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第六章 捆绑、诱饵档与按题付费

捆绑为什么有效

第五章说明,多层付费墙多收的钱来自多卖的商品。这些商品可以分别卖,也可以打包卖。亚当斯与耶伦早就指出,当买方对几件商品的估值不完全相关时,捆绑能让卖方收到更多 (Adams and Yellen 1976);巴科斯与布林约尔松进一步说明,对边际成本为零的信息商品,捆绑的件数越多,每件的平均估值越集中于其均值,一个捆绑价就能收走越大比例的价值 (Bakos and Brynjolfsson 1999)。

第十一段程序让每个问题的估值独立(对数正态,中位数 2),比较分别定价与整体捆绑。

推导

# Chapter 6. Why "ask as many questions as you like" can pay.
# A buyer's value for each answered question is independent across
# questions: log-normal with median 2 and log-sd 0.8. Selling n questions
# separately at the best single price per question, against selling the
# n as one bundle at the best bundle price (Bakos and Brynjolfsson: the
# law of large numbers makes the bundle's value per question concentrate
# near its mean, so one price captures more of it). 20,000 buyers.
import math
import random

def best_price(vals):
    vs = sorted(vals, reverse=True)
    return max(v * (i + 1) for i, v in enumerate(vs)) / len(vs)

if __name__ == "__main__":
    rng = random.Random(63011)
    print("   questions   separate (per q)   bundle (per q)   value per q"
          "   share")
    for n in (1, 2, 5, 10, 20):
        vals = [[2 * math.exp(rng.gauss(0, 0.8)) for _ in range(n)]
                for _ in range(20000)]
        sep = best_price([v for row in vals for v in row])
        bun = best_price([sum(row) for row in vals]) / n
        mean = sum(sum(row) for row in vals) / (20000 * n)
        print("     {:3d}          {:6.3f}             {:6.3f}"
              "          {:6.3f}        {:5.3f}".format(
                  n, sep, bun, mean, bun / mean))
    print("\nReading: priced one by one, each question earns the same share")
    print("of its value however many there are. As one bundle, the share")
    print("captured climbs towards the whole value as n grows. This is an")
    print("argument for bundles of independent questions, not for tiers of")
    print("one reading.")
#    questions   separate (per q)   bundle (per q)   value per q   share
#        1           1.003              1.003           2.770        0.362
#        2           1.000              1.187           2.753        0.431
#        5           1.001              1.463           2.749        0.532
#       10           0.999              1.670           2.758        0.605
#       20           0.998              1.861           2.746        0.678
#
# Reading: priced one by one, each question earns the same share
# of its value however many there are. As one bundle, the share
# captured climbs towards the whole value as n grows. This is an
# argument for bundles of independent questions, not for tiers of
# one reading.

分别定价时,无论有几个问题,每个问题都只收走同样的约 1.000;捆绑时,每题的收入随件数上升,从 1 题的 1.003 到 20 题的 1.861,收走的价值比例从 0.362 升到 0.678。这是「问多少都行」的套餐的道理——但它依赖于各个问题的估值相互独立,是捆绑彼此独立的问题的理由,而不是给一份测算分档的理由。

每题收走的价值比例:分别定价与整体捆绑,随问题数 n 的变化。

诱饵档

「合购锚定包」一类的设计常常依赖另一种效应:在菜单中加入一个明显较差的选项,让旁边的高价选项显得划算。休伯、佩恩与普托称之为「非对称支配效应」(Huber et al. 1982);锚定的研究也说明,一个无关的数字可以改变人们的支付意愿 (Ariely et al. 2003)。第十二段程序在多项逻辑选择模型中加入一个被高档完全支配的诱饵,并用参数 λ\lambda 表示吸引效应的大小。

推导

# Chapter 6. The decoy tier: an effect that has to be measured.
# Visitors choose among: nothing (utility 0), a basic reading A (quality
# 1, price 9.9) and a premium reading B (quality 2, price 29.9). A decoy D
# (quality 1.7, price 29.9) is dominated by B and is not meant to sell.
# Choice is multinomial logit with utility 4 q - 0.15 price - 1.5 for
# each product, plus lambda for every option it dominates (the
# "attraction" or asymmetric-dominance effect of Huber, Payne and Puto).
# With lambda = 0 the decoy works only through the logit's arithmetic.
# The program reports choice shares and revenue per visitor with and
# without the decoy for lambda from 0 to 1.
import math

OPTS = {"A": (1.0, 9.9), "B": (2.0, 29.9), "D": (1.7, 29.9)}

def dominates(x, y):
    (qx, px), (qy, py) = OPTS[x], OPTS[y]
    return qx >= qy and px <= py and (qx, px) != (qy, py)

def shares(menu, lam):
    u = {"none": 0.0}
    for o in menu:
        q, p = OPTS[o]
        u[o] = 4 * q - 0.15 * p - 1.5 + lam * sum(
            dominates(o, other) for other in menu if other != o)
    z = sum(math.exp(v) for v in u.values())
    return {k: math.exp(v) / z for k, v in u.items()}

def revenue(sh):
    return sum(sh[o] * OPTS[o][1] for o in sh if o != "none")

if __name__ == "__main__":
    print("   lambda   menu      none    A       B       D       revenue")
    for lam in (0.0, 0.5, 1.0):
        for menu in (("A", "B"), ("A", "B", "D")):
            sh = shares(menu, lam)
            print("   {:4.1f}     {:8s}  {:5.3f}   {:5.3f}   {:5.3f}   {}"
                  "   {:6.3f}".format(lam, "+".join(menu), sh["none"],
                                       sh["A"], sh["B"],
                                       "{:5.3f}".format(sh["D"])
                                       if "D" in sh else "  -  ",
                                       revenue(sh)))
    print("\nReading: without an attraction effect (lambda = 0) revenue")
    print("rises only because some visitors buy the dominated decoy itself:")
    print("they pay the premium price for less. The further rise at lambda")
    print("> 0 comes entirely from one assumed parameter. Experiments with")
    print("realistic products have often found it small or absent, so it")
    print("has to be measured, not assumed.")
#    lambda   menu      none    A       B       D       revenue
#     0.0     A+B       0.089   0.245   0.666     -     22.343
#     0.0     A+B+D     0.074   0.204   0.555   0.167   23.606
#     0.5     A+B       0.089   0.245   0.666     -     22.343
#     0.5     A+B+D     0.054   0.150   0.673   0.123   25.272
#     1.0     A+B       0.089   0.245   0.666     -     22.343
#     1.0     A+B+D     0.038   0.104   0.772   0.086   26.678
#
# Reading: without an attraction effect (lambda = 0) revenue
# rises only because some visitors buy the dominated decoy itself:
# they pay the premium price for less. The further rise at lambda
# > 0 comes entirely from one assumed parameter. Experiments with
# realistic products have often found it small or absent, so it
# has to be measured, not assumed.

没有吸引效应时(λ=0\lambda = 0),加入诱饵使每位访客的收入从 22.343 升到 23.606——但这只是因为 0.167 的访客买了诱饵本身:付了高档的价钱,得到更少的东西。这部分收入来自买方的错误,而不是设计的巧妙。λ\lambda 增大时收入继续上升(λ=1.0\lambda = 1.0 时 26.678),这一增量完全来自这一个假设的参数。

证据

诱饵效应在真实商品上并不稳定。 弗雷德里克、李与巴斯金用接近真实的商品与描述做了一系列实验,发现吸引效应在许多情形下很小,甚至消失或反转 (Frederick et al. 2014)。第 47 本讨论过选择架构的这类证据。诱饵档是否有效,只能在具体的菜单与受众中测量。

按题付费还是年卡

「一事一占、按题点杀」是按次收费;与之相对的是包年。第十三段程序假设每个用户每年提问的频率因人而异(伽马分布,形状参数 kk 越小,越是少数人问得多、多数人问得少),比较按题付费、年卡与两者并行。

推导

# Chapter 6. Pay per question, or an annual pass?
# Each user has questions at a personal yearly rate lam, gamma-distributed
# with mean 3 and shape k (small k: a few heavy askers and many light
# ones). Each question is worth v, log-normal with median 6, log-sd 0.6.
# Over a year a user with rate lam asks Poisson(lam) questions.
#   per question  price p per answer; a question is bought if v >= p
#   annual pass   price P for unlimited answers; bought if the user's
#                 expected yearly value lam E[v] is at least P
#   both          the user takes whichever leaves more expected surplus
# Prices are chosen by grid search; 20,000 users; revenue per user-year.
import math
import random

def users(k, rng, n=20000):
    out = []
    for _ in range(n):
        lam = rng.gammavariate(k, 3 / k)
        q = sum(1 for _ in range(200) if rng.random() < lam / 200)
        out.append((lam, [6 * math.exp(rng.gauss(0, 0.6)) for _ in range(q)]))
    return out

EV = 6 * math.exp(0.6 ** 2 / 2)

def per_q(us, p):
    return sum(p for _, vs in us for v in vs if v >= p) / len(us)

def both(us, p, pp):
    rev = 0.0
    for lam, vs in us:
        s_q = sum(max(v - p, 0) for v in vs)
        s_pass = lam * EV - pp
        if s_pass > s_q and s_pass >= 0:
            rev += pp
        else:
            rev += sum(p for v in vs if v >= p)
    return rev / len(us)

if __name__ == "__main__":
    rng = random.Random(63013)
    pq_grid = [3 + 0.5 * i for i in range(17)]
    pass_grid = [5 * i for i in range(1, 21)]
    print("   shape k   per question   annual pass   both offered")
    for k in (0.5, 2.0, 10.0):
        us = users(k, rng)
        best_q = max((per_q(us, p), p) for p in pq_grid)
        best_pass = max((sum(pp for lam, _ in us if lam * EV >= pp)
                         / len(us), pp) for pp in pass_grid)
        best_both = max((both(us, p, pp), p, pp)
                        for p in pq_grid[::2] for pp in pass_grid[::2])
        print("    {:4.1f}     {:6.2f} at {:4.1f}  {:6.2f} at {:3d}"
              "   {:6.2f} at {:4.1f} / {:3d}".format(
                  k, best_q[0], best_q[1], best_pass[0], best_pass[1],
                  best_both[0], best_both[1], best_both[2]))
    print("\nReading: when users ask at similar rates (large k) a pass")
    print("earns more than pricing each answer; when a few ask a great deal")
    print("(small k) pricing each question does better, and offering both")
    print("lets light askers pay per answer while heavy askers buy the pass.")
#    shape k   per question   annual pass   both offered
#      0.5       9.17 at  5.0    7.16 at  30     9.74 at  5.0 /  65
#      2.0       9.30 at  5.0    8.96 at  20    11.08 at  6.0 /  25
#     10.0       9.37 at  5.0   12.59 at  15    13.36 at  7.0 /  15
#
# Reading: when users ask at similar rates (large k) a pass
# earns more than pricing each answer; when a few ask a great deal
# (small k) pricing each question does better, and offering both
# lets light askers pay per answer while heavy askers buy the pass.

提问频率相近时(k=10.0k = 10.0),年卡收入更高(12.59 对 9.37);少数人问得极多时(k=0.5k = 0.5),按题付费更好(9.17 对 7.16)。两者并行在三种情形下都最好:轻度用户按题付费,重度用户买年卡,例如 k=2.0k = 2.0 时为 11.08。这与第 58 本的结论一致:用量越分散,单一的包年价越会让重度用户带走价值、让轻度用户离开。

注

按题付费与「点杀」。 本章的模型只描述价格结构对收入的影响。一个设计如果利用好奇心衰减或焦虑去促使用户为同一件事反复付费,可能违反所在地的消费者保护规定;第八章的合规清单列出了需要核对的事项。

小结

捆绑彼此独立的问题能收走越来越大的价值比例:20 题时为 0.678,而分别定价始终约为 0.362。诱饵档在没有吸引效应时只因为有人买了被支配的选项而增加收入,吸引效应本身在实验中并不稳定,必须测量。按题付费与年卡孰优取决于提问频率的分散程度,两者并行在各种情形下都最好。

参考文献

Adams, William James, and Janet L. Yellen. 1976. “Commodity Bundling and the Burden of Monopoly.” Quarterly Journal of Economics 90 (3): 475–98.
Ariely, Dan, George Loewenstein, and Drazen Prelec. 2003. “”Coherent Arbitrariness”: Stable Demand Curves without Stable Preferences.” Quarterly Journal of Economics 118 (1): 73–106.
Bakos, Yannis, and Erik Brynjolfsson. 1999. “Bundling Information Goods: Pricing, Profits, and Efficiency.” Management Science 45 (12): 1613–30.
Frederick, Shane, Leonard Lee, and Ernest Baskin. 2014. “The Limits of Attraction.” Journal of Marketing Research 51 (4): 487–507.
Huber, Joel, John W. Payne, and Christopher Puto. 1982. “Adding Asymmetrically Dominated Alternatives: Violations of Regularity and the Similarity Hypothesis.” Journal of Consumer Research 9 (1): 90–98.

Fan, Y. (2026). Supercritical Viral Cascades, Information-Gap Hazard Rates and Multi-Tier Paywall Optimization: Galton-Watson Referral Thresholds, Share-to-Unlock Incentives and Second-Degree Price Discrimination [超临界病毒级联、信息缺口风险率与多层付费墙优化] (Version 1.0.0). 5D Library. https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.24090174 · Licensed under Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International (CC BY-NC-ND 4.0).