5D Library › Shareholder Free-Riding Games, Dynamic Vesting Mechanisms and Defection Early-Warning Models · 中文

Preface: Partners, Shares and Trust as Arithmetic

Note

Please read this first. This book studies the problems that arise between co-founders, shareholders and senior executives: why equal, fixed shares invite free riding; what vesting does and does not repair; how buy-sell (“shotgun”) clauses behave when one side knows more or has more cash; how contributions can be measured; and how early warning of a partner’s defection can be built and how often it will be wrong. Its parameters are illustrative or synthetic, meant to show structure; all calculations are generated by the programs printed in the book. This book is not legal, tax or investment advice; shareholder agreements must be drafted by a qualified lawyer under the law that governs them, and monitoring of people at work must respect privacy and employment law.

Several claims about founders and partners are widely repeated: that a 50/50 split is the fair default; that four-year vesting with a one-year cliff solves the incentive problem; that a shotgun clause is fair because the person who names the price must accept either side of it; that equity should follow contribution; and that betrayal can be spotted early from behaviour. This book writes them as arithmetic that can be run, then asks when they hold.

What the book covers

Chapter 1 computes the free-riding loss when effort cannot be verified, and shows what Holmström’s group target can and cannot repair. Chapter 2 computes dead equity and shows that vesting repairs retention but not effort. Chapter 3 solves the shotgun clause with private information and with unequal cash. Chapter 4 computes Shapley values for three founders and asks whether drift in measured contributions can serve as an alarm. Chapter 5 builds Wald’s sequential test for the quiet transfer of key resources and works out how many alarms are true. Chapter 6 asks when bad-leaver and restrictive clauses actually deter. Chapter 7 reads the Han Feizi’s “Bei nei” and “Ba jian” chapters and the arrangements of pooled capital and of the Shanxi merchants’ “body shares”. Chapter 8 gives a cap table, a key-person test and the rule that an alarm is not proof.

Claims corrected after checking

  1. Equal shares are not free of loss. Two equal founders whose effort cannot be verified reach only 0.750 of the first best, three reach 0.556 and four 0.438 (Chapter 1, p01); unequal splits are worse still, not better.
  2. A group target can restore effort, but only with little noise. With small noise it gets 0.990 of the first best, but with larger noise the good equilibrium disappears and efficiency falls to 0.010, far below plain equal shares (p02).
  3. Vesting repairs retention, not effort. In the model, vesting keeps a co-founder 20 months instead of 1, but while the founder stays, effort is still that of a half owner, so the joint value rises only from 0.016 to 0.312 of the full value (Chapter 2, p04).
  4. A shotgun clause is not neutral. With private values, the person naming the price shades it toward the middle; with unequal cash, a partner who can raise only 0.2 of the firm’s value can be bought out at 0.21 instead of 0.5 (Chapter 3, p05, p06).
  5. Measured contributions make a poor alarm. With realistic noise, an alarm based on the drift of a founder’s Shapley share also sounds in 0.823 of cases in which nothing changed (Chapter 4, p08).
  6. Most alarms can be false. With a base rate of 2% and a false-alarm rate of 5%, only 0.279 of alarms concern a partner who is really defecting (Chapter 5, p10).
  7. A clause that is not enforced deters no one. A broad non-compete that a court will not enforce deters nothing at any detection rate (Chapter 6, p12).
  8. One historical claim. A “Song dynasty pooled-capital contract” is often cited; this book could not check a Song source text and quotes none (Chapter 7).

How to read the boxes

The boxes separate published evidence, runnable Python computations (16 programs, standard library only, fixed random seeds, each actually run at build time with its real output printed beneath it), classical sources, notes and the author’s hypotheses; every hypothesis states what result would show it wrong. Programs and their output use ASCII characters only.

Disclosure

The author uses the works of 5D Library (including this book) as the methodological basis of community courses, the 5D Ascension Cards (Dimensional Shift Card Decks) and the Yafu AI knowledge base, and runs several websites, paid online calculators, subscriptions, reports, courses, business licences and advisory services, including sites on partner and executive risk and on shareholder agreements, which is exactly what this book studies; the author therefore has a direct commercial interest in its subject. This book promotes no software, course, card deck, legal service or financial product, uses no client’s data, and accepts no sponsorship. All parameters in the book are synthetic or illustrative. The hypotheses of Chapters 1 to 7 must be tested under pre-registered protocols, and the results published whether positive or negative.

Fan, Y. (2026). Shareholder Free-Riding Games, Dynamic Vesting Mechanisms and Defection Early-Warning Models: Moral-Hazard Equity Dilution, Shotgun Buy-Sell Clauses and Behavioral Divergence Signals [股东搭便车博弈、动态股权成熟与背刺早期预警模型] (Version 1.0.0). 5D Library. https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.24090243 · Licensed under Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International (CC BY-NC-ND 4.0).