5D Library › 超临界病毒级联、信息缺口风险率与多层付费墙优化 · English
第五章 帕累托支付意愿、单一价格与收益上界
支付意愿的重尾
愿意为一份测算付钱的人当中,大多数只愿意付很少,少数人愿意付很多。帕累托分布是描述这种重尾的标准模型:支付意愿超过 的比例为 ,尾指数 越小,尾巴越重。数字商品的边际成本接近零,所以卖方的问题完全是:怎样从这个分布里收到尽可能多的钱。
经济学把价格歧视分为三级 (Pigou 1920; Varian 1989):一级是向每个人收取他愿意付的最高价(完全价格歧视),二级是提供一份菜单让人自己选(数量、版本、档位),三级是按可观察的群体分别定价。一级价格歧视给出了收益的上界:全部支付意愿之和。
推导
单一价格与上界。 价格 时收入为 。 时它随 递减,所以最优单一价格就是 ,收入为 ;上界是平均支付意愿 。两者之比为 : 趋于 1 时没有上限, 时平均支付意愿为无穷大。
第九段程序计算各种尾指数下的最优单一价格、收入与上界,并检验一个经典定理。
推导
# Chapter 5. Pareto willingness to pay, one price, and the ceiling.
# Among visitors who would pay anything, willingness to pay v is Pareto:
# P(v > x) = (3 / x)^a for x >= 3 (minimum 3, tail index a). Marginal cost
# of a digital reading is taken as 0.
# Part 1. Revenue per buyer-candidate from the best single price, against
# the full surplus E[v] that perfect (first-degree) discrimination would
# take. For a > 1 every price above 3 loses more buyers than it gains in
# price, so the best single price is 3; E[v] = 3a / (a - 1). For a <= 1
# E[v] is infinite; here values are capped at 1,000 to show the size.
# Part 2. Riley and Zeckhauser: for ONE good no menu - not even a menu of
# lotteries "get the reading with probability x for price t" - beats the
# best posted price. A grid search over two-option menus (x, t; 1, p)
# with a = 1.5 checks this, with revenue computed in closed form.
def tail(x, a, cap=None):
if x <= 3:
return 1.0
if cap is not None and x >= cap:
return 0.0
return (3 / x) ** a
def mean_v(a, cap=None):
if cap is None:
return 3 * a / (a - 1)
n, lo = 200000, 3.0
h = (cap - lo) / n
return lo + sum(tail(lo + (i + 0.5) * h, a, cap) * h for i in range(n))
def best_price(a, cap=None):
top = cap if cap else 1000.0
grid = [3 * (top / 3) ** (i / 4000) for i in range(4000)]
return max((p * tail(p, a, cap), p) for p in grid)
def menu_revenue(x, t, p, a):
v_low = t / x # indifferent between lottery and nothing
v_high = (p - t) / (1 - x) # indifferent between lottery and good
if v_low >= v_high: # lottery never chosen: posted price p
return p * tail(p, a)
return t * (tail(v_low, a) - tail(v_high, a)) + p * tail(v_high, a)
if __name__ == "__main__":
print(" tail a best price revenue full surplus ceiling ratio")
for a, cap in ((3.0, None), (2.0, None), (1.5, None), (1.1, None),
(0.8, 1000.0)):
rev, p = best_price(a, cap)
ev = mean_v(a, cap)
print(" {:4.1f}{} {:7.2f} {:6.3f} {:8.3f} {:6.2f}"
.format(a, "*" if cap else " ", p, rev, ev, ev / rev))
print(" (* values capped at 1,000)")
best = (0.0, None)
for i in range(1, 40):
x = i / 40
for j in range(1, 60):
t = 0.25 * j * x
for k in range(1, 60):
p = 3 + 0.25 * k
r = menu_revenue(x, t, p, 1.5)
if r > best[0]:
best = (r, (x, t, p))
print("\n a = 1.5: best two-option menu earns {:.3f} against {:.3f}"
" for one price".format(best[0], best_price(1.5)[0]))
print("\nReading: with a heavy tail the gap between one price and full")
print("extraction is large - three times at a = 1.5, and without bound")
print("as a falls to 1; below 1 the best single price chases the few")
print("buyers at the very top. For a single reading no menu closes the")
print("gap: splitting one good into tiers or chances cannot beat one")
print("price.")
# tail a best price revenue full surplus ceiling ratio
# 3.0 3.00 3.000 4.500 1.50
# 2.0 3.00 3.000 6.000 2.00
# 1.5 3.00 3.000 9.000 3.00
# 1.1 3.00 3.000 33.000 11.00
# 0.8* 998.55 9.585 35.937 3.75
# (* values capped at 1,000)
#
# a = 1.5: best two-option menu earns 2.961 against 3.000 for one price
#
# Reading: with a heavy tail the gap between one price and full
# extraction is large - three times at a = 1.5, and without bound
# as a falls to 1; below 1 the best single price chases the few
# buyers at the very top. For a single reading no menu closes the
# gap: splitting one good into tiers or chances cannot beat one
# price.尾巴越重,单一价格与上界之间的差距越大: 时上界是单一价格收入的 1.50 倍, 时 3.00 倍, 时 11.00 倍。 时(支付意愿截断在 1,000),最优单一价格跳到 998.55——只卖给最顶端的极少数人。
最后一行检验的是赖利与泽克豪泽的定理:对一件商品,卖方的最优机制就是一个标价,任何菜单——甚至「以概率 得到测算、付 」这样的抽奖菜单——都不能做得更好 (Riley and Zeckhauser 1983; Myerson 1981)。网格搜索中最好的二选项菜单只得 2.961,低于单一价格的 3.000。把一件商品拆成几个档位,本身不能多收钱。
那么多层付费墙为什么多收钱?
因为它卖的不是一件商品。第十段程序设想免费钩子之后的四件付费产品——过往高低点验算、十年全景、双人合盘、单个问题——每件的价值是一个共同的帕累托尺度乘以产品权重,再乘以一个因人而异的随机因子,其对数标准差为 。
推导
# Chapter 5. When do several tiers beat one price? When they are
# different goods.
# Four paid products after the free teaser, with weights w:
# past-events check 1, ten-year overview 3, two-person match 2,
# one question answered 0.8.
# Buyer i values product k at v_ik = theta_i w_k eps_ik: theta is a common
# Pareto scale (minimum 1, tail 1.5, capped at 200), eps an idiosyncratic
# log-normal factor with log-sd sigma (sigma = 0: everyone ranks the four
# products the same way, in fixed proportions). 20,000 buyers, cost 0.
# Strategies, each with prices chosen by grid search on the sample:
# one product sell only the overview, one price
# four prices each product at its own price
# mixed bundle the four single prices held at their separate optimum,
# plus a bundle price f * (sum of the four); only the
# bundle discount factor f is searched
# The ceiling is the total value (perfect discrimination).
import math
import random
W = (1.0, 3.0, 2.0, 0.8)
def sample(sigma, rng, n=20000):
out = []
for _ in range(n):
th = min((1 - rng.random()) ** (-1 / 1.5), 200.0)
out.append([th * w * math.exp(rng.gauss(0, sigma)) for w in W])
return out
def best_single(vals):
vs = sorted(vals, reverse=True)
best = (0.0, 0.0)
for i, v in enumerate(vs):
best = max(best, (v * (i + 1), v))
return best
def mixed(buyers, prices):
# single prices stay at their separate optimum; search f only
tot = [sum(b) for b in buyers]
best = (0.0, None)
for f in [0.5 + 0.02 * i for i in range(26)]:
pb = f * sum(prices)
rev = 0.0
for b, t in zip(buyers, tot):
sep = sum(max(v - p, 0.0) for v, p in zip(b, prices))
if t - pb >= sep and t - pb >= 0:
rev += pb
else:
rev += sum(p for v, p in zip(b, prices) if v >= p)
best = max(best, (rev, pb))
return best
if __name__ == "__main__":
rng = random.Random(63010)
print(" sigma one product four prices mixed bundle ceiling"
" (per buyer)")
for sigma in (0.0, 0.5, 1.0):
buyers = sample(sigma, rng)
n = len(buyers)
one = best_single([b[1] for b in buyers])[0] / n
four, prices = 0.0, []
for k in range(4):
r, p = best_single([b[k] for b in buyers])
four += r / n
prices.append(p)
mix = mixed(buyers, prices)[0] / n
ceil = sum(sum(b) for b in buyers) / n
print(" {:3.1f} {:6.3f} {:6.3f} {:6.3f}"
" {:6.3f}".format(sigma, one, four, mix, ceil))
print(" ({:.3f}) ({:.3f}) ({:.3f})"
" share of ceiling".format(one / ceil, four / ceil,
mix / ceil))
print("\nReading: more tiers earn more because they are more goods, not")
print("because they screen one good. When the four values move together")
print("(sigma = 0) a bundle adds nothing to four separate prices; the")
print("more buyers differ in which product they want, the more a bundle")
print("adds. Even then, well over half of the value stays with buyers.")
# sigma one product four prices mixed bundle ceiling (per buyer)
# 0.0 3.000 6.800 6.800 20.040
# (0.150) (0.339) (0.339) share of ceiling
# 0.5 2.649 5.995 6.321 21.458
# (0.123) (0.279) (0.295) share of ceiling
# 1.0 3.163 7.177 7.808 32.611
# (0.097) (0.220) (0.239) share of ceiling
#
# Reading: more tiers earn more because they are more goods, not
# because they screen one good. When the four values move together
# (sigma = 0) a bundle adds nothing to four separate prices; the
# more buyers differ in which product they want, the more a bundle
# adds. Even then, well over half of the value stays with buyers.只卖十年全景一件产品时,收入是价值上界的 0.150。四件产品分别定价,收入升到 0.339 倍上界——多出来的钱来自多卖的三件商品,而不是来自对同一件商品的筛选。混合捆绑在保持单品独立最优标价不变的前提下,搜索套餐折扣因子 (套餐价为四件单价之和乘以 )。当每个人对四件产品的估值完全成比例时(),再加一个四件合买的捆绑价不会多收一分钱(6.800 对 6.800);人们对各产品的偏好越不一致,捆绑越有用( 时从 7.177 升到 7.808)。即便如此,四分之三以上的价值仍留在买方手里。
注
二级与一级价格歧视的法律界线(需按所在地核对)。 让用户从同一份公开菜单中自选档位,属于二级价格歧视;根据个人数据对同一商品向不同的人报不同的价格,接近一级价格歧视。中国《个人信息保护法》第二十四条要求利用个人信息进行自动化决策时保证结果公平、公正,不得对个人在交易价格等交易条件上实行不合理的差别待遇 (Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress 2021)。本书的模型只讨论公开菜单。
小结
帕累托支付意愿下,单一价格与完全价格歧视之间的差距随尾巴变重而扩大,尾指数 1.5 时为三倍,趋于 1 时没有上限。但对一件商品,任何菜单都胜不过单一价格:最好的二选项菜单得 2.961,低于单一价格的 3.000。多层付费墙之所以多收钱,是因为每一层是一件不同的商品;捆绑只有在人们对各产品的偏好不一致时才额外增加收入,而且大部分价值仍留在买方。
参考文献
Fan, Y. (2026). Supercritical Viral Cascades, Information-Gap Hazard Rates and Multi-Tier Paywall Optimization: Galton-Watson Referral Thresholds, Share-to-Unlock Incentives and Second-Degree Price Discrimination [超临界病毒级联、信息缺口风险率与多层付费墙优化] (Version 1.0.0). 5D Library. https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.24090174 · Licensed under Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International (CC BY-NC-ND 4.0).