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Chapter 3. Capital Lock-Up: Why Near-Certain Contracts Sit at 0.92 to 0.96

Money for nothing?

Six months before resolution, a contract that will almost certainly pay out is quoted at 0.95. If its true probability is 0.99, buying it has an expected return of 4 %; this looks like free money that arbitrageurs should bid up to 0.99 at once. Yet such contracts often sit between 0.92 and 0.96 for months and converge to 1 only in the last weeks. This chapter shows that this is not a market failure but a direct consequence of the cost of capital.

The key point: a contract pays no interest before it resolves. Buying it at xx locks xx away until resolution day. That money has other uses — the risk-free rate, or whatever return the trader could earn elsewhere. Shleifer and Vishny called such constraints “the limits of arbitrage”: arbitrage needs capital, and capital has a cost (Shleifer and Vishny 1997).

The no-arbitrage band

Calculation

Lock-up discounting. A contract resolves in τ\tau years and pays 1 with probability pp. The trader’s money earns ρ\rho a year elsewhere, so a position must return g=(1+ρ)τg = (1 + \rho)^\tau in total to be worth holding. Buying YES at xx returns p/xp/x on average; buying NO at 1−x1 – x returns (1−p)/(1−x)(1 – p)/(1 – x). Neither side wants to trade in the range pg≤x≤1−1−pg.\frac{p}{g} \;\le\; x \;\le\; 1 – \frac{1 – p}{g} . Inside that band the price is set by whoever does want to trade: hedgers, supporters, longshot buyers.

Calculation

# Chapter 3. p06: Capital lock-up opens a no-arbitrage band around p.
# A contract pays 1 at resolution, tau years away, with probability p.
# Money in it earns nothing until then; the trader's alternative earns
# rho a year, so a position must return g = (1 + rho) ** tau to be worth
# holding. Buying YES at price x pays p / x on average; buying NO at
# 1 - x pays (1 - p) / (1 - x). Neither side wants to trade while
#     p / g  <=  x  <=  1 - (1 - p) / g.
# Inside the band the price is set by whoever does want to trade: hedgers,
# fans, longshot buyers. rho = 0.045 is a risk-free rate; rho = 0.145
# adds a 10 % a year return the trader could earn elsewhere.
TAUS = ((1 / 52, "1 week"), (1 / 12, "1 month"), (0.25, "3 months"),
        (0.5, "6 months"), (1.0, "1 year"), (2.0, "2 years"))

def band(p, tau, rho):
    g = (1 + rho) ** tau
    return p / g, 1 - (1 - p) / g

if __name__ == "__main__":
    for p in (0.99, 0.05):
        print("true p = {:.2f}".format(p))
        print("   horizon     rho = 0.045         rho = 0.145")
        for tau, name in TAUS:
            a = band(p, tau, 0.045)
            c = band(p, tau, 0.145)
            print("   {:<9}  [{:.4f}, {:.4f}]   [{:.4f}, {:.4f}]"
                  .format(name, a[0], a[1], c[0], c[1]))
        print()
    p, tau = 0.99, 0.5
    for x in (0.92, 0.95, 0.96):
        r = (p / x) ** (1 / tau) - 1
        print("buy YES at {:.2f}, 6 months, p = 0.99: expected {:+.1%}"
              " a year".format(x, r))
    print("\nReading: a near-certain contract a year out can trade anywhere")
    print("from 0.86 to 0.99 without offering anyone a return above 14.5 %;")
    print("a 5 % longshot can trade up to 0.17. The band, not the")
    print("probability, is what arbitrage enforces, and it closes only as")
    print("resolution nears.")
# true p = 0.99
#    horizon     rho = 0.045         rho = 0.145
#    1 week     [0.9892, 0.9900]   [0.9874, 0.9900]
#    1 month    [0.9864, 0.9900]   [0.9789, 0.9901]
#    3 months   [0.9792, 0.9901]   [0.9570, 0.9903]
#    6 months   [0.9684, 0.9902]   [0.9252, 0.9907]
#    1 year     [0.9474, 0.9904]   [0.8646, 0.9913]
#    2 years    [0.9066, 0.9908]   [0.7551, 0.9924]
#
# true p = 0.05
#    horizon     rho = 0.045         rho = 0.145
#    1 week     [0.0500, 0.0508]   [0.0499, 0.0525]
#    1 month    [0.0498, 0.0535]   [0.0494, 0.0607]
#    3 months   [0.0495, 0.0604]   [0.0483, 0.0816]
#    6 months   [0.0489, 0.0707]   [0.0467, 0.1122]
#    1 year     [0.0478, 0.0909]   [0.0437, 0.1703]
#    2 years    [0.0458, 0.1301]   [0.0381, 0.2754]
#
# buy YES at 0.92, 6 months, p = 0.99: expected +15.8% a year
# buy YES at 0.95, 6 months, p = 0.99: expected +8.6% a year
# buy YES at 0.96, 6 months, p = 0.99: expected +6.3% a year
#
# Reading: a near-certain contract a year out can trade anywhere
# from 0.86 to 0.99 without offering anyone a return above 14.5 %;
# a 5 % longshot can trade up to 0.17. The band, not the
# probability, is what arbitrage enforces, and it closes only as
# resolution nears.

The first table is for a contract with true probability 0.99. At the risk-free rate alone (ρ=0.045\rho = 0.045), a one-year contract can be priced anywhere from 0.9474 to 0.9904 without offering anyone more than 4.5 % a year. If the trader can earn another 10 % elsewhere (ρ=0.145\rho = 0.145), the lower edge falls to 0.8646; to 0.9252 at six months and 0.9570 at three. The range 0.92 to 0.96 sits right at the lower edge for three- to six-month contracts.

The second table applies the same arithmetic to a longshot whose true probability is only 0.05. At one year and ρ=0.145\rho = 0.145 the upper edge is 0.1703: a 5 % longshot can trade at 0.17 without being arbitraged, because correcting it means buying NO — locking up 1−0.171 – 0.17 for a year to earn a few per cent.

The last three lines turn “free money” into annual returns. For a six-month contract with true probability 0.99, buying at 0.95 earns +8.6 % a year, at 0.96 +6.3 %; only at 0.92 does it reach +15.8 %. For a trader who can earn 14.5 % elsewhere, 0.95 is not cheap.

The no-arbitrage band of a contract with true probability 0.99 widens with time to resolution, for two costs of capital; the shaded strip marks 0.92 to 0.96.

Note

What is left out. The band counts only the time cost of money. Platform risk (exchange failure, resolution disputes, oracle errors), fees and withdrawal costs widen it; platforms that let positions serve as collateral or pay interest on them narrow it. ρ\rho differs from trader to trader, and so does the band: a trader who can only earn the risk-free rate is willing to buy a one-year contract at 0.9474, while one who can earn 14.5 % is not.

Why the favourite-longshot bias survives

Chapter 1 showed that dispersed beliefs are enough to create the favourite-longshot bias. If capital were free, arbitrageurs who knew the true probabilities would remove the bias entirely. The seventh program puts the two together: the crowd’s mean belief sets the price, but when it leaves the no-arbitrage band, informed capital pushes it back to the band’s edge.

Calculation

# Chapter 3. p07: Why long-dated prices lean toward 0.5.
# Each contract has a true p (uniform on log-odds in [-4, 4]). The crowd
# price is the mean of 200 noisy beliefs (log-odds noise sd 1.0, the L
# rule of p03). Informed arbitrage capital knows p and requires
# rho = 0.145 a year, so it pushes the crowd price only back to the edge
# of the no-arbitrage band of p06; inside the band the crowd price stands.
# With rho = 0 the band is a point and prices equal p. Calibration error
# (mean price minus mean true p) is reported by price band and horizon.
import math
import random

K, T, SD, RHO = 6000, 200, 1.0, 0.145
EDGES = (0.0, 0.1, 0.3, 0.7, 0.9, 1.0)

def sig(x):
    return 1 / (1 + math.exp(-x))

def priced(rng, tau, rho):
    rows = []
    for _ in range(K):
        x = rng.uniform(-4, 4)
        p = sig(x)
        crowd = sum(sig(x + rng.gauss(0, SD)) for _ in range(T)) / T
        g = (1 + rho) ** tau
        lo, hi = p / g, 1 - (1 - p) / g
        rows.append((min(max(crowd, lo), hi), p))
    return rows

if __name__ == "__main__":
    rng = random.Random(59007)
    heads = "".join("  [{:.1f},{:.1f})".format(a, b)
                    for a, b in zip(EDGES, EDGES[1:]))
    print("mean price - mean true p, by price band")
    print("  horizon   rho  " + heads)
    for tau, name in ((1 / 12, "1 month"), (0.5, "6 months"),
                      (1.0, "1 year"), (2.0, "2 years")):
        for rho in (0.0, RHO):
            rows = priced(rng, tau, rho)
            cells = []
            for a, b in zip(EDGES, EDGES[1:]):
                g = [r for r in rows if a <= r[0] < b]
                d = round(sum(r[0] - r[1] for r in g) / len(g), 4) + 0.0
                cells.append("  {:+9.4f}".format(d))
            print("  {:<8} {:5.3f}".format(name, rho) + "".join(cells))
    print("\nReading: with costless capital the crowd's bias is arbitraged")
    print("away; with a 14.5 % hurdle it survives - longshots too dear,")
    print("favourites too cheap - growing with the horizon until the band")
    print("is wide enough to hold the whole crowd bias (by six months here).")
    print("The same price means a different probability a month out.")
# mean price - mean true p, by price band
#   horizon   rho    [0.0,0.1)  [0.1,0.3)  [0.3,0.7)  [0.7,0.9)  [0.9,1.0)
#   1 month  0.000    +0.0000    +0.0000    +0.0000    +0.0000    +0.0000
#   1 month  0.145    +0.0105    +0.0092    -0.0001    -0.0092    -0.0106
#   6 months 0.000    +0.0000    +0.0000    +0.0000    +0.0000    +0.0000
#   6 months 0.145    +0.0183    +0.0358    +0.0002    -0.0355    -0.0181
#   1 year   0.000    +0.0000    +0.0000    +0.0000    +0.0000    +0.0000
#   1 year   0.145    +0.0179    +0.0354    -0.0005    -0.0355    -0.0178
#   2 years  0.000    +0.0000    +0.0000    +0.0000    +0.0000    +0.0000
#   2 years  0.145    +0.0183    +0.0351    +0.0004    -0.0357    -0.0181
#
# Reading: with costless capital the crowd's bias is arbitraged
# away; with a 14.5 % hurdle it survives - longshots too dear,
# favourites too cheap - growing with the horizon until the band
# is wide enough to hold the whole crowd bias (by six months here).
# The same price means a different probability a month out.

With free capital (ρ=0\rho = 0) the band shrinks to a point, every bias is removed and every cell is 0. With capital that requires 14.5 %, the bias survives: at one month, longshots are overpriced by +0.0105 and favourites underpriced by −0.0106; at six months, contracts priced between 0.1 and 0.3 are overpriced by +0.0358 and those between 0.7 and 0.9 underpriced by −0.0355. The bias grows with the horizon until the band is wide enough to hold the whole of the crowd’s bias (here by six months), after which one-year and two-year contracts look like six-month ones.

This is the pattern Page and Clemen found in real prediction markets: the further from resolution, the more prices lean toward 0.5, and the nearer, the better calibrated (Page and Clemen 2013). This chapter’s model supplies a mechanism: overpriced longshots and underpriced favourites both sit inside the no-arbitrage band, and the band widens with the horizon.

Hypothesis · not established

The author’s hypothesis (not yet tested): on the same platform, contracts whose locked funds earn interest or can be used as collateral price their long-dated favourites closer to the realised resolution rate than comparable contracts that earn nothing; a week before resolution the two kinds are equally calibrated. What would show it wrong: the two kinds show the same long-dated mispricing, or the interest-earning kind shows more. Chapter 8 gives a pre-registered test of the lock-up discount itself.

Summary

A contract that pays no interest before resolution locks the buyer’s money away until resolution day. At a cost of capital ρ\rho, a contract with true probability pp has a no-arbitrage band [p/g,1−(1−p)/g][p/g,\ 1 – (1-p)/g] with g=(1+ρ)τg = (1+\rho)^\tau, and no price inside the band pays an arbitrageur enough. The band widens with the horizon and the cost of capital: for a contract with true probability 0.99, a one-year horizon and a 14.5 % cost of capital put its lower edge at 0.8646. Overpriced longshots and underpriced favourites both survive inside it, so the longer the horizon, the more prices lean toward 0.5 — the same price stands for different probabilities a month out and a year out.

References

Page, Lionel, and Robert T. Clemen. 2013. “Do Prediction Markets Produce Well-Calibrated Probability Forecasts?” The Economic Journal 123 (568): 491–513.
Shleifer, Andrei, and Robert W. Vishny. 1997. “The Limits of Arbitrage.” The Journal of Finance 52 (1): 35–55.

Fan, Y. (2026). Prediction Market Microstructure, Bregman Information Projection and Cross-Book Arbitrage Bounds: Logarithmic Market Scoring Rules, Favorite-Longshot Calibration Bias, Lock-Up Opportunity Cost and Frank-Wolfe Combinatorial Pricing [预测市场微观结构、布雷格曼信息投影与跨盘口无套利边界] (Version 1.0.0). 5D Library. https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.24090166 · Licensed under Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International (CC BY-NC-ND 4.0).