5D Library › 超临界病毒级联、信息缺口风险率与多层付费墙优化 · English

第五章 帕累托支付意愿、单一价格与收益上界

支付意愿的重尾

愿意为一份测算付钱的人当中,大多数只愿意付很少,少数人愿意付很多。帕累托分布是描述这种重尾的标准模型:支付意愿超过 xx 的比例为 (xmin/x)a(x_{\min}/x)^{a},尾指数 aa 越小,尾巴越重。数字商品的边际成本接近零,所以卖方的问题完全是:怎样从这个分布里收到尽可能多的钱。

经济学把价格歧视分为三级 (Pigou 1920; Varian 1989):一级是向每个人收取他愿意付的最高价(完全价格歧视),二级是提供一份菜单让人自己选(数量、版本、档位),三级是按可观察的群体分别定价。一级价格歧视给出了收益的上界:全部支付意愿之和。

推导

单一价格与上界。 价格 p≥xminp \ge x_{\min} 时收入为 p(xmin/p)ap\,(x_{\min}/p)^{a}。a>1a > 1 时它随 pp 递减,所以最优单一价格就是 xminx_{\min},收入为 xminx_{\min};上界是平均支付意愿 axmin/(a−1)a\,x_{\min}/(a-1)。两者之比为 a/(a−1)a/(a-1):aa 趋于 1 时没有上限,a≤1a \le 1 时平均支付意愿为无穷大。

第九段程序计算各种尾指数下的最优单一价格、收入与上界,并检验一个经典定理。

推导

# Chapter 5. Pareto willingness to pay, one price, and the ceiling.
# Among visitors who would pay anything, willingness to pay v is Pareto:
# P(v > x) = (3 / x)^a for x >= 3 (minimum 3, tail index a). Marginal cost
# of a digital reading is taken as 0.
# Part 1. Revenue per buyer-candidate from the best single price, against
# the full surplus E[v] that perfect (first-degree) discrimination would
# take. For a > 1 every price above 3 loses more buyers than it gains in
# price, so the best single price is 3; E[v] = 3a / (a - 1). For a <= 1
# E[v] is infinite; here values are capped at 1,000 to show the size.
# Part 2. Riley and Zeckhauser: for ONE good no menu - not even a menu of
# lotteries "get the reading with probability x for price t" - beats the
# best posted price. A grid search over two-option menus (x, t; 1, p)
# with a = 1.5 checks this, with revenue computed in closed form.
def tail(x, a, cap=None):
    if x <= 3:
        return 1.0
    if cap is not None and x >= cap:
        return 0.0
    return (3 / x) ** a

def mean_v(a, cap=None):
    if cap is None:
        return 3 * a / (a - 1)
    n, lo = 200000, 3.0
    h = (cap - lo) / n
    return lo + sum(tail(lo + (i + 0.5) * h, a, cap) * h for i in range(n))

def best_price(a, cap=None):
    top = cap if cap else 1000.0
    grid = [3 * (top / 3) ** (i / 4000) for i in range(4000)]
    return max((p * tail(p, a, cap), p) for p in grid)

def menu_revenue(x, t, p, a):
    v_low = t / x                  # indifferent between lottery and nothing
    v_high = (p - t) / (1 - x)     # indifferent between lottery and good
    if v_low >= v_high:            # lottery never chosen: posted price p
        return p * tail(p, a)
    return t * (tail(v_low, a) - tail(v_high, a)) + p * tail(v_high, a)

if __name__ == "__main__":
    print("   tail a   best price   revenue   full surplus   ceiling ratio")
    for a, cap in ((3.0, None), (2.0, None), (1.5, None), (1.1, None),
                   (0.8, 1000.0)):
        rev, p = best_price(a, cap)
        ev = mean_v(a, cap)
        print("   {:4.1f}{}    {:7.2f}    {:6.3f}     {:8.3f}       {:6.2f}"
              .format(a, "*" if cap else " ", p, rev, ev, ev / rev))
    print("   (* values capped at 1,000)")
    best = (0.0, None)
    for i in range(1, 40):
        x = i / 40
        for j in range(1, 60):
            t = 0.25 * j * x
            for k in range(1, 60):
                p = 3 + 0.25 * k
                r = menu_revenue(x, t, p, 1.5)
                if r > best[0]:
                    best = (r, (x, t, p))
    print("\n   a = 1.5: best two-option menu earns {:.3f} against {:.3f}"
          " for one price".format(best[0], best_price(1.5)[0]))
    print("\nReading: with a heavy tail the gap between one price and full")
    print("extraction is large - three times at a = 1.5, and without bound")
    print("as a falls to 1; below 1 the best single price chases the few")
    print("buyers at the very top. For a single reading no menu closes the")
    print("gap: splitting one good into tiers or chances cannot beat one")
    print("price.")
#    tail a   best price   revenue   full surplus   ceiling ratio
#     3.0        3.00     3.000        4.500         1.50
#     2.0        3.00     3.000        6.000         2.00
#     1.5        3.00     3.000        9.000         3.00
#     1.1        3.00     3.000       33.000        11.00
#     0.8*     998.55     9.585       35.937         3.75
#    (* values capped at 1,000)
#
#    a = 1.5: best two-option menu earns 2.961 against 3.000 for one price
#
# Reading: with a heavy tail the gap between one price and full
# extraction is large - three times at a = 1.5, and without bound
# as a falls to 1; below 1 the best single price chases the few
# buyers at the very top. For a single reading no menu closes the
# gap: splitting one good into tiers or chances cannot beat one
# price.

尾巴越重,单一价格与上界之间的差距越大:a=3.0a = 3.0 时上界是单一价格收入的 1.50 倍,a=1.5a = 1.5 时 3.00 倍,a=1.1a = 1.1 时 11.00 倍。a=0.8a = 0.8 时(支付意愿截断在 1,000),最优单一价格跳到 998.55——只卖给最顶端的极少数人。

最后一行检验的是赖利与泽克豪泽的定理:对一件商品,卖方的最优机制就是一个标价,任何菜单——甚至「以概率 xx 得到测算、付 tt」这样的抽奖菜单——都不能做得更好 (Riley and Zeckhauser 1983; Myerson 1981)。网格搜索中最好的二选项菜单只得 2.961,低于单一价格的 3.000。把一件商品拆成几个档位,本身不能多收钱。

帕累托支付意愿下,收入随单一价格的变化(横轴为对数刻度)。a > 1 时收入在最低价处最高;a = 0.8 时收入一直上升到截断点。

那么多层付费墙为什么多收钱?

因为它卖的不是一件商品。第十段程序设想免费钩子之后的四件付费产品——过往高低点验算、十年全景、双人合盘、单个问题——每件的价值是一个共同的帕累托尺度乘以产品权重,再乘以一个因人而异的随机因子,其对数标准差为 σ\sigma。

推导

# Chapter 5. When do several tiers beat one price? When they are
# different goods.
# Four paid products after the free teaser, with weights w:
#   past-events check 1, ten-year overview 3, two-person match 2,
#   one question answered 0.8.
# Buyer i values product k at v_ik = theta_i w_k eps_ik: theta is a common
# Pareto scale (minimum 1, tail 1.5, capped at 200), eps an idiosyncratic
# log-normal factor with log-sd sigma (sigma = 0: everyone ranks the four
# products the same way, in fixed proportions). 20,000 buyers, cost 0.
# Strategies, each with prices chosen by grid search on the sample:
#   one product     sell only the overview, one price
#   four prices     each product at its own price
#   mixed bundle    the four single prices held at their separate optimum,
#                   plus a bundle price f * (sum of the four); only the
#                   bundle discount factor f is searched
# The ceiling is the total value (perfect discrimination).
import math
import random

W = (1.0, 3.0, 2.0, 0.8)

def sample(sigma, rng, n=20000):
    out = []
    for _ in range(n):
        th = min((1 - rng.random()) ** (-1 / 1.5), 200.0)
        out.append([th * w * math.exp(rng.gauss(0, sigma)) for w in W])
    return out

def best_single(vals):
    vs = sorted(vals, reverse=True)
    best = (0.0, 0.0)
    for i, v in enumerate(vs):
        best = max(best, (v * (i + 1), v))
    return best

def mixed(buyers, prices):
    # single prices stay at their separate optimum; search f only
    tot = [sum(b) for b in buyers]
    best = (0.0, None)
    for f in [0.5 + 0.02 * i for i in range(26)]:
        pb = f * sum(prices)
        rev = 0.0
        for b, t in zip(buyers, tot):
            sep = sum(max(v - p, 0.0) for v, p in zip(b, prices))
            if t - pb >= sep and t - pb >= 0:
                rev += pb
            else:
                rev += sum(p for v, p in zip(b, prices) if v >= p)
        best = max(best, (rev, pb))
    return best

if __name__ == "__main__":
    rng = random.Random(63010)
    print("   sigma   one product   four prices   mixed bundle   ceiling"
          "   (per buyer)")
    for sigma in (0.0, 0.5, 1.0):
        buyers = sample(sigma, rng)
        n = len(buyers)
        one = best_single([b[1] for b in buyers])[0] / n
        four, prices = 0.0, []
        for k in range(4):
            r, p = best_single([b[k] for b in buyers])
            four += r / n
            prices.append(p)
        mix = mixed(buyers, prices)[0] / n
        ceil = sum(sum(b) for b in buyers) / n
        print("   {:3.1f}       {:6.3f}        {:6.3f}        {:6.3f}"
              "       {:6.3f}".format(sigma, one, four, mix, ceil))
        print("               ({:.3f})       ({:.3f})       ({:.3f})"
              "       share of ceiling".format(one / ceil, four / ceil,
                                               mix / ceil))
    print("\nReading: more tiers earn more because they are more goods, not")
    print("because they screen one good. When the four values move together")
    print("(sigma = 0) a bundle adds nothing to four separate prices; the")
    print("more buyers differ in which product they want, the more a bundle")
    print("adds. Even then, well over half of the value stays with buyers.")
#    sigma   one product   four prices   mixed bundle   ceiling   (per buyer)
#    0.0        3.000         6.800         6.800       20.040
#                (0.150)       (0.339)       (0.339)       share of ceiling
#    0.5        2.649         5.995         6.321       21.458
#                (0.123)       (0.279)       (0.295)       share of ceiling
#    1.0        3.163         7.177         7.808       32.611
#                (0.097)       (0.220)       (0.239)       share of ceiling
#
# Reading: more tiers earn more because they are more goods, not
# because they screen one good. When the four values move together
# (sigma = 0) a bundle adds nothing to four separate prices; the
# more buyers differ in which product they want, the more a bundle
# adds. Even then, well over half of the value stays with buyers.

只卖十年全景一件产品时,收入是价值上界的 0.150。四件产品分别定价,收入升到 0.339 倍上界——多出来的钱来自多卖的三件商品,而不是来自对同一件商品的筛选。混合捆绑在保持单品独立最优标价不变的前提下,搜索套餐折扣因子 ff(套餐价为四件单价之和乘以 ff)。当每个人对四件产品的估值完全成比例时(σ=0\sigma = 0),再加一个四件合买的捆绑价不会多收一分钱(6.800 对 6.800);人们对各产品的偏好越不一致,捆绑越有用(σ=1.0\sigma = 1.0 时从 7.177 升到 7.808)。即便如此,四分之三以上的价值仍留在买方手里。

注

二级与一级价格歧视的法律界线(需按所在地核对)。 让用户从同一份公开菜单中自选档位,属于二级价格歧视;根据个人数据对同一商品向不同的人报不同的价格,接近一级价格歧视。中国《个人信息保护法》第二十四条要求利用个人信息进行自动化决策时保证结果公平、公正,不得对个人在交易价格等交易条件上实行不合理的差别待遇 (Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress 2021)。本书的模型只讨论公开菜单。

小结

帕累托支付意愿下,单一价格与完全价格歧视之间的差距随尾巴变重而扩大,尾指数 1.5 时为三倍,趋于 1 时没有上限。但对一件商品,任何菜单都胜不过单一价格:最好的二选项菜单得 2.961,低于单一价格的 3.000。多层付费墙之所以多收钱,是因为每一层是一件不同的商品;捆绑只有在人们对各产品的偏好不一致时才额外增加收入,而且大部分价值仍留在买方。

参考文献

Myerson, Roger B. 1981. “Optimal Auction Design.” Mathematics of Operations Research 6 (1): 58–73.
Pigou, A. C. 1920. The Economics of Welfare. Macmillan.
Riley, John, and Richard Zeckhauser. 1983. “Optimal Selling Strategies: When to Haggle, When to Hold Firm.” Quarterly Journal of Economics 98 (2): 267–89.
Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress. 2021. Personal Information Protection Law of the People’s Republic of China, Article 24. In Chinese.
Varian, Hal R. 1989. “Price Discrimination.” In Handbook of Industrial Organization, edited by Richard Schmalensee and Robert Willig, vol. 1. North-Holland.

Fan, Y. (2026). Supercritical Viral Cascades, Information-Gap Hazard Rates and Multi-Tier Paywall Optimization: Galton-Watson Referral Thresholds, Share-to-Unlock Incentives and Second-Degree Price Discrimination [超临界病毒级联、信息缺口风险率与多层付费墙优化] (Version 1.0.0). 5D Library. https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.24090174 · Licensed under Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International (CC BY-NC-ND 4.0).