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Chapter 7 Reading the Classics: Price Stabilisation, the Jiaozi Reserve and Inflated Salt Vouchers

This chapter reads the modern models of the earlier chapters beside two classical texts: the Western Han Discourses on Salt and Iron (Yantie lun) and the Treatise on Food and Money in the History of Song (Song shi), compiled under the Yuan. The aim is not to show that the ancients “had already discovered” arbitrage pricing, reserve theory or models of bank runs, but to see how ancient fiscal officials and their critics described price differences across time and place, convertible paper claims and their over-issue, and to state plainly the boundary between ancient fiscal institutions and modern financial models. Quotations follow the Zhonghua Book Company editions; the English renderings are the author’s translations.

Pingzhun and junshu: the state “buys cheap and sells dear”

In 81 BCE, the sixth year of the Shiyuan era of Emperor Zhao of Han, the court summoned the Chancellor, the Imperial Counsellor and “worthy and good” and “literati” men recommended from the provinces to discuss the hardships of the people. One of the fiercest disputes concerned the state monopolies on salt and iron and the policies of equitable transport (junshu) and price stabilisation (pingzhun) introduced by Sang Hongyang under Emperor Wu. Huan Kuan edited the records of the meeting into the Discourses on Salt and Iron. Chapter 7 of Book 20 cited this work from the angle of credit cycles; this chapter considers only the passage on price differences and stockpiles.

Source text

大夫曰:「往者,郡国诸侯各以其方物贡输,往来烦杂,物多苦恶,或不偿其费。故郡国置输官以相给运,而便远方之贡,故曰均输。开委府于京师,以笼货物。贱即买,贵则卖。是以县官不失实,商贾无所贸利,故曰平准。平准则民不失职,均输则民齐劳逸。故平准、均输,所以平万物而便百姓,非开利孔而为民罪梯者也。」(桓宽 撰,王利器 校注 1992)

(Discourses on Salt and Iron, “Fundamental Debate”, chapter 1)

In plain language: The Imperial Counsellor said: “In the past, the commanderies and the feudal lords each sent their local products to the capital as tribute. The traffic was confused, the goods were mostly poor, and sometimes they did not cover the cost of carriage. So transport officers were placed in the commanderies to organise shipments and ease tribute from distant places; this is called equitable transport. A storehouse was opened in the capital to gather in goods, buying when they were cheap and selling when they were dear. So the state lost nothing and merchants had no profit to make; this is called price stabilisation. With price stabilisation the people do not lose their livelihoods; with equitable transport their labour is evenly shared. Price stabilisation and equitable transport serve to level all things and benefit the people; they do not open a gateway to profit or build the people a ladder to crime.”

Source text

文学曰:「……今释其所有,责其所无。百姓贱卖货物,以便上求。间者,郡国或令民作布絮,吏恣留难,与之为市。吏之所入,非独齐、阿之缣,蜀、汉之布也,亦民间之所为耳。行奸卖平,农民重苦,女工再税,未见输之均也。县官猥发,阖门擅市,则万物并收。万物并收,则物腾跃。腾跃,则商贾侔利。自市,则吏容奸。豪吏富商积货储物以待其急,轻贾奸吏收贱以取贵,未见准之平也。」(桓宽 撰,王利器 校注 1992)

(Same chapter)

In plain language: The Literati said: “… Now (the state) ignores what people have and demands what they do not have. The people must sell their own goods cheaply to supply what is demanded from above. Lately some commanderies have ordered the people to make cloth and floss, and officials obstruct them at will and force trade on them. What the officials take in is not only the fine silk of Qi and E and the cloth of Shu and Han, but also what ordinary households make. With fraud and cheap valuations, farmers suffer twice and weaving women are taxed twice over; we have not seen transport made equitable. When the state requisitions recklessly and shuts the gates to monopolise the market, every kind of goods is bought up. When everything is bought up, prices soar. When prices soar, merchants share in the profit. When the state trades on its own account, officials shelter fraud. Powerful officials and rich merchants hoard goods to await an emergency, and speculators and corrupt officials buy cheap to sell dear; we have not seen prices made level.”

In modern language, pingzhun is a buffer stock held by the state: buy below some price, sell above another, smoothing out price differences over time; junshu exploits price differences between regions and transport costs by organising shipments centrally. They do share one feature with arbitrage, profiting from price differences and thereby narrowing them, which is what the Counsellor means by “merchants had no profit to make”. But the framework’s “arbitrage character” is only an analogy, and there are at least three fundamental differences. First, the arbitrageur in the modern sense is one of many competing private traders; pingzhun was run by a monopolistic state, and the Literati point precisely to the problems of monopoly: once the state “shuts the gates to monopolise the market”, price differences are not narrowed but captured by officials and rich merchants. Second, the aim of pingzhun was first revenue and price stability, not risk-neutral pricing. Third, the text contains no quantitative price model; reading it as “mean-reversion trading” is a modern projection. The Literati’s criticism is closer, to modern ears, to an argument about principal–agent problems and rent-seeking: the intent of an institution’s design does not survive the incentives of those who run it.

The jiaozi: reserve, issue periods and over-issue

Northern Song Sichuan used iron coins, heavy and of little value. Wealthy private households first issued a convertible paper note; later the state took it over.

Source text

会子、交子之法,盖有取于唐之飞钱。真宗时,张咏镇蜀,患蜀人铁钱重,不便贸易,设质剂之法,一交一缗,以三年为一界而换之。六十五年为二十二界,谓之交子,富民十六户主之。后富民赀稍衰,不能偿所负,争讼不息。转运使薛田、张若谷请置益州交子务,以榷其出入,私造者禁之。仁宗从其议。界以百二十五万六千三百四十缗为额。(脱脱 等撰 1977)

(History of Song, chapter 181, Treatise on Food and Money, part 2, section 3)

In plain language: The methods of the huizi and jiaozi were probably modelled on the “flying money” of the Tang. Under Emperor Zhenzong, when Zhang Yong governed Shu, he was troubled that the iron coins of Shu were too heavy for trade, so he set up a system of notes: one note for one string, exchanged for new ones every three years as one issue period. In sixty-five years there were twenty-two periods; the notes were called jiaozi and were run by sixteen wealthy households. Later the households’ wealth declined and they could not repay what they owed, and lawsuits never ceased. The fiscal commissioners Xue Tian and Zhang Ruogu asked that a Yizhou Jiaozi Office be set up to control issue and redemption as a state monopoly, with private printing forbidden. Emperor Renzong accepted the proposal. Each issue period was limited to 1,256,340 strings.

According to the Long Draft Continuation of the Comprehensive Mirror, the Yizhou Jiaozi Office was “first established” on the wuwu day of the eleventh month of the first year of Tiansheng (李焘 撰 2004), which in the Gregorian calendar is already January 1024; official jiaozi were issued from the following year. The History of Song says “three years for one issue period”; some researchers think the actual cycle was about two full years (spanning three calendar years), and this book takes no position.

Source text

大凡旧岁造一界,备本钱三十六万缗,新旧相因。大观中,不蓄本钱而增造无艺,至引一缗当钱十数。及张商英秉政,奉诏复循旧法。宣和中,商英录奏当时所行,以为自旧法之用,至今引价复平。(脱脱 等撰 1977)

(Same chapter)

In plain language: In general, in former years, for each issue period printed, a reserve of 360,000 strings was set aside, with new and old periods succeeding one another. In the Daguan era no reserve was kept and printing grew without limit, until one string of notes was worth only a dozen-odd coins. When Zhang Shangying took charge of government, he restored the old method by imperial order. In the Xuanhe era Shangying reported what had been done, saying that since the old method was restored, the price of the notes had become stable again.

These two passages are the source of the framework’s “a first issue of 1,256,340 strings against a reserve of 360,000 strings”. The original text shows two things. First, 1,256,340 strings is the cap per issue period, and 360,000 strings is the reserve set aside for each period, not figures specific to the first issue. Second, their ratio is 360,000/1,256,340≈28.65%360{,}000 / 1{,}256{,}340 \approx 28.65\%: in modern terms, a fractionally reserved convertible paper money. In the first year of Daguan the court “ordered the Sichuan Jiaozi Office renamed the Qianyin Office” (脱脱 等撰 1977), and the jiaozi became the qianyin. Already after the Shaosheng era of Emperor Zhezong, “each period was printed in larger amounts, to pay for grain purchases on the Shaanxi frontier and for recruiting soldiers, from several hundred thousand strings to several million”; by the Daguan era “no reserve was kept and printing grew without limit”, and a string (1,000 coins) of qianyin was worth only a dozen or so coins, one or two per cent of face value. In the sixth year of Shaoxing in the Southern Song, an official objecting to the replacement of cash-backed guanzi by jiaozi without a reserve put it bluntly: “If the state has no reserve, how can the people trust it?” (脱脱 等撰 1977) Richard von Glahn has studied the rise and fall of Song paper money systematically (Glahn 1996).

Salt vouchers: “too many empty vouchers”

Salt vouchers (yanchao) were another convertible claim: merchants delivered grain or cash to the frontier, received vouchers and redeemed them for salt at the place of production to sell.

Source text

中书议陕西盐钞,出多虚钞,而盐益轻……

自新法未行,钞之贵贱,视有司出之多寡。

言事者以钞法屡变,民听疑惑,公家失轻重之权,商旅困往来之费。(脱脱 等撰 1977)

(Same chapter. The three sentences come from the Secretariat’s discussion of 1074, from Li Ji in 1081, and from a memorial at the start of the Chongning era)

In plain language: The Secretariat, discussing the Shaanxi salt vouchers, held that too many empty vouchers had been issued and the salt (vouchers) had grown ever lighter in value… Before the new law was put into effect, whether vouchers were dear or cheap depended on how many the office issued. Those who submitted memorials held that because the voucher system was changed again and again, the people were confused, the state lost its power to regulate values, and merchants were worn down by the costs of travelling back and forth.

These three sentences could almost go straight into a textbook of monetary economics: a claim’s value depends on the ratio between the amount issued and the goods (salt) it can be converted into, and rules that keep changing destroy credit. The same chapter also records what happened after Fan Xiang’s reform: some time after the Zhihe era the frontier was again allowed to accept fodder and grain in place of cash, so that “the abuse of inflated valuations grew, the vouchers’ value fell accordingly, and the state lost perhaps a million a year in revenue” (脱脱 等撰 1977). The framework also mentions the redemption of tea vouchers (chayin); the tea sections of the Treatise on Food and Money contain similar records, but this book could not check their wording character by character, so they are only mentioned here and not quoted.

A structural comparison with modern models

Evidence

A model of bank runs. In Diamond and Dybvig’s 1983 model a bank holds illiquid long-term assets but offers deposits that can be withdrawn at any time; whether each depositor withdraws depends on what they expect others to do, so the same bank can be in an equilibrium with no run or in one where everyone rushes to withdraw, and those at the back of the queue may get nothing. They argued that, unless total cash needs are known with certainty, suspending convertibility is not optimal, and that deposit insurance backed by the government or central bank removes the incentive to run (Diamond and Dybvig 1983).

Set beside this model, the jiaozi shows clear similarities and differences. The similarity: with a reserve of about 28.65 % backing the full face value, the jiaozi was a fractionally reserved convertible liability, and in the private period, when the sixteen households’ “wealth declined and they could not repay what they owed, and lawsuits never ceased”, that was a collapse of credit caused by an inability to redeem. The difference matters as much: the depreciation of the Daguan era was mainly not a self-fulfilling run but the issuer itself, for fiscal needs, “keeping no reserve and printing without limit”; in modern terms, over-issue and inflation under fiscal dominance, not a healthy institution brought down by expectations. The “too many empty vouchers” of the salt system are the same: the quantity of claims kept swelling relative to the goods they represented.

The comparison with the earlier chapters is even more an analogy: too many liquidation orders relative to depth, and the price gaps; too many claims relative to the reserve or the goods, and the claims collapse. The shared structure is “claims on a limited resource exceeding the resource”, but the ancients had no concepts of branching ratio, equilibrium or probability, and this book does not hold that they “had already discovered” reserve theory or models of runs. The value of these texts is a real, thousand-year-old record of credit and over-issue, with a clear-eyed critique of the incentives of those who ran the system.

Chapter summary

Pingzhun and junshu resemble arbitrage only in form; they were monopolistic fiscal and price policies. Each jiaozi issue period was capped at 1,256,340 strings with a reserve of 360,000 (about 28.65 %); in the Daguan era notes were over-issued without reserves until a string of qianyin was worth a dozen-odd coins, and salt vouchers likewise depreciated through “too many empty vouchers”. Compared with the Diamond–Dybvig model, their collapse resembles fiscal over-issue more than a self-fulfilling run. The next chapter returns to the present: a checklist and a pre-registered out-of-sample test.

References

Diamond, Douglas W., and Philip H. Dybvig. 1983. “Bank Runs, Deposit Insurance, and Liquidity.” Journal of Political Economy 91 (3): 401–19. https://doi.org/10.1086/261155.
Glahn, Richard von. 1996. Fountain of Fortune: Money and Monetary Policy in China, 1000–1700. University of California Press.
李焘 撰. 2004. 续资治通鉴长编. 中华书局.
桓宽 撰,王利器 校注. 1992. 盐铁论校注(定本). 中华书局.
脱脱 等撰. 1977. 宋史. 中华书局.

Fan, Y. (2026). Liquidation Cascades, Order-Book Depth Depletion and Cointegrated Statistical Arbitrage: Ornstein-Uhlenbeck Processes and Kalman-Filter Dynamic Hedging [高杠杆衍生品清算瀑布、订单簿深度衰竭与协整统计套利] (Version 1.0.0). 5D Library. https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.23796776 · Licensed under Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International (CC BY-NC-ND 4.0).