5D Library › Prediction Market Microstructure, Bregman Information Projection and Cross-Book Arbitrage Bounds · 中文
Chapter 7. “The Wise Gain Tenfold” and “Watching the Turn of the Times”: Information Rent and the Cost of Carry
Why read the Guanzi and the Shiji here
Prediction markets are new, but what they trade is old: judgements about the future, and money that waits for those judgements to come true. Two passages in early Chinese texts match this book’s two themes closely. The “Guo xu” (Accumulating for the State) chapter of the Guanzi discusses how the timing of decrees moves prices and how those who know first profit from it; the “Biographies of the Money-makers” in Sima Qian’s Shiji tells how Bai Gui bought when others sold and sold when others bought. This chapter reads them alongside Chapters 1 to 4 and marks clearly where reading becomes interpretation.
The texts
Source text
The Guanzi, “Guo xu” (chapter 73, one of the “Qing zhong” chapters).
歲有凶穰,故穀有貴賤;令有緩急,故物有輕重。然而人君不能治,故使蓄賈游市,乘民之不給,百倍其本。分地若一,強者能守;分財若一,智者能收。智者有什倍人之功,愚者有不賡本之事。
Years bring famine or plenty, so grain is dear or cheap; decrees are urgent or slack, so goods are heavy or light. If the ruler cannot manage this, hoarding merchants roam the market and, exploiting the people’s want, make a hundred times their outlay. Divide land equally and the strong will keep it; divide wealth equally and the clever will gather it. The clever gain tenfold what others gain; the foolish cannot even recover their outlay.
Sima Qian, Shiji, “Biographies of the Money-makers”, on Bai Gui.
白圭,周人也。當魏文侯時,李克務盡地力,而白圭樂觀時變,故人棄我取,人取我與。夫歲孰取穀,予之絲漆;繭出取帛絮,予之食。
趨時若猛獸摯鳥之發。故曰:「吾治生產,猶伊尹、呂尚之謀,孫吳用兵,商鞅行法是也。是故其智不足與權變,勇不足以決斷,仁不能以取予,彊不能有所守,雖欲學吾術,終不告之矣。」
Bai Gui was a man of Zhou. In the time of Marquis Wen of Wei, when Li Ke was bent on wringing the most from the land, Bai Gui delighted in watching the turns of the times: what others discarded he took, what others took he let go. In a ripe year he bought grain and sold silk and lacquer; when the cocoons came out he bought silk and floss and sold food. … He seized his moment like a beast of prey or a bird of prey striking. So he said: “I manage my business as Yi Yin and Lü Shang laid their plans, as Sunzi and Wu Qi used troops, as Shang Yang applied the law. So if a man’s wit is not equal to adapting to change, his courage not equal to decision, his kindness not equal to giving and taking, his strength not equal to holding his ground, though he wishes to learn my art I will never teach him.”
Note
Chapter title and edition. The author’s outline labels the first passage “Guanzi, Qing zhong”. In the Guanzi, “Qing zhong” names a group of chapters running from “Chen cheng ma” to “Qing zhong ji”; the passage comes from the “Guo xu” chapter of that group, and is labelled accordingly here. The book quotes the standard text of Li Xiangfeng’s Guanzi jiaozhu and the Zhonghua Shuju punctuated Shiji; the wording has been checked against these standard punctuated editions. The English renderings are the author’s own.
“Decrees urgent or slack, goods heavy or light”: information rent
The “Guo xu” chain of cause is clear: the timing of decrees moves prices; those who know in advance (“the clever”) profit from the people’s want; the result is “tenfold” for some and “not recovering their outlay” for others. In this book’s terms it is information rent: whoever knows the outcome first trades at a price that does not yet reflect it.
Part A of the fifteenth program turns this into a concrete account and adds a market maker.
Calculation
# Chapter 7. p15: Guanzi's information rent and Bai Gui's carry, as models.
# A. "Zhi zhe you shi bei ren zhi gong": an insider who already knows a
# decree buys a contract priced at the public belief. A dealer quotes
# to a crowd in which a share mu of buyers know the outcome
# (Glosten-Milgrom, one trade): the ask that breaks even is
# ask = P(event | a buy)
# and the uninformed pay the informed's rent through the spread.
# B. "Ren qi wo qu, ren qu wo yu": buy grain at the harvest low, sell in
# the lean season. Seasonal price 1 - 0.2 cos(2 pi t), t in years
# from harvest; storage loses 1 % of stock a month; capital costs rho.
# Net return of holding from harvest to month m, and the loss from
# starting d months late ("qu shi ruo meng shou zhi niao zhi fa").
import math
def ask_bid(prior, mu):
# a buyer is informed with prob mu (buys iff event), else buys w.p. 1/2
pb_e = mu + (1 - mu) / 2
pb_n = (1 - mu) / 2
ask = prior * pb_e / (prior * pb_e + (1 - prior) * pb_n)
ps_e = (1 - mu) / 2
ps_n = mu + (1 - mu) / 2
bid = prior * ps_e / (prior * ps_e + (1 - prior) * ps_n)
return ask, bid
def price(t):
return 1 - 0.2 * math.cos(2 * math.pi * t)
def carry(start, months, rho):
t0, t1 = start / 12, (start + months) / 12
stock = 0.99 ** months
return stock * price(t1) / price(t0) / (1 + rho) ** (months / 12) - 1
if __name__ == "__main__":
print("A. prior 0.10; an insider who knows YES gains 1 / price - 1")
print(" price 0.10 -> {:.1f} times; price 0.0909 -> {:.1f} times"
.format(1 / 0.10 - 1, 1 / (1 / 11) - 1))
print(" share informed ask bid spread")
for mu in (0.0, 0.05, 0.2, 0.5):
a, b = ask_bid(0.10, mu)
print(" {:12.2f} {:.4f} {:.4f} {:.4f}".format(
mu, a, b, a - b))
print("\nB. buy at harvest, sell after m months (net of storage and"
" capital)")
print(" months rho = 0.00 rho = 0.10 rho = 0.30")
for m in (2, 4, 6, 8):
print(" {:6d} {:+8.1%} {:+8.1%} {:+8.1%}".format(
m, carry(0, m, 0.0), carry(0, m, 0.10), carry(0, m, 0.30)))
print(" start late, sell at month 6 (rho = 0.10):")
for d in (0, 1, 2, 3):
print(" start at month {}: {:+.1%}".format(
d, carry(d, 6 - d, 0.10)))
print("\nReading: A - the 'tenfold' gain is what any sure buyer earns")
print("at a price near 0.1; a dealer who expects one buyer in five to")
print("be informed must quote 0.1429 against 0.0690. B - the seasonal")
print("spread pays for storage, capital and the willingness to buy")
print("when others sell; it survives because carry is costly, the same")
print("reason a lock-up band survives in Chapter 3.")
# A. prior 0.10; an insider who knows YES gains 1 / price - 1
# price 0.10 -> 9.0 times; price 0.0909 -> 10.0 times
# share informed ask bid spread
# 0.00 0.1000 0.1000 0.0000
# 0.05 0.1094 0.0913 0.0180
# 0.20 0.1429 0.0690 0.0739
# 0.50 0.2500 0.0357 0.2143
#
# B. buy at harvest, sell after m months (net of storage and capital)
# months rho = 0.00 rho = 0.10 rho = 0.30
# 2 +10.3% +8.5% +5.5%
# 4 +32.1% +28.0% +21.0%
# 6 +41.2% +34.6% +23.9%
# 8 +26.9% +19.1% +6.5%
# start late, sell at month 6 (rho = 0.10):
# start at month 0: +34.6%
# start at month 1: +32.7%
# start at month 2: +24.1%
# start at month 3: +13.7%
#
# Reading: A - the 'tenfold' gain is what any sure buyer earns
# at a price near 0.1; a dealer who expects one buyer in five to
# be informed must quote 0.1429 against 0.0690. B - the seasonal
# spread pays for storage, capital and the willingness to buy
# when others sell; it survives because carry is costly, the same
# reason a lock-up band survives in Chapter 3.First, “tenfold”. Someone who already knows the outcome buys YES at price and makes : 9.0 times at a price of 0.10, exactly 10.0 times at 0.0909. On an event the public gives one chance in ten, the insider’s return is precisely “tenfold”.
Next, who pays. The market maker does not know who the insiders are, only that some share of buyers know the outcome (Glosten and Milgrom’s model (Glosten and Milgrom 1985)). To break even he must set the ask at the value implied by the fact that someone wants to buy: if one buyer in five is informed, the ask is 0.1429 and the bid 0.0690, a spread of 0.0739; if half are, the spread widens to 0.2143. The insider’s “tenfold” is paid through the spread by every uninformed trader. That is the other face of Chapters 1 and 4: when prices depart from probabilities, someone collects rent.
“What others discard I take, what others take I let go”: the cost of carry
Bai Gui’s method has the same form as the hoarding merchants of the “Guo xu” — buy low, sell high — but a different structure in time. He relies not on advance knowledge of decrees but on the seasons: when grain ripens and everyone sells grain, he buys grain and sells silk and lacquer; when cocoons come out and everyone sells silk, he buys silk and sells food. What he provides is liquidity: taking goods when others are eager to sell, and bearing the cost of holding them until others need them.
Part B lets the grain price follow the seasons, lowest at harvest and highest in the lean months. Buying at harvest and holding for six months, after storage losses of 1 % a month, nets +41.2 % with free capital, +34.6 % when capital costs 10 % a year and +23.9 % at 30 %. Holding for eight months overshoots the peak: only +6.5 % at a 30 % cost of capital. Starting a month late yields +32.7 %; three months late, +13.7 %. “Seizing the moment like a bird of prey striking” has a quantitative meaning here: the profit is concentrated in a narrow window of time.
The seasonal spread can persist precisely because carrying goods is costly: storage, spoilage, the time value of money, and the nerve to buy when others sell. It is the same logic as Chapter 3’s no-arbitrage band — prices inside the band are not corrected by arbitrageurs because correcting them locks up capital. Bai Gui’s profit is his payment for bearing those costs.
Hypothesis · not established
The author’s hypothesis about the texts (not yet tested): the “Guo xu”‘s “the clever gain tenfold” and Bai Gui’s “what others discard I take” describe two different sources of profit — advance knowledge (information rent) in the first, payment for bearing carrying costs and providing liquidity in the second — and the Guanzi’s censure of the first and the Shiji’s praise of the second reflect that distinction. What would show it wrong: traditional commentaries explain Bai Gui’s profit as advance knowledge of decrees or a monopoly of information, or explain the hoarding merchants’ profit as a fair reward for bearing risk.
Note
The limits of the analogy. The models here show only that the ways of making money the two passages describe can be captured by information rent and the cost of carry. They do not show that the ancient authors had these concepts, nor do they equate ancient grain markets with today’s prediction markets. Bai Gui’s own conditions — he would not teach a man whose wit was not equal to adapting to change or whose courage was not equal to decision — are about character, not arithmetic.
Summary
The Guanzi’s “Guo xu” explains price swings by “decrees urgent or slack, goods heavy or light” and notes that those who know first “gain tenfold”; in a prediction market an insider who buys a sure contract at 0.0909 makes exactly ten times, and the market maker passes that information rent on to uninformed traders through the spread — 0.0739 when one buyer in five is informed. The Shiji records Bai Gui’s “what others discard I take, what others take I let go”; read as liquidity provision and the cost of carry — an interpretation, not what the text says outright — the seasonal spread remains substantial after spoilage and the cost of capital, but the profit lies in a narrow window of time, for the same reason as Chapter 3’s lock-up band.
References
Fan, Y. (2026). Prediction Market Microstructure, Bregman Information Projection and Cross-Book Arbitrage Bounds: Logarithmic Market Scoring Rules, Favorite-Longshot Calibration Bias, Lock-Up Opportunity Cost and Frank-Wolfe Combinatorial Pricing [预测市场微观结构、布雷格曼信息投影与跨盘口无套利边界] (Version 1.0.0). 5D Library. https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.24090166 · Licensed under Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International (CC BY-NC-ND 4.0).