5D Library › 预测市场微观结构、布雷格曼信息投影与跨盘口无套利边界 · English

第一章 价格不是概率:信念分布、风险态度与冷热门偏差

一个流行的读法

预测市场的合约在事件发生时支付 1,否则支付 0。于是有一个流行的读法:价格 0.20 的合约,意味着市场认为事件有 20% 的可能。Wolfers 与 Zitzewitz 的综述让这个读法广为人知 (Wolfers and Zitzewitz 2004),它在不少场合也确实好用。但它是一个结论,需要前提。本章找出这些前提,并说明前提不成立时价格偏向哪里。

先把问题说清楚。市场里有许多交易者,各自对事件持有一个信念 qq。价格只有一个。把一个分布压缩为一个数,必须选定一个统计量:均值、中位数,或别的分位数。价格选的是哪一个,取决于交易者的预算、风险态度与信念分布的形状,而不取决于我们希望它是什么。

Manski 的结果:价格是分位数

Manski 用一个最简单的模型回答了这个问题 (Manski 2006):交易者风险中性、预算相同,信念高于价格的人把预算全部买 YES,低于价格的人全部买 NO。

推导

出清条件。 设信念的分布函数为 FF,价格为 π\pi。每位 YES 买家用预算 1 买到 1/π1/\pi 份,每位 NO 买家买到 1/(1−π)1/(1-\pi) 份。YES 与 NO 的份数必须相等: 1−F(π)π=F(π)1−π⇔F(π)=1−π.\frac{1 – F(\pi)}{\pi} = \frac{F(\pi)}{1 – \pi} \quad\Longleftrightarrow\quad F(\pi) = 1 – \pi . 价格是这样一个点:信念高于它的交易者所占的比例恰好等于它自己。Manski 进一步证明,无论信念如何分布,信念均值都严格落在 (π2,2π−π2)(\pi^2,\ 2\pi – \pi^2) 之内——这是价格对均值所能说的全部。

推导

# Chapter 1. p01: Manski's result: a market price is not the mean belief.
# Risk-neutral traders hold equal budgets and a belief q that a binary
# event happens. A trader with q above the price spends the budget on YES
# contracts (each pays 1 if the event happens), one below it on NO.
# Clearing (YES bought = NO bought) gives F(price) = 1 - price: the price
# is the point where the SHARE of traders above it equals the price.
# Manski (2006): the mean belief lies strictly inside
# (price^2, 2*price - price^2), whatever the belief distribution.
# Section B gives budgets that rise with belief: then the price is the
# point where the WEALTH share above it equals the price.
import bisect
import random

N = 20000

def clear(beliefs, budgets=None):
    pairs = sorted(zip(beliefs, budgets or [1.0] * len(beliefs)))
    qs = [q for q, _ in pairs]
    cum = [0.0]
    for _, w in pairs:
        cum.append(cum[-1] + w)
    total = cum[-1]
    lo, hi = 1e-9, 1 - 1e-9
    for _ in range(60):
        mid = (lo + hi) / 2
        above = (total - cum[bisect.bisect_left(qs, mid)]) / total
        lo, hi = (mid, hi) if above > mid else (lo, mid)
    return (lo + hi) / 2

def draw(spec, rng):
    if spec[0] == "beta":
        return [rng.betavariate(spec[1], spec[2]) for _ in range(N)]
    out = []
    for _ in range(N):
        a, b = spec[1] if rng.random() < spec[3] else spec[2]
        out.append(rng.betavariate(a, b))
    return out

if __name__ == "__main__":
    rng = random.Random(59001)
    pops = [("symmetric  Beta(4,4)", ("beta", 4, 4)),
            ("pessimist  Beta(2,8)", ("beta", 2, 8)),
            ("optimist   Beta(8,2)", ("beta", 8, 2)),
            ("longshot   Beta(1.5,13.5)", ("beta", 1.5, 13.5)),
            ("split 70/30 bimodal", ("mix", (2, 18), (18, 2), 0.7))]
    print("A. equal budgets")
    print("   population                mean  median  price  (p^2,  2p-p^2)")
    kept = {}
    for name, spec in pops:
        q = draw(spec, rng)
        kept[name] = q
        p = clear(q)
        mean, med = sum(q) / N, sorted(q)[N // 2]
        ok = p * p < mean < 2 * p - p * p
        print("   {:<26}{:5.3f}  {:6.3f}  {:5.3f}  ({:5.3f}, {:5.3f}) {}"
              .format(name, mean, med, p, p * p, 2 * p - p * p,
                      "inside" if ok else "OUTSIDE"))
    print("\nB. Beta(1.5,13.5) beliefs; budget = q ** k (richer if bolder)")
    q = kept["longshot   Beta(1.5,13.5)"]
    mean = sum(q) / N
    for k in (0.0, 0.5, 1.0, 2.0):
        w = [x ** k for x in q]
        wmean = sum(a * b for a, b in zip(q, w)) / sum(w)
        p = clear(q, w)
        print("   k = {:3.1f}  mean {:5.3f}  wealth-weighted mean {:5.3f}"
              "  price {:5.3f}".format(k, mean, wmean, p))
    print("\nReading: the price sits where the share (or wealth share) of")
    print("traders above it equals it - a quantile, not the mean. With the")
    print("same mean belief, skew and budgets move the price; only Manski's")
    print("interval constrains the mean.")
# A. equal budgets
#    population                mean  median  price  (p^2,  2p-p^2)
#    symmetric  Beta(4,4)      0.501   0.501  0.501  (0.251, 0.751) inside
#    pessimist  Beta(2,8)      0.201   0.181  0.267  (0.071, 0.462) inside
#    optimist   Beta(8,2)      0.800   0.822  0.735  (0.541, 0.930) inside
#    longshot   Beta(1.5,13.5) 0.100   0.083  0.167  (0.028, 0.306) inside
#    split 70/30 bimodal       0.341   0.127  0.307  (0.094, 0.520) inside
#
# B. Beta(1.5,13.5) beliefs; budget = q ** k (richer if bolder)
#    k = 0.0  mean 0.100  wealth-weighted mean 0.100  price 0.167
#    k = 0.5  mean 0.100  wealth-weighted mean 0.128  price 0.193
#    k = 1.0  mean 0.100  wealth-weighted mean 0.154  price 0.216
#    k = 2.0  mean 0.100  wealth-weighted mean 0.202  price 0.257
#
# Reading: the price sits where the share (or wealth share) of
# traders above it equals it - a quantile, not the mean. With the
# same mean belief, skew and budgets move the price; only Manski's
# interval constrains the mean.

A 段的五个人群说明了分位数与均值的差别。信念对称时,价格、均值、中位数重合于 0.501。信念偏斜时就不再如此:一个平均只信 0.100 的「冷门」人群,中位数 0.083,价格却是 0.167——比均值高出三分之二。原因在出清条件本身:价格低时,NO 方每份要付接近 1 的钱,YES 方每份只付很少,少数乐观者的预算就能买走大量 YES。同样的机制把乐观人群(均值 0.800)的价格压到 0.735。双峰人群的均值 0.341、中位数 0.127,价格 0.307,与两者都不同。五种情形的均值都落在 Manski 区间内,但区间很宽:冷门人群的区间是 (0.028, 0.306)。

B 段让预算随信念上升:越大胆的人越有钱。信念的分布不变,价格就从 0.167 一路升到 0.257。此时价格追随的是财富分布的分位数:财富位于价格之上的份额等于价格。

对数效用:唯一让价格等于均值的情形

Wolfers 与 Zitzewitz 给出了另一端的结论:若所有交易者都是对数效用,价格恰好等于以财富加权的平均信念 (Wolfers and Zitzewitz 2006)。Gjerstad 研究了风险厌恶如何使价格偏离这个均值 (Gjerstad 2005)。第二段程序用常相对风险厌恶(CRRA)效用逐一检验。

推导

CRRA 交易者的需求。 信念 qq、财富 ww、风险厌恶 γ\gamma 的交易者持有 nn 份 YES(负数为 NO)。最大化期望效用的一阶条件给出 R=(q(1−π)(1−q)π)1/γ,n=w(R−1)(1−π)+Rπ,R = \left(\frac{q(1-\pi)}{(1-q)\pi}\right)^{1/\gamma}, \qquad n = \frac{w(R – 1)}{(1 – \pi) + R\pi}, 价格使 ∑n=0\sum n = 0。

推导

# Chapter 1. p02: Wolfers-Zitzewitz: with log utility the price IS the
# wealth-weighted mean belief; other risk attitudes move it away.
# Trader i has belief q, wealth w and CRRA risk aversion g. Holding n YES
# contracts bought at price p, terminal wealth is w + n(1 - p) if the
# event happens and w - n p if not. Maximising expected utility gives
#     R = (q (1 - p) / ((1 - q) p)) ** (1 / g)
#     n = w (R - 1) / ((1 - p) + R p)
# (n < 0 is a NO position). The price clears sum(n) = 0.
import math
import random

N = 4000

def demand(q, w, g, p):
    r = (q * (1 - p) / ((1 - q) * p)) ** (1.0 / g)
    return w * (r - 1) / ((1 - p) + r * p)

def clear(traders):
    lo, hi = 1e-6, 1 - 1e-6
    for _ in range(60):
        mid = (lo + hi) / 2
        excess = math.fsum(demand(q, w, g, mid) for q, w, g in traders)
        lo, hi = (mid, hi) if excess > 0 else (lo, mid)
    return (lo + hi) / 2

if __name__ == "__main__":
    rng = random.Random(59002)
    q = [rng.betavariate(1.5, 13.5) for _ in range(N)]
    w = [math.exp(rng.gauss(0, 1)) for _ in range(N)]
    mean = math.fsum(q) / N
    wmean = math.fsum(a * b for a, b in zip(q, w)) / math.fsum(w)
    med = sorted(q)[N // 2]
    print("beliefs Beta(1.5,13.5): mean {:.4f}, wealth-weighted {:.4f},"
          " median {:.4f}".format(mean, wmean, med))
    print("\n   risk aversion g            price   price - wtd mean")
    cases = [("all g = 1 (log)", lambda x: 1.0),
             ("all g = 3", lambda x: 3.0),
             ("all g = 0.5 (risk-loving)", lambda x: 0.5),
             ("bold g=0.5, timid g=4", lambda x: 0.5 if x > med else 4.0),
             ("bold g=4, timid g=0.5", lambda x: 4.0 if x > med else 0.5)]
    for name, gf in cases:
        p = clear([(a, b, gf(a)) for a, b in zip(q, w)])
        d = round(p - wmean, 4) + 0.0     # + 0.0 turns -0.0 into 0.0
        print("   {:<26} {:6.4f}   {:+.4f}".format(name, p, d))
    print("\nReading: log utility returns the wealth-weighted mean exactly.")
    print("Strong uniform risk aversion pulls the price toward the median")
    print("belief, risk-loving toward the bold; when risk attitude goes with")
    print("belief the price moves furthest, in either direction. A price")
    print("reads as a probability only under an assumption about who trades")
    print("and how they weigh risk.")
# beliefs Beta(1.5,13.5): mean 0.0984, wealth-weighted 0.0989, median 0.0819
#
#    risk aversion g            price   price - wtd mean
#    all g = 1 (log)            0.0989   +0.0000
#    all g = 3                  0.0823   -0.0167
#    all g = 0.5 (risk-loving)  0.1171   +0.0182
#    bold g=0.5, timid g=4      0.1444   +0.0454
#    bold g=4, timid g=0.5      0.0560   -0.0429
#
# Reading: log utility returns the wealth-weighted mean exactly.
# Strong uniform risk aversion pulls the price toward the median
# belief, risk-loving toward the bold; when risk attitude goes with
# belief the price moves furthest, in either direction. A price
# reads as a probability only under an assumption about who trades
# and how they weigh risk.

四千位交易者的信念与 p01 的冷门人群同分布,财富服从对数正态。对数效用下价格是 0.0989,与财富加权均值完全一致,这验证了程序本身。所有人风险厌恶系数为 3 时,价格降到 0.0823,几乎就是中位数 0.0819;所有人都偏好风险(γ=0.5\gamma = 0.5)时,价格升到 0.1171。最大的偏离出现在风险态度与信念相关时:大胆者同时不怕风险、谨慎者同时怕风险,价格是 0.1444,比财富加权均值高 0.0454;反过来则低 0.0429。

这说明「价格 = 概率」需要的不只是交易者整体无偏。它需要一个关于谁在交易、如何权衡风险的具体假设,而这个假设通常无法从价格本身检验。

冷热门偏差:不需要谁爱冒险

赛马投注中,冷门马的赔率长期过于慷慨,而热门马的赔率过于吝啬:同样一元,押冷门的平均回报低于押热门。这被称为冷热门偏差(favourite-longshot bias),最早由 Griffith 记录 (Griffith 1949),Ali 用赛马数据系统测量 (Ali 1977),Thaler 与 Ziemba 作了综述 (Thaler and Ziemba 1988)。常见的两种解释是:投注者爱好风险,或者投注者高估小概率 (Snowberg and Wolfers 2010)。

第三段程序检验第三种可能:什么偏好与认知偏差都没有,只有分歧。每位交易者看到的是真实概率加上无偏噪声。

推导

# Chapter 1. p03: The favourite-longshot bias from belief dispersion alone.
# 12,000 binary contracts. Each has a true probability p (uniform on the
# log-odds scale between -4 and +4). 200 traders per contract see p with
# unbiased noise on the log-odds scale (sd 1.0), so no one is biased on
# average and no one loves risk. Two clearing rules are compared:
#   M  Manski: risk-neutral, equal budgets (the quantile price of p01)
#   L  log utility, equal wealth (price = mean belief, as in p02)
# Contracts are grouped by price; each group's mean price is compared
# with its mean true probability and with simulated outcomes.
import bisect
import math
import random

K, T, SD = 12000, 200, 1.0
EDGES = (0.0, 0.05, 0.10, 0.20, 0.40, 0.60, 0.80, 0.90, 0.95, 1.0)

def sig(x):
    return 1 / (1 + math.exp(-x))

def manski(qs):
    qs = sorted(qs)
    lo, hi = 1e-9, 1 - 1e-9
    for _ in range(50):
        mid = (lo + hi) / 2
        above = 1 - bisect.bisect_left(qs, mid) / len(qs)
        lo, hi = (mid, hi) if above > mid else (lo, mid)
    return (lo + hi) / 2

def table(rows, label):
    print("\n{}   price band     n   mean price  true p  observed"
          .format(label))
    for lo, hi in zip(EDGES, EDGES[1:]):
        g = [r for r in rows if lo <= r[0] < hi]
        if not g:
            continue
        n = len(g)
        mp = sum(r[0] for r in g) / n
        tp = sum(r[1] for r in g) / n
        ob = sum(r[2] for r in g) / n
        print("    [{:.2f}, {:.2f})  {:5d}    {:6.3f}    {:6.3f}   {:6.3f}"
              .format(lo, hi, n, mp, tp, ob))

if __name__ == "__main__":
    rng = random.Random(59003)
    rows_m, rows_l = [], []
    for _ in range(K):
        x = rng.uniform(-4, 4)
        p = sig(x)
        qs = [sig(x + rng.gauss(0, SD)) for _ in range(T)]
        y = 1 if rng.random() < p else 0
        rows_m.append((manski(qs), p, y))
        rows_l.append((sum(qs) / T, p, y))
    table(rows_m, "M")
    table(rows_l, "L")
    print("\nReading: with unbiased but dispersed beliefs, both rules")
    print("overprice longshots and underprice favourites - the bias needs")
    print("neither risk-love nor misperception, only disagreement plus a")
    print("price bounded by 0 and 1.")
#
# M   price band     n   mean price  true p  observed
#     [0.05, 0.10)    802     0.084     0.024    0.022
#     [0.10, 0.20)   1905     0.145     0.058    0.065
#     [0.20, 0.40)   2379     0.296     0.202    0.206
#     [0.40, 0.60)   2039     0.500     0.499    0.502
#     [0.60, 0.80)   2287     0.707     0.800    0.813
#     [0.80, 0.90)   1798     0.854     0.942    0.946
#     [0.90, 0.95)    790     0.914     0.976    0.977
#
# L   price band     n   mean price  true p  observed
#     [0.00, 0.05)    971     0.038     0.025    0.025
#     [0.05, 0.10)   1212     0.072     0.050    0.049
#     [0.10, 0.20)   1369     0.145     0.111    0.129
#     [0.20, 0.40)   1799     0.294     0.260    0.260
#     [0.40, 0.60)   1502     0.500     0.499    0.503
#     [0.60, 0.80)   1708     0.705     0.738    0.752
#     [0.80, 0.90)   1335     0.854     0.888    0.894
#     [0.90, 0.95)   1178     0.927     0.950    0.954
#     [0.95, 1.00)    926     0.962     0.975    0.977
#
# Reading: with unbiased but dispersed beliefs, both rules
# overprice longshots and underprice favourites - the bias needs
# neither risk-love nor misperception, only disagreement plus a
# price bounded by 0 and 1.

两种出清规则都产生了冷热门偏差。Manski 规则下,价格在 0.05 到 0.10 之间的合约平均价 0.084,真实概率只有 0.024,模拟结果的实际发生率 0.022;价格 0.90 到 0.95 的合约平均价 0.914,真实概率 0.976。对数效用规则下偏差较小但方向相同:价格 0.038 的冷门真实概率 0.025,价格 0.962 的热门真实概率 0.975;中间一档(0.500 对 0.499)几乎没有偏差。

机制很简单。价格被夹在 0 与 1 之间,而噪声在对数几率上对称。真实概率很小时,噪声把一些人的信念推高很多、把另一些人的信念压低一点点——压低的那一侧已经贴近 0 了。对这些信念取平均(对数效用)或取 Manski 分位数,结果都被拉向 0.5。

由信念分散产生的校准曲线:横轴为市场价格,纵轴为真实概率;虚线为完美校准。两种出清规则都把冷门定得太高、热门定得太低。

注

这个结果说明了什么、没说明什么。 它说明冷热门偏差可以完全来自信念分散加上有界价格,因此在数据中看到偏差,并不能证明交易者爱好风险或高估小概率。它没有说明真实市场中偏差来自哪一种机制;Snowberg 与 Wolfers 用不同彩池投注的组合区分了风险偏好与概率误判两种解释 (Snowberg and Wolfers 2010),本书不重复那项工作。

假说 · 尚未验证

作者的假说(尚未验证): 在同一平台上,交易者之间信念分歧越大的合约(例如以同一事件不同来源的预测分散度衡量),冷门的价格高估越严重;分歧小的合约,冷热门偏差接近零。什么结果会证明它错:按分歧分组后,各组的偏差幅度相同,或分歧小的组偏差更大。

小结

预测市场的价格是信念分布的某个统计量,而这个统计量由交易规则决定。风险中性、预算相同时,价格是信念高于它的人所占比例等于它自己的那个分位数,信念均值只能被界定在 (π2,2π−π2)(\pi^2, 2\pi – \pi^2) 内;对数效用时,价格恰好是财富加权均值;其他风险态度,尤其是风险态度与信念相关时,价格可以朝任一方向偏离。只要信念有分歧、价格有上下界,冷门就会被高估、热门就会被低估,不需要任何人爱好风险。读价格之前,先问是谁在出价。

参考文献

Ali, Mukhtar M. 1977. “Probability and Utility Estimates for Racetrack Bettors.” Journal of Political Economy 85 (4): 803–15.
Gjerstad, Steven. 2005. Risk Aversion, Beliefs, and Prediction Market Equilibrium. Working paper. University of Arizona, Economic Science Laboratory.
Griffith, R. M. 1949. “Odds Adjustments by American Horse-Race Bettors.” American Journal of Psychology 62 (2): 290–94.
Manski, Charles F. 2006. “Interpreting the Predictions of Prediction Markets.” Economics Letters 91 (3): 425–29.
Snowberg, Erik, and Justin Wolfers. 2010. “Explaining the Favorite–Long Shot Bias: Is It Risk-Love or Misperceptions?” Journal of Political Economy 118 (4): 723–46.
Thaler, Richard H., and William T. Ziemba. 1988. “Anomalies: Parimutuel Betting Markets: Racetracks and Lotteries.” Journal of Economic Perspectives 2 (2): 161–74.
Wolfers, Justin, and Eric Zitzewitz. 2004. “Prediction Markets.” Journal of Economic Perspectives 18 (2): 107–26.
Wolfers, Justin, and Eric Zitzewitz. 2006. Interpreting Prediction Market Prices as Probabilities. NBER Working Paper No. 12200. National Bureau of Economic Research.

Fan, Y. (2026). Prediction Market Microstructure, Bregman Information Projection and Cross-Book Arbitrage Bounds: Logarithmic Market Scoring Rules, Favorite-Longshot Calibration Bias, Lock-Up Opportunity Cost and Frank-Wolfe Combinatorial Pricing [预测市场微观结构、布雷格曼信息投影与跨盘口无套利边界] (Version 1.0.0). 5D Library. https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.24090166 · Licensed under Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International (CC BY-NC-ND 4.0).