5D Library › 股东搭便车博弈、动态股权成熟与背刺早期预警模型 · English

第六章 条款何时有威慑力

坏离职条款

成熟机制把未成熟的股份押在桌上,以此阻止过早离开。随着股份成熟,押注越来越小,到第四年,离开去竞争的创始人几乎什么也不会失去。坏离职条款把押注补回来:违约离开的创始人,例如去竞争的,连已成熟的股份也要以低价卖回。p11 比较离开去竞争的预期损失与收益。

推导

# Chapter 6. p11: A bad-leaver clause as deterrence. Founder B holds
# 30% of a firm worth 40 units, vesting monthly over 48 months after a
# 12-month cliff. B can leave to compete, gaining G = 6 units. Without
# a bad-leaver clause B keeps the vested shares and forfeits only the
# unvested ones. With the clause, a leaver who competes must also sell
# the vested shares back at 20% of fair value, if the clause is
# enforced (chance 0.7). B is deterred if the expected loss exceeds G.
VALUE, STAKE, G, BUYBACK, ENFORCE = 40.0, 0.30, 6.0, 0.20, 0.7

def vested(month):
    return 0.0 if month < 12 else min(1.0, month / 48)

def loss(month, clause):
    full = VALUE * STAKE
    unvested = full * (1 - vested(month))
    if not clause:
        return unvested
    return unvested + ENFORCE * full * vested(month) * (1 - BUYBACK)

if __name__ == "__main__":
    print("   month   vested   loss, no clause   loss, clause   deterred?")
    for m in (6, 12, 24, 36, 48):
        a, b = loss(m, False), loss(m, True)
        print("   {:5d}   {:6.3f}   {:15.2f}   {:12.2f}   {:>4} / {}"
              .format(m, vested(m), a, b, "yes" if a > G else "no",
                      "yes" if b > G else "no"))
    print("   gain from competing G = {:.1f}".format(G))
#    month   vested   loss, no clause   loss, clause   deterred?
#        6    0.000             12.00          12.00    yes / yes
#       12    0.250              9.00          10.68    yes / yes
#       24    0.500              6.00           9.36     no / yes
#       36    0.750              3.00           8.04     no / yes
#       48    1.000              0.00           6.72     no / yes
#    gain from competing G = 6.0

没有这一条款时,离开去竞争的损失从第 6 个月的 12.00 降到第 12 个月的 9.00、第 24 个月的 6.00、第 36 个月的 3.00、第 48 个月的 0.00;对于 6.0 的收益,只在头两年有威慑力。有这一条款时,即使十次只有七次得到执行,损失在第 12 个月是 10.68,第 24 个月 9.36,第 36 个月 8.04,第 48 个月 6.72,自始至终都足以威慑。这一条款恰恰在成熟机制完成任务之后最重要。

发现与执行

条款只有在违约被及时发现、法院愿意执行时才有威慑力。宽泛的竞业禁止在某些地方不可执行,尤其是加利福尼亚州,这一点被认为与硅谷工程师的流动性有关 (Gilson 1999);保密、发明转让与不招揽客户的条款则较普遍地得到执行。p12 把威慑写成 dfP>Gd f P > G,其中 dd 是被发现的机会,ff 是得到执行的机会,PP 是处罚。

推导

# Chapter 6. p12: Clauses work only if breaches are found and enforced.
# A defecting executive gains G = 6. A breach is detected before the
# damage is done with chance d (for example by the p09 test), and then
# a court enforces the relevant clause with chance f: a broad
# non-compete may be unenforceable where the law does not allow it
# (f near 0), while confidentiality, IP assignment and non-solicitation
# clauses are usually enforceable (f near 0.8). Penalty if enforced:
# P = 10 (damages plus forfeited equity). Deterred if d f P > G; the
# critical detection rate is G / (f P).
G, P = 6.0, 10.0

if __name__ == "__main__":
    print("   enforceable f   d = 0.3   d = 0.6   d = 0.9   critical d")
    for f in (0.0, 0.4, 0.8, 1.0):
        row = ["yes" if d * f * P > G else "no" for d in (0.3, 0.6, 0.9)]
        crit = "none" if f == 0 or G / (f * P) > 1 else \
            "{:.3f}".format(G / (f * P))
        print("   {:13.1f}   {:>7}   {:>7}   {:>7}   {:>10}".format(
            f, *row, crit))
#    enforceable f   d = 0.3   d = 0.6   d = 0.9   critical d
#              0.0        no        no        no         none
#              0.4        no        no        no         none
#              0.8        no        no       yes        0.750
#              1.0        no        no       yes        0.600

完全没有执行机会时,任何发现率都威慑不了。十次执行四次时,即使必然被发现也不够。十次执行八次时,违约必须至少有 0.750 的机会被发现;必然执行时是 0.600。公司无法靠写越来越宽的条款买到安全;它需要法院会支持的条款,以及及早看见违约的办法,这正是第五章所讨论的。

假说 · 尚未验证

作者的诠释(尚未验证): 把可执行的保密与不招揽条款和早期发现结合起来的公司,因高管离职而流失的客户,少于只依赖宽泛竞业禁止的公司。什么会证明它错: 在一项对执行与不执行竞业禁止的法域中公司的预先登记比较中,高管离职后的客户流失与条款和发现的组合无关。

小结

坏离职条款在成熟期走完之后仍把一份押注留在风险之中。但任何条款的威慑力都只等于发现、执行与处罚三者的乘积;不会被执行的宽泛条款吓不住任何人。

参考文献

Gilson, Ronald J. 1999. “The Legal Infrastructure of High Technology Industrial Districts: Silicon Valley, Route 128, and Covenants Not to Compete.” New York University Law Review 74 (3): 575 to 629.

Fan, Y. (2026). Shareholder Free-Riding Games, Dynamic Vesting Mechanisms and Defection Early-Warning Models: Moral-Hazard Equity Dilution, Shotgun Buy-Sell Clauses and Behavioral Divergence Signals [股东搭便车博弈、动态股权成熟与背刺早期预警模型] (Version 1.0.0). 5D Library. https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.24090243 · Licensed under Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International (CC BY-NC-ND 4.0).