5D Library › 预测市场微观结构、布雷格曼信息投影与跨盘口无套利边界 · English
第二章 对数市场评分规则:Softmax、KL 散度与补贴上限
没有对手方的市场
订单簿市场需要有人挂单。交易稀少的问题——一场小型选举、一项内部项目能否按期完成——往往没有足够的对手方,价格要么不存在,要么停在很久以前。Hanson 的解决办法是让一个自动做市商永远报价,并为它的亏损设一个上限 (Hanson 2003, 2007)。这个做市商就是对数市场评分规则(LMSR)。
它的设计源自适当评分规则:一个预测者报出概率 ,若结果 发生,得到 分;诚实地报出自己的信念,期望得分最高 (Gneiting and Raftery 2007)。LMSR 把评分规则变成市场:每位交易者付钱「接手」上一位的预测,并按自己的新预测得分。
成本函数与它的凸对偶
推导
LMSR。 设各结果的已售份数为 ,流动性参数为 。做市商的成本函数与价格为 价格就是 的 Softmax。买入 要付 。它的凸对偶是 也就是负熵在单纯形上的共轭。Chen 与 Pennock 用效用框架描述了这一类有界亏损做市商 (Chen and Pennock 2007),Abernethy、Chen 与 Wortman Vaughan 证明了一般的成本函数做市商都对应一个凸正则项,并与在线学习中的「跟随正则化领先者」算法一一对应 (Abernethy et al. 2013)。
第四段程序逐项核对这些性质。
推导
# Chapter 2. p04: Hanson's logarithmic market scoring rule (LMSR) and its
# convex dual. Outstanding shares q (one per outcome) cost
# C(q) = b ln sum_i exp(q_i / b), prices p = softmax(q / b).
# Four facts are checked numerically:
# 1. duality C(q) = p.q + b H(p), H = entropy (so C is the convex
# conjugate of -b H on the simplex)
# 2. payoff moving prices from p to p' and then seeing outcome i
# earns exactly b ln(p'_i / p_i)
# 3. Bregman a trader who believes p' and moves the price to p'
# expects b KL(p' || p); KL is the Bregman divergence of
# negative entropy
# 4. bound the market maker's worst-case loss is b ln n
import math
def cost(q, b):
m = max(q)
return m + b * math.log(math.fsum(math.exp((x - m) / b) for x in q))
def prices(q, b):
m = max(q)
e = [math.exp((x - m) / b) for x in q]
s = math.fsum(e)
return [x / s for x in e]
def entropy(p):
return -math.fsum(x * math.log(x) for x in p if x > 0)
def kl(a, c):
return math.fsum(x * math.log(x / y) for x, y in zip(a, c) if x > 0)
def bregman_negent(a, c):
f = lambda v: math.fsum(x * math.log(x) for x in v if x > 0)
grad = [math.log(y) + 1 for y in c]
return f(a) - f(c) - math.fsum(g * (x - y)
for g, x, y in zip(grad, a, c))
if __name__ == "__main__":
b = 100.0
q = [30.0, -10.0, -50.0]
p = prices(q, b)
print("b = 100, q = {} -> prices {}".format(
q, [round(x, 4) for x in p]))
gap = cost(q, b) - math.fsum(x * y for x, y in zip(p, q)) - b * entropy(p)
print("1. |C(q) - p.q - b H(p)| < 1e-9: {}".format(abs(gap) < 1e-9))
target = [0.60, 0.25, 0.15]
dq = [b * (math.log(t) - math.log(x)) for t, x in zip(target, p)]
dq = [d - min(dq) for d in dq] # buy only; same prices
q2 = [x + d for x, d in zip(q, dq)]
paid = cost(q2, b) - cost(q, b)
print("2. buy {} shares -> prices {}; pay {:.3f}".format(
[round(d, 2) for d in dq], target, paid))
for i in range(3):
print(" outcome {}: net {:+8.3f} b ln(p'_i/p_i) {:+8.3f}".format(
i, dq[i] - paid, b * math.log(target[i] / p[i])))
exp_profit = math.fsum(t * (d - paid) for t, d in zip(target, dq))
print("3. expected profit under p' {:.4f}; b KL(p'||p) {:.4f};"
" b Bregman {:.4f}".format(exp_profit, b * kl(target, p),
b * bregman_negent(target, p)))
print("4. worst case: start uniform, outcome 0 wins, price of 0 -> 1")
for n in (2, 4, 10, 50):
q0 = [0.0] * n
qn = [3000.0] + [0.0] * (n - 1)
loss = 3000.0 - (cost(qn, b) - cost(q0, b))
print(" n = {:2d}: loss at q_0 = 3000 is {:7.2f};"
" b ln n = {:7.2f}".format(n, loss, b * math.log(n)))
print("\nReading: the LMSR is the entropy-regularised market: its prices")
print("are a softmax, a trader's expected gain is a KL (Bregman)")
print("divergence, and the subsidy for that information is capped at")
print("b ln n, reached only when the market becomes certain.")
# b = 100, q = [30.0, -10.0, -50.0] -> prices [0.4718, 0.3162, 0.212]
# 1. |C(q) - p.q - b H(p)| < 1e-9: True
# 2. buy [58.63, 11.08, 0.0] shares -> prices [0.6, 0.25, 0.15]; pay 34.587
# outcome 0: net +24.042 b ln(p'_i/p_i) +24.042
# outcome 1: net -23.504 b ln(p'_i/p_i) -23.504
# outcome 2: net -34.587 b ln(p'_i/p_i) -34.587
# 3. expected profit under p' 3.3614; b KL(p'||p) 3.3614; b Bregman 3.3614
# 4. worst case: start uniform, outcome 0 wins, price of 0 -> 1
# n = 2: loss at q_0 = 3000 is 69.31; b ln n = 69.31
# n = 4: loss at q_0 = 3000 is 138.63; b ln n = 138.63
# n = 10: loss at q_0 = 3000 is 230.26; b ln n = 230.26
# n = 50: loss at q_0 = 3000 is 391.20; b ln n = 391.20
#
# Reading: the LMSR is the entropy-regularised market: its prices
# are a softmax, a trader's expected gain is a KL (Bregman)
# divergence, and the subsidy for that information is capped at
# b ln n, reached only when the market becomes certain.第一项检查对偶等式:残差在机器精度以内。第二项是一笔具体交易:价格从 (0.4718, 0.3162, 0.212) 被推到 (0.60, 0.25, 0.15),交易者只买不卖,付出 34.587。之后无论哪个结果发生,净收益都恰好是 :结果 0 发生得 +24.042,结果 2 发生则亏 −34.587。这就是对数评分规则:交易者因改进了预测而得分,因弄错了而失分。
第三项把这笔账取期望。若交易者的信念正是 ,他的期望收益为 3.3614,恰好等于 乘以 KL 散度 ,也恰好等于负熵的布雷格曼散度 (Bregman 1967)。KL 散度是负熵生成的布雷格曼散度;Csiszár 用它建立了概率分布的「信息投影」几何 (Csiszár 1975)。所以 LMSR 里的每一笔交易都是一次信息投影:交易者把市场的分布投影到自己的分布上,做市商为这段距离付钱。
推导
最坏情况的亏损。 设市场从均匀价格开始,最终结果 发生。做市商卖出的份额中只有 要兑付,而它收到的总额为 。由 与 ,亏损 。
第四项把价格推到确定:两个结果的亏损为 69.31,四个 138.63,十个 230.26,五十个 391.20——都等于 。这就是做市商为整个市场的信息所付的补贴上限,只在市场完全确定时达到。上限随结果数的对数增长,所以多结果的市场只贵一点点。
流动性参数买的是什么
是唯一的设计参数。它同时决定两件事:做市商最多亏多少,以及一笔订单能把价格推多远。
推导
# Chapter 2. p05: The liquidity parameter b buys depth with subsidy.
# Binary LMSR starting at a price of 0.50. For each b: the market maker's
# worst-case loss (b ln 2), the price after a trader spends 100 on YES,
# the average price paid, and the cost of moving the price from 0.50 to
# 0.60, which is b ln((1 - 0.50) / (1 - 0.60)) = 0.2231 b.
# A small order of size x at 0.50 moves the price by about x / (2 b), so
# (worst-case loss) x (price impact) tends to x ln(2) / 2 for every b:
# the trade-off cannot be escaped by choosing b, only moved along.
import math
def spend(budget, b, p0=0.5):
"""Shares s of YES bought for `budget` from price p0 (binary LMSR)."""
# cost(s) = b ln(1 - p0 + p0 e^{s/b}); invert it
s = b * math.log((math.exp(budget / b) - (1 - p0)) / p0)
p1 = p0 * math.exp(s / b) / (1 - p0 + p0 * math.exp(s / b))
return s, p1
if __name__ == "__main__":
print(" b worst loss price after 100 avg price move .50->.60"
" loss x impact")
for b in (50, 100, 250, 500, 1000, 5000):
s, p1 = spend(100.0, b)
move = b * math.log(0.5 / 0.4)
loss = b * math.log(2)
print(" {:5d} {:9.1f} {:13.4f} {:8.4f} {:11.1f} {:12.2f}"
.format(b, loss, p1, 100.0 / s, move, loss * (p1 - 0.5)))
print("\n order size needed to move 0.50 -> 0.60 at b = 1000:"
" {:.1f}".format(1000 * math.log(0.5 / 0.4)))
print("\nReading: small b means a cheap subsidy and a jumpy price; large")
print("b means a deep market that the operator pays for. The product of")
print("the two tends to 100 ln(2) / 2 = {:.2f} as orders become small"
.format(50 * math.log(2)))
print("relative to b.")
# b worst loss price after 100 avg price move .50->.60 loss x impact
# 50 34.7 0.9323 0.7625 11.2 14.98
# 100 69.3 0.8161 0.6712 22.3 21.91
# 250 173.3 0.6648 0.5840 55.8 28.56
# 500 346.6 0.5906 0.5456 111.6 31.41
# 1000 693.1 0.5476 0.5238 223.1 32.98
# 5000 3465.7 0.5099 0.5050 1115.7 34.31
#
# order size needed to move 0.50 -> 0.60 at b = 1000: 223.1
#
# Reading: small b means a cheap subsidy and a jumpy price; large
# b means a deep market that the operator pays for. The product of
# the two tends to 100 ln(2) / 2 = 34.66 as orders become small
# relative to b.时补贴上限只有 34.7,但一笔 100 元的买单就把价格从 0.50 推到 0.9323; 时同一笔买单只把价格推到 0.5476,平均成交价 0.5238,补贴上限却是 693.1。把价格从 0.50 推到 0.60,所需金额恰为 ,在 时是 223.1。
最后一列是最坏亏损乘以价格冲击。它随 增大而趋于一个常数,34.66,即 。原因是:在价格 0.50 附近,金额为 的小单把价格推动约 ,而最坏亏损是 ,两者的乘积与 无关。选择 不能逃出这个权衡,只能沿着它移动:要更深的市场,就得付更多的补贴。
注
流动性敏感的变体。 Othman、Pennock、Reeves 与 Sandholm 提出让 随交易量增长的变体,使市场在交易活跃时自动加深 (Othman et al. 2013)。它改变了补贴随时间的分配,但在任何给定时刻,深度与补贴之间的权衡仍然存在。本书只讨论固定的 。
假说 · 尚未验证
作者的假说(尚未验证): 在使用 LMSR 的内部预测市场中,按「最坏亏损 / 参与人数」设定 的市场,其最终预测的布赖尔分数优于把 设得很大或很小的市场; 太小时价格被少数大单左右,太大时价格不动、交易者失去动力。什么结果会证明它错:在预先登记的多个内部市场中,预测精度与 无关,或单调地随 增大而提高。
小结
LMSR 的价格是份额的 Softmax,成本函数是负熵的凸共轭;每笔交易的收益恰为对数评分之差,交易者的期望收益恰为 KL 散度——负熵的布雷格曼散度,因此每笔交易都是一次信息投影。做市商的最坏亏损是 。流动性参数 在补贴与价格冲击之间做精确的交换:对小单而言,两者之积趋于与 无关的常数。
参考文献
Fan, Y. (2026). Prediction Market Microstructure, Bregman Information Projection and Cross-Book Arbitrage Bounds: Logarithmic Market Scoring Rules, Favorite-Longshot Calibration Bias, Lock-Up Opportunity Cost and Frank-Wolfe Combinatorial Pricing [预测市场微观结构、布雷格曼信息投影与跨盘口无套利边界] (Version 1.0.0). 5D Library. https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.24090166 · Licensed under Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International (CC BY-NC-ND 4.0).