyer (100, 10) chooses C
#      buyer ( 80, 40) chooses C+A
#      buyer ( 60, 60) chooses C+A
#      buyer ( 40, 80) chooses C+A
#      buyer ( 10,100) chooses A
#
# Reading: with negatively correlated values the bundle
# beats separate prices and mixed bundling beats both. This is
# the case FOR bundling; Chapter 2 asks when it fails.

分拆时两个板块各卖 60,收入 360;套餐卖 110,收入 550;混合捆绑把单品价提到 100、套餐卖 120,收入 560。两端的买家只买自己偏爱的单品,中间三位买套餐。这正是 Adams 与 Yellen 所说的机制:套餐把「一个高、一个低」的估值加成一个稳定的总数。

四个板块、四种需求结构

把四个板块记为 C(周期测算)、A(声学干预)、M(代谢配餐)与 B(商业脚本),用 8,000 位模拟买家在四种需求结构下比较四种方案:

  • indep:四个板块的估值独立,均匀分布在 0 到 100 之间;
  • ortho:每位买家只想要一个板块,其余板块对他几乎没有价值(单一尺度的正交需求);
  • segm:92% 是普通消费者,只对 C、A、M 有 0 到 100 的估值;8% 是工作室,对商业脚本 B 的估值在 1,000 到 5,000 之间(正交,并且相差三个数量级);
  • pareto:四个板块的估值独立,服从尾指数 1.5 的 Lomax 分布(重尾,方差无穷),以 2,000 的预算封顶。

为了不让样本中某一位「巨鲸」决定价格,程序要求每个价格至少卖给 1% 的买家。

推导

# Chapter 1. [p02] Four modules, four demand regimes, four price plans.
# Modules: C cycle, A acoustic, M metabolic, B business scripts.
# 8,000 simulated buyers per regime (seeds 68..71):
#   indep : values iid uniform on 0..100 (light tails, independent)
#   ortho : each buyer wants ONE module (uniform 0..100), the others
#           are worth 0..5 to her (orthogonal demand, one scale)
#   segm  : 92% consumers value C, A, M uniform 0..100 and B 0..10;
#           8% studios value B uniform 1,000..5,000 and C, A, M 0..100
#           (orthogonal AND three orders of magnitude apart)
#   pareto: values iid Lomax, scale 20, tail index 1.5 (heavy tails),
#           capped at a budget of 2,000
# Plans: SEP optimal separate prices; BUN optimal pure bundle;
#        PASS separate prices plus a cheap all-access pass priced at
#        1.5 x the mean separate price; MIX best of separate prices
#        scaled by s (1, 1.25, 1.5, 2) plus a pass on a price grid.
# A price must sell to at least 1% of buyers (no pricing for a single
# whale in the sample).
import random

N, MODS = 8000, 4

def draw(regime, rng):
    if regime == "indep":
        return [rng.uniform(0, 100) for _ in range(MODS)]
    if regime == "ortho":
        v = [rng.uniform(0, 5) for _ in range(MODS)]
        v[rng.randrange(MODS)] = rng.uniform(0, 100)
        return v
    if regime == "segm":
        v = [rng.uniform(0, 100) for _ in range(3)]
        if rng.random() < 0.08:
            return v + [rng.uniform(1000, 5000)]
        return v + [rng.uniform(0, 10)]
    return [min(2000.0, 20 * ((1 - rng.random()) ** (-1 / 1.5) - 1))
            for _ in range(MODS)]

def best_price(values):
    s = sorted(values)
    n = len(s)
    top = n - n // 100
    return max((s[i] * (n - i), s[i]) for i in range(top))[1]

def revenue(pop, prices, pass_price=None):
    tot = 0.0
    for v in pop:
        sep_s = sum(max(0.0, x - p) for x, p in zip(v, prices))
        sep_r = sum(p for x, p in zip(v, prices) if x >= p)
        t = sum(v)
        if pass_price is not None and t >= pass_price and \
                t - pass_price >= sep_s:
            tot += pass_price
        else:
            tot += sep_r
    return tot / len(pop)

def plans(pop):
    prices = [best_price([v[j] for v in pop]) for j in range(MODS)]
    pb = best_price([sum(v) for v in pop])
    sep = revenue(pop, prices)
    bun = revenue(pop, [1e18] * MODS, pb)
    cheap = 1.5 * sum(prices) / MODS
    pas = revenue(pop, prices, cheap)
    mix = max(revenue(pop, [s * p for p in prices], pb * k / 10)
              for s in (1, 1.25, 1.5, 2) for k in range(6, 17))
    return prices, pb, sep, bun, cheap, pas, mix

if __name__ == "__main__":
    print("   regime     SEP      BUN   PASS 1.5x      MIX   SEP/BUN")
    for k, regime in enumerate(("indep", "ortho", "segm", "pareto")):
        rng = random.Random(68 + k)
        pop = [draw(regime, rng) for _ in range(N)]
        pr, pb, sep, bun, cheap, pas, mix = plans(pop)
        print("   {:6s} {:8.2f} {:8.2f} {:11.2f} {:8.2f} {:9.3f}".format(
            regime, sep, bun, pas, mix, sep / bun))
        print("          prices C,A,M,B = {}".format(
            ", ".join("{:.1f}".format(p) for p in pr)))
        print("          bundle {:.1f}; cheap pass {:.1f}".format(
            pb, cheap))
    print("\n   (revenue per buyer; cost zero)")
#    regime     SEP      BUN   PASS 1.5x      MIX   SEP/BUN
#    indep     99.82   121.05       73.37   122.31     0.825
#           prices C,A,M,B = 52.3, 50.5, 48.3, 47.4
#           bundle 156.8; cheap pass 74.4
#    ortho     25.29    28.95       25.29    28.95     0.873
#           prices C,A,M,B = 52.5, 53.8, 54.3, 48.4
#           bundle 50.8; cheap pass 78.4
#    segm     206.54   139.65      151.75   207.16     1.479
#           prices C,A,M,B = 48.7, 50.8, 51.1, 2558.5
#           bundle 2647.3; cheap pass 1015.9
#    pareto    31.05    42.51       38.58    41.95     0.730
#           prices C,A,M,B = 46.0, 39.5, 30.0, 47.9
#           bundle 92.7; cheap pass 61.3
#
#    (revenue per buyer; cost zero)
四种需求结构下,最优纯捆绑与廉价全通卡的收入(以分拆收入为 1)。

结果与提纲的直觉相反:在 indep、ortho 与 pareto 三种结构下,最优纯捆绑都胜过分拆,分拆只得到捆绑收入的 0.825、0.873 与 0.730。正交需求本身不足以让分拆获胜:当每位买家只想要一个板块时,套餐价格可以设在单品价附近,额外的零星估值反而成了白得的收入。重尾估值也不足以让分拆获胜(第二章会把尾指数一路调低)。

只有在 segm 结构下,分拆是最优捆绑的 1.479 倍。原因在于价格的数量级:B 板块的最优单价为 2558.5,消费者板块约为 50;一个统一的套餐价格要么设在 2647.3,把所有消费者挡在门外,要么设在消费者能接受的水平,把工作室的剩余白白送掉。混合捆绑(MIX)几乎只能追平分拆。

假说 · 尚未验证

作者的诠释(尚未验证): 作者业务的真实需求接近 segm:商业脚本板块的买家是少数工作室与从业者,他们的估值比个人用户高两到三个数量级,而个人用户对四个板块的兴趣大体彼此独立。在这种结构下,应当分拆出售,并把 B 板块单独定价。什么会证明这一判断错:若用真实的盲测意愿支付数据(而非本书的参数)估计出 B 板块与消费者板块的估值同处一个数量级,或者个人用户对 B 板块也有可观的估值,那么 indep 或 pareto 的结论适用,最优捆绑将胜过分拆。

小结

捆绑定理说的是最优定价的套餐。在独立、单一尺度正交与重尾三种结构下,最优纯捆绑都胜过分拆;分拆只有在「正交」与「数量级分离」同时成立时才获胜,在本书参数下收入高出 1.479 倍。至于便宜的全通卡,那是另一个问题,留给第二章。

参考文献

Adams, William James, and Janet L. Yellen. 1976. “Commodity Bundling and the Burden of Monopoly.” Quarterly Journal of Economics 90 (3): 475–98.
Bakos, Yannis, and Erik Brynjolfsson. 1999. “Bundling Information Goods: Pricing, Profits, and Efficiency.” Management Science 45 (12): 1613–30.
McAfee, R. Preston, John McMillan, and Michael D. Whinston. 1989. “Multiproduct Monopoly, Commodity Bundling, and Correlation of Values.” Quarterly Journal of Economics 104 (2): 371–83.

Fan, Y. (2026). Unbundling Economics, Anti-Arbitrage Identity Locking and Multi-Tier Licensing Ladders: Orthogonal Demand Partitioning, Resale Cannibalization Bounds, Affiliate Margin Preservation and Five-Figure B2B Upsell Equilibria [分拆经济学、防套利身份锁定与多阶授权阶梯] (Version 1.0.0). 5D Library. https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.24090184 · Licensed under Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International (CC BY-NC-ND 4.0).