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Chapter 1. When Bundling Pays: from Two Modules to Four

What the bundling theorems say

The classical result on multiproduct pricing is Adams and Yellen’s: when buyers’ values for two goods are negatively correlated, selling them together evens out the differences between buyers and extracts more consumer surplus, and offering both the single goods and the bundle (mixed bundling) is often better still than offering the bundle alone (Adams and Yellen 1976). McAfee, McMillan and Whinston went further: as long as values are independent, adding a slightly discounted bundle to the optimal single prices is always profitable, so bundling does not need negative correlation (McAfee et al. 1989). Bakos and Brynjolfsson carried the argument to large numbers of information goods: with zero marginal cost and independent values, the more products in the bundle, the more concentrated the buyer’s total value, and the seller can take almost all of the surplus (Bakos and Brynjolfsson 1999).

Evidence

Three published results. (1) With negatively correlated values, pure and mixed bundling beat separate selling (Adams and Yellen 1976). (2) With independent values, adding a discounted bundle to the optimal single prices strictly raises revenue (McAfee et al. 1989). (3) With zero marginal cost, independent values and many products, bundle revenue tends to the whole consumer surplus (Bakos and Brynjolfsson 1999). All three are about optimally priced bundles; none says that a bundle at any price pays.

The claim in the author’s outline that “unbundling beats a cheap all-in bundle” therefore splits in two. Can separate selling beat the optimally priced bundle? Can it beat a cheap all-access pass? This chapter answers the first half.

Two modules: the textbook example

Five buyers have negatively correlated values for the cycle module (C) and the acoustic module (A). The program searches every possible price exactly.

Calculation

# Chapter 1. [p01] Adams-Yellen on two modules: components, bundle, mixed.
# Five buyers value the cycle module (C) and the acoustic module (A).
# Values are negatively correlated, the textbook case for bundling.
# Marginal cost is zero (digital goods). Every candidate price is a
# buyer's value or a sum of values, so the search below is exact.
from itertools import product

BUYERS = ((100, 10), (80, 40), (60, 60), (40, 80), (10, 100))

def revenue_separate(pc, pa):
    return sum((pc if c >= pc else 0) + (pa if a >= pa else 0)
               for c, a in BUYERS)

def revenue_bundle(pb):
    return sum(pb for c, a in BUYERS if c + a >= pb)

def choice(c, a, pc, pa, pb):
    """the option with the largest surplus; ties go to more product"""
    opts = [(0, 0, "none"), (c - pc, pc, "C"), (a - pa, pa, "A"),
            (c + a - pb, pb, "C+A")]
    best = max(opts, key=lambda o: (o[0], o[1]))
    return best if best[0] >= 0 else (0, 0, "none")

def revenue_mixed(pc, pa, pb):
    return sum(choice(c, a, pc, pa, pb)[1] for c, a in BUYERS)

if __name__ == "__main__":
    vals = sorted({c for c, a in BUYERS} | {a for c, a in BUYERS})
    sums = sorted({c + a for c, a in BUYERS})
    sep = max((revenue_separate(pc, pa), pc, pa)
              for pc, pa in product(vals, vals))
    bun = max((revenue_bundle(pb), pb) for pb in sums)
    mix = max((revenue_mixed(pc, pa, pb), pc, pa, pb)
              for pc, pa, pb in product(vals, vals, sums))
    print("   pure components: pC={} pA={}  revenue {}".format(
        sep[1], sep[2], sep[0]))
    print("   pure bundle    : pCA={}        revenue {}".format(
        bun[1], bun[0]))
    print("   mixed bundling : pC={} pA={} pCA={}  revenue {}".format(
        mix[1], mix[2], mix[3], mix[0]))
    for c, a in BUYERS:
        print("     buyer ({:3d},{:3d}) chooses {}".format(
            c, a, choice(c, a, *mix[1:])[2]))
    print("\nReading: with negatively correlated values the bundle")
    print("beats separate prices and mixed bundling beats both. This is")
    print("the case FOR bundling; Chapter 2 asks when it fails.")
#    pure components: pC=60 pA=60  revenue 360
#    pure bundle    : pCA=110        revenue 550
#    mixed bundling : pC=100 pA=100 pCA=120  revenue 560
#      buyer (100, 10) chooses C
#      buyer ( 80, 40) chooses C+A
#      buyer ( 60, 60) chooses C+A
#      buyer ( 40, 80) chooses C+A
#      buyer ( 10,100) chooses A
#
# Reading: with negatively correlated values the bundle
# beats separate prices and mixed bundling beats both. This is
# the case FOR bundling; Chapter 2 asks when it fails.

Sold separately, each module goes for 60 and revenue is 360; the bundle sells for 110 and earns 550; mixed bundling raises the single prices to 100 and sells the bundle for 120, earning 560. The two buyers at the ends buy only their favourite module, the three in the middle buy the bundle. This is Adams and Yellen’s mechanism: the bundle adds “one high, one low” into a steady total.

Four modules, four demand structures

Call the four modules C (cycle readings), A (acoustic interventions), M (metabolic meal plans) and B (business scripts), and compare four plans for 8,000 simulated buyers under four demand structures:

  • indep: the four values are independent and uniform between 0 and 100;
  • ortho: each buyer wants one module and the others are worth almost nothing to her (orthogonal demand on one scale);
  • segm: 92% are ordinary consumers who value C, A and M between 0 and 100; 8% are studios that value the business scripts B between 1,000 and 5,000 (orthogonal, and three orders of magnitude apart);
  • pareto: the four values are independent Lomax with tail index 1.5 (heavy tails, infinite variance), capped at a budget of 2,000.

So that no single “whale” in the sample sets a price, the program requires every price to sell to at least 1% of buyers.

Calculation

# Chapter 1. [p02] Four modules, four demand regimes, four price plans.
# Modules: C cycle, A acoustic, M metabolic, B business scripts.
# 8,000 simulated buyers per regime (seeds 68..71):
#   indep : values iid uniform on 0..100 (light tails, independent)
#   ortho : each buyer wants ONE module (uniform 0..100), the others
#           are worth 0..5 to her (orthogonal demand, one scale)
#   segm  : 92% consumers value C, A, M uniform 0..100 and B 0..10;
#           8% studios value B uniform 1,000..5,000 and C, A, M 0..100
#           (orthogonal AND three orders of magnitude apart)
#   pareto: values iid Lomax, scale 20, tail index 1.5 (heavy tails),
#           capped at a budget of 2,000
# Plans: SEP optimal separate prices; BUN optimal pure bundle;
#        PASS separate prices plus a cheap all-access pass priced at
#        1.5 x the mean separate price; MIX best of separate prices
#        scaled by s (1, 1.25, 1.5, 2) plus a pass on a price grid.
# A price must sell to at least 1% of buyers (no pricing for a single
# whale in the sample).
import random

N, MODS = 8000, 4

def draw(regime, rng):
    if regime == "indep":
        return [rng.uniform(0, 100) for _ in range(MODS)]
    if regime == "ortho":
        v = [rng.uniform(0, 5) for _ in range(MODS)]
        v[rng.randrange(MODS)] = rng.uniform(0, 100)
        return v
    if regime == "segm":
        v = [rng.uniform(0, 100) for _ in range(3)]
        if rng.random() < 0.08:
            return v + [rng.uniform(1000, 5000)]
        return v + [rng.uniform(0, 10)]
    return [min(2000.0, 20 * ((1 - rng.random()) ** (-1 / 1.5) - 1))
            for _ in range(MODS)]

def best_price(values):
    s = sorted(values)
    n = len(s)
    top = n - n // 100
    return max((s[i] * (n - i), s[i]) for i in range(top))[1]

def revenue(pop, prices, pass_price=None):
    tot = 0.0
    for v in pop:
        sep_s = sum(max(0.0, x - p) for x, p in zip(v, prices))
        sep_r = sum(p for x, p in zip(v, prices) if x >= p)
        t = sum(v)
        if pass_price is not None and t >= pass_price and \
                t - pass_price >= sep_s:
            tot += pass_price
        else:
            tot += sep_r
    return tot / len(pop)

def plans(pop):
    prices = [best_price([v[j] for v in pop]) for j in range(MODS)]
    pb = best_price([sum(v) for v in pop])
    sep = revenue(pop, prices)
    bun = revenue(pop, [1e18] * MODS, pb)
    cheap = 1.5 * sum(prices) / MODS
    pas = revenue(pop, prices, cheap)
    mix = max(revenue(pop, [s * p for p in prices], pb * k / 10)
              for s in (1, 1.25, 1.5, 2) for k in range(6, 17))
    return prices, pb, sep, bun, cheap, pas, mix

if __name__ == "__main__":
    print("   regime     SEP      BUN   PASS 1.5x      MIX   SEP/BUN")
    for k, regime in enumerate(("indep", "ortho", "segm", "pareto")):
        rng = random.Random(68 + k)
        pop = [draw(regime, rng) for _ in range(N)]
        pr, pb, sep, bun, cheap, pas, mix = plans(pop)
        print("   {:6s} {:8.2f} {:8.2f} {:11.2f} {:8.2f} {:9.3f}".format(
            regime, sep, bun, pas, mix, sep / bun))
        print("          prices C,A,M,B = {}".format(
            ", ".join("{:.1f}".format(p) for p in pr)))
        print("          bundle {:.1f}; cheap pass {:.1f}".format(
            pb, cheap))
    print("\n   (revenue per buyer; cost zero)")
#    regime     SEP      BUN   PASS 1.5x      MIX   SEP/BUN
#    indep     99.82   121.05       73.37   122.31     0.825
#           prices C,A,M,B = 52.3, 50.5, 48.3, 47.4
#           bundle 156.8; cheap pass 74.4
#    ortho     25.29    28.95       25.29    28.95     0.873
#           prices C,A,M,B = 52.5, 53.8, 54.3, 48.4
#           bundle 50.8; cheap pass 78.4
#    segm     206.54   139.65      151.75   207.16     1.479
#           prices C,A,M,B = 48.7, 50.8, 51.1, 2558.5
#           bundle 2647.3; cheap pass 1015.9
#    pareto    31.05    42.51       38.58    41.95     0.730
#           prices C,A,M,B = 46.0, 39.5, 30.0, 47.9
#           bundle 92.7; cheap pass 61.3
#
#    (revenue per buyer; cost zero)
Revenue of the optimal pure bundle and of a cheap all-access pass under four demand structures (separate selling = 1).

The result runs against the outline’s intuition. Under indep, ortho and pareto the optimal pure bundle beats separate selling, which earns only 0.825, 0.873 and 0.730 of bundle revenue. Orthogonal demand alone does not make unbundling win: when each buyer wants one module, the bundle can be priced near the single price and the small stray values become free revenue. Heavy tails alone do not make it win either (Chapter 2 turns the tail index all the way down).

Only under segm does separate selling earn 1.479 times the optimal bundle. The reason is the order of magnitude of prices: the optimal single price of B is 2558.5, the consumer modules about 50. A single bundle price is either set at 2647.3, which shuts out every consumer, or at a level consumers accept, which gives away the studios’ surplus. Mixed bundling (MIX) can barely match separate selling.

Hypothesis · not established

The author’s interpretation (not yet tested): the real demand of the author’s business is close to segm: the buyers of the business-script module are a few studios and practitioners whose values are two to three orders of magnitude above those of individual users, and individual users’ interest in the four modules is roughly independent. Under that structure the modules should be sold separately and B priced on its own. What would show this wrong: if real blinded willingness-to-pay data (not this book’s parameters) put the values of B and of the consumer modules within one order of magnitude, or showed that individual users value B substantially, then the indep or pareto results apply and the optimal bundle beats separate selling.

Summary

The bundling theorems are about optimally priced bundles. Under independent, single-scale orthogonal and heavy-tailed demand, the optimal pure bundle beats separate selling; separate selling wins only when demand is orthogonal and the segments are orders of magnitude apart, earning 1.479 times as much with this book’s parameters. The cheap all-access pass is a different question, left to Chapter 2.

References

Adams, William James, and Janet L. Yellen. 1976. “Commodity Bundling and the Burden of Monopoly.” Quarterly Journal of Economics 90 (3): 475–98.
Bakos, Yannis, and Erik Brynjolfsson. 1999. “Bundling Information Goods: Pricing, Profits, and Efficiency.” Management Science 45 (12): 1613–30.
McAfee, R. Preston, John McMillan, and Michael D. Whinston. 1989. “Multiproduct Monopoly, Commodity Bundling, and Correlation of Values.” Quarterly Journal of Economics 104 (2): 371–83.

Fan, Y. (2026). Unbundling Economics, Anti-Arbitrage Identity Locking and Multi-Tier Licensing Ladders: Orthogonal Demand Partitioning, Resale Cannibalization Bounds, Affiliate Margin Preservation and Five-Figure B2B Upsell Equilibria [分拆经济学、防套利身份锁定与多阶授权阶梯] (Version 1.0.0). 5D Library. https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.24090184 · Licensed under Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International (CC BY-NC-ND 4.0).