5D Library › 股东搭便车博弈、动态股权成熟与背刺早期预警模型 · English
第六章 条款何时有威慑力
坏离职条款
成熟机制把未成熟的股份押在桌上,以此阻止过早离开。随着股份成熟,押注越来越小,到第四年,离开去竞争的创始人几乎什么也不会失去。坏离职条款把押注补回来:违约离开的创始人,例如去竞争的,连已成熟的股份也要以低价卖回。p11 比较离开去竞争的预期损失与收益。
推导
# Chapter 6. p11: A bad-leaver clause as deterrence. Founder B holds
# 30% of a firm worth 40 units, vesting monthly over 48 months after a
# 12-month cliff. B can leave to compete, gaining G = 6 units. Without
# a bad-leaver clause B keeps the vested shares and forfeits only the
# unvested ones. With the clause, a leaver who competes must also sell
# the vested shares back at 20% of fair value, if the clause is
# enforced (chance 0.7). B is deterred if the expected loss exceeds G.
VALUE, STAKE, G, BUYBACK, ENFORCE = 40.0, 0.30, 6.0, 0.20, 0.7
def vested(month):
return 0.0 if month < 12 else min(1.0, month / 48)
def loss(month, clause):
full = VALUE * STAKE
unvested = full * (1 - vested(month))
if not clause:
return unvested
return unvested + ENFORCE * full * vested(month) * (1 - BUYBACK)
if __name__ == "__main__":
print(" month vested loss, no clause loss, clause deterred?")
for m in (6, 12, 24, 36, 48):
a, b = loss(m, False), loss(m, True)
print(" {:5d} {:6.3f} {:15.2f} {:12.2f} {:>4} / {}"
.format(m, vested(m), a, b, "yes" if a > G else "no",
"yes" if b > G else "no"))
print(" gain from competing G = {:.1f}".format(G))
# month vested loss, no clause loss, clause deterred?
# 6 0.000 12.00 12.00 yes / yes
# 12 0.250 9.00 10.68 yes / yes
# 24 0.500 6.00 9.36 no / yes
# 36 0.750 3.00 8.04 no / yes
# 48 1.000 0.00 6.72 no / yes
# gain from competing G = 6.0没有这一条款时,离开去竞争的损失从第 6 个月的 12.00 降到第 12 个月的 9.00、第 24 个月的 6.00、第 36 个月的 3.00、第 48 个月的 0.00;对于 6.0 的收益,只在头两年有威慑力。有这一条款时,即使十次只有七次得到执行,损失在第 12 个月是 10.68,第 24 个月 9.36,第 36 个月 8.04,第 48 个月 6.72,自始至终都足以威慑。这一条款恰恰在成熟机制完成任务之后最重要。
发现与执行
条款只有在违约被及时发现、法院愿意执行时才有威慑力。宽泛的竞业禁止在某些地方不可执行,尤其是加利福尼亚州,这一点被认为与硅谷工程师的流动性有关 (Gilson 1999);保密、发明转让与不招揽客户的条款则较普遍地得到执行。p12 把威慑写成 ,其中 是被发现的机会, 是得到执行的机会, 是处罚。
推导
# Chapter 6. p12: Clauses work only if breaches are found and enforced.
# A defecting executive gains G = 6. A breach is detected before the
# damage is done with chance d (for example by the p09 test), and then
# a court enforces the relevant clause with chance f: a broad
# non-compete may be unenforceable where the law does not allow it
# (f near 0), while confidentiality, IP assignment and non-solicitation
# clauses are usually enforceable (f near 0.8). Penalty if enforced:
# P = 10 (damages plus forfeited equity). Deterred if d f P > G; the
# critical detection rate is G / (f P).
G, P = 6.0, 10.0
if __name__ == "__main__":
print(" enforceable f d = 0.3 d = 0.6 d = 0.9 critical d")
for f in (0.0, 0.4, 0.8, 1.0):
row = ["yes" if d * f * P > G else "no" for d in (0.3, 0.6, 0.9)]
crit = "none" if f == 0 or G / (f * P) > 1 else \
"{:.3f}".format(G / (f * P))
print(" {:13.1f} {:>7} {:>7} {:>7} {:>10}".format(
f, *row, crit))
# enforceable f d = 0.3 d = 0.6 d = 0.9 critical d
# 0.0 no no no none
# 0.4 no no no none
# 0.8 no no yes 0.750
# 1.0 no no yes 0.600完全没有执行机会时,任何发现率都威慑不了。十次执行四次时,即使必然被发现也不够。十次执行八次时,违约必须至少有 0.750 的机会被发现;必然执行时是 0.600。公司无法靠写越来越宽的条款买到安全;它需要法院会支持的条款,以及及早看见违约的办法,这正是第五章所讨论的。
假说 · 尚未验证
作者的诠释(尚未验证): 把可执行的保密与不招揽条款和早期发现结合起来的公司,因高管离职而流失的客户,少于只依赖宽泛竞业禁止的公司。什么会证明它错: 在一项对执行与不执行竞业禁止的法域中公司的预先登记比较中,高管离职后的客户流失与条款和发现的组合无关。
小结
坏离职条款在成熟期走完之后仍把一份押注留在风险之中。但任何条款的威慑力都只等于发现、执行与处罚三者的乘积;不会被执行的宽泛条款吓不住任何人。
参考文献
Fan, Y. (2026). Shareholder Free-Riding Games, Dynamic Vesting Mechanisms and Defection Early-Warning Models: Moral-Hazard Equity Dilution, Shotgun Buy-Sell Clauses and Behavioral Divergence Signals [股东搭便车博弈、动态股权成熟与背刺早期预警模型] (Version 1.0.0). 5D Library. https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.24090243 · Licensed under Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International (CC BY-NC-ND 4.0).