5D Library › Retrodictive Belief Locking, Sequential Pain-Point Agitation and Markovian Upsell Automata · 中文
Chapter 3. The Commitment Ratchet: Price Ratios and Upsell Timing
Two published regularities
Upsells (order bumps, one-click upgrades, course conversions) rest on two regularities with experimental evidence. One is the “foot in the door”: people who agree to a small request are more likely to agree to a larger one later (Freedman and Fraser 1966). The other is sunk cost: those who have already invested are more inclined to keep investing, even when going on does not pay from where they stand (Arkes and Blumer 1985); in organisational decisions it appears as escalating commitment to a chosen course (Staw 1976).
Evidence
Where the regularities come from. In Freedman and Fraser’s experiment, householders who first agreed to put a small sign in a window agreed more often to a large sign in the yard later (Freedman and Fraser 1966). Arkes and Blumer showed that people who had paid more were more likely to keep using things they regretted buying (Arkes and Blumer 1985). Staw showed that people personally responsible for a failing decision commit more resources to it (Staw 1976). These experiments show that the effects exist but give no parameters that can be used directly for pricing; this chapter’s parameters are illustrative.
The best price ratio for one upsell
Let a user who has bought tier (price ) accept tier (price ) with probability where is the resistance threshold, rising with the amount already spent (sunk cost). Some who accept later ask for a refund, more so the harder they were pushed.
Calculation
# Chapter 3. [p05] The optimal price jump for one upsell, with and
# without the cost of regret. A buyer of tier i (price p) is offered
# tier i+1 at r * p. She accepts with logistic probability
# A(r) = 1 / (1 + exp((r - r0) / 0.6)),
# where her resistance threshold r0 = 2.5 + 0.8 * ln(1 + S / p) rises
# with what she has already spent, S (sunk cost; S = 0 for a first
# purchase). A share of buyers who accept ask for a refund, more so
# the harder they were pushed: phi(r) = 0.05 + 0.30 / (1 + exp(-(r -
# r0) / 0.6)). Net revenue per offer, in units of p: r A(r) (1 - phi).
import math
def r0(sunk):
return 2.5 + 0.8 * math.log(1 + sunk)
def accept(r, t):
return 1 / (1 + math.exp((r - t) / 0.6))
def refund(r, t):
return 0.05 + 0.30 / (1 + math.exp(-(r - t) / 0.6))
def best(sunk, with_refunds):
t = r0(sunk)
grid = [1 + k / 100 for k in range(0, 1201)]
def net(r):
return r * accept(r, t) * ((1 - refund(r, t)) if with_refunds
else 1.0)
r = max(grid, key=net)
return t, r, accept(r, t), refund(r, t), net(r)
if __name__ == "__main__":
print(" sunk S/p threshold no refunds: r* A(r*) with refunds:"
" r* A(r*) phi")
for sunk in (0, 1, 3, 10):
t, r1, a1, f1, n1 = best(sunk, False)
t, r2, a2, f2, n2 = best(sunk, True)
print(" {:7d} {:10.3f} {:16.2f} {:6.3f} {:17.2f} {:6.3f} {:5.3f}"
.format(sunk, t, r1, a1, r2, a2, f2))
print("\nReading: sunk cost raises the jump a buyer tolerates, so the")
print("best ratio grows along the ladder. The optimum always lies")
print("well below the resistance threshold, and counting refunds")
print("lowers it further: pushing to the threshold does not pay.")
# sunk S/p threshold no refunds: r* A(r*) with refunds: r* A(r*) phi
# 0 2.500 1.99 0.701 1.86 0.744 0.127
# 1 3.055 2.40 0.749 2.26 0.790 0.113
# 3 3.609 2.82 0.788 2.68 0.825 0.103
# 10 4.418 3.48 0.827 3.33 0.860 0.092
#
# Reading: sunk cost raises the jump a buyer tolerates, so the
# best ratio grows along the ladder. The optimum always lies
# well below the resistance threshold, and counting refunds
# lowers it further: pushing to the threshold does not pay.At a first purchase () the resistance threshold is 2.500, the best ratio 1.99, and 1.86 with refunds counted; once the buyer has spent 10 times the current price, the threshold rises to 4.418 and the best ratio is 3.48 (3.33 with refunds). The optimum always lies well below the threshold: at the threshold half of all offers are refused, and regret among those who accept is highest. So “pushing the price to what the user can bear” does not maximise profit, and with refunds counted even less so.
A four-step ladder: ratios and timing
Now take a four-step ladder: the first step costs 9, and each upsell is offered days after the previous purchase. The user’s “readiness” peaks when she has felt the first result (here on day 7), while each day she may leave. The program searches the three ratios and the common delay together.
Calculation
# Chapter 3. [p06] Timing and ratios along a four-step ladder.
# Tier 1 costs 9. After each purchase the next offer is made t days
# later. Readiness peaks when the first result has been felt:
# g(t) = (t/7) exp(1 - t/7); the buyer is still around with probability
# exp(-t/60). Acceptance of the next step is g(t) * A(r) with A and the
# refund share phi from p05 (sunk cost counted). The ratios r1, r2, r3
# and one common delay t are chosen to maximise expected net revenue
# from the three upsells (grid search).
import math
from itertools import product
def thr(sunk):
return 2.5 + 0.8 * math.log(1 + sunk)
def acc(r, t):
return 1 / (1 + math.exp((r - t) / 0.6))
def phi(r, t):
return 0.05 + 0.30 / (1 + math.exp(-(r - t) / 0.6))
def ready(t):
return (t / 7) * math.exp(1 - t / 7) * math.exp(-t / 60)
def value(rs, t):
p, spent, alive, total = 9.0, 9.0, 1.0, 0.0
for r in rs:
th = thr(spent / p - 1)
a = ready(t) * acc(r, th)
alive *= a
price = r * p
total += alive * price * (1 - phi(r, th))
spent += price
p = price
return total
if __name__ == "__main__":
grid = [1.5 + k / 10 for k in range(0, 31)]
best = max(((value(rs, t), rs, t) for rs in product(grid, repeat=3)
for t in (1, 3, 5, 7, 10, 14, 21, 30)),
key=lambda x: x[0])
v, rs, t = best
prices = [9.0]
for r in rs:
prices.append(prices[-1] * r)
print(" best delay t = {} days; ratios r1..r3 = {}".format(
t, ", ".join("{:.1f}".format(r) for r in rs)))
print(" prices: " + " -> ".join("{:.2f}".format(x) for x in prices))
print(" expected net upsell revenue per tier-1 buyer: {:.2f}".format(v))
for tt in (1, 7, 30):
print(" same ratios, delay {:2d} days: {:.2f}".format(
tt, value(rs, tt)))
print("\nReading: the ratios rise along the ladder as sunk cost")
print("accumulates, and timing matters as much as price: an offer")
print("the next day or a month later earns far less than one made")
print("when the first result has been felt.")
# best delay t = 7 days; ratios r1..r3 = 1.9, 2.1, 2.2
# prices: 9.00 -> 17.10 -> 35.91 -> 79.00
# expected net upsell revenue per tier-1 buyer: 45.35
# same ratios, delay 1 days: 6.67
# same ratios, delay 7 days: 45.35
# same ratios, delay 30 days: 1.25
#
# Reading: the ratios rise along the ladder as sunk cost
# accumulates, and timing matters as much as price: an offer
# the next day or a month later earns far less than one made
# when the first result has been felt.The best delay is 7 days and the ratios are 1.9, 2.1 and 2.2, prices rising from 9.00 to 79.00, with 45.35 of net upsell revenue per first-step buyer. With the same ratios, an offer the next day brings only 6.67, an offer a month later only 1.25. Timing matters as much as price: too early, the user has not felt the first result; too late, she has gone.
Hypothesis · not established
The author’s interpretation (not yet tested): the profit of upsells comes mainly from timing (making the offer after the user has felt a result), not from pushing prices to the limit of what she will bear. What would show this wrong: if, in an experiment that randomises the timing of offers, upsells made on day 1 and on day 7 are accepted at rates that do not differ significantly, there is no readiness peak and this chapter’s conclusion about timing fails.
Summary
Sunk cost raises the price ratio a user will tolerate along the ladder, but the best ratio always lies far below the resistance threshold, and lower still with refunds counted. On a four-step ladder the best time is when the user has felt a result; at the same prices, an early or a late offer earns only a small part of the revenue.
References
Fan, Y. (2026). Retrodictive Belief Locking, Sequential Pain-Point Agitation and Markovian Upsell Automata: Bayesian Trust Avalanches, Sunk-Cost Commitment Ratchets and Cross-Domain Transition Matrices [回溯信念锁定、序贯痛点唤醒与马尔可夫升单自动机] (Version 1.0.0). 5D Library. https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.24090186 · Licensed under Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International (CC BY-NC-ND 4.0).