5D Library › High-Frequency Limit Order Book Microstructure, Hawkes Self-Exciting Point Processes and Adverse-Selection Flow Toxicity · 中文
Chapter 7 Reading the Classics: the Market Director, the Conspicuous Mound and the Market Exchange
This chapter reads the earlier discussion of price formation, middlemen and adverse selection beside three groups of ancient Chinese texts: the duties of the market officers, the market director (sishi) and the price officers (jiashi), in the “Offices of Earth” of the Rites of Zhou; the story of the “conspicuous mound” (longduan) in “Gongsun Chou II” of the Mencius; and the market-exchange law of the Xining era of the Northern Song as recorded in the “Treatise on Food and Money” of the History of Song. The aim is not to show that the ancients already understood order books or market making, but to see how they described “what order a market needs”, “where a middleman’s profit comes from” and “what happens when the government takes part in buying and selling”, and to mark clearly the limits between ancient institutional design, moral argument and modern mathematical models. Quotations follow Sun Yirang’s Zhouli zhengyi, Jiao Xun’s Mengzi zhengyi and the Zhonghua Shuju punctuated edition of the History of Song (孙诒让 撰,王文锦、陈玉霞 点校 1987; 焦循 撰,沈文倬 点校 1987; 脱脱 等 撰 1977), cited only by work, chapter and juan; the wording was also checked against common online transcriptions (Zhonghua Wenku, the Chinese Text Project and Gushiwen), with punctuation following common practice. English renderings of the Rites of Zhou and the History of Song are the author’s own (Biot’s French translation of the Rites of Zhou was consulted (Biot 1851)); the Mencius follows Legge (Legge 1895).
The Rites of Zhou: the market director and the price officers
Source text
司市掌市之治、教、政、刑、量度、禁令。以次叙分地而经市,以陈肆辨物而平市,以政令禁物靡而均市,以商贾阜货而行布,以量度成贾而征儥,以质剂结信而止讼,以贾民禁伪而除诈,以刑罚禁虣而去盗,以泉府同货而敛赊。大市日昃而市,百族为主;朝市朝时而市,商贾为主;夕市夕时而市,贩夫贩妇为主。(孙诒让 撰,王文锦、陈玉霞 点校 1987)
(Rites of Zhou, “Offices of Earth”, “Market Director”)
In plain terms: the market director is in charge of the market’s administration, instruction, ordinances, punishments, measures and prohibitions. He lays out the market by dividing the ground according to the order of the officers’ stations; makes the market fair by arranging the shops and distinguishing the goods; keeps the market balanced by ordinances forbidding extravagant and useless goods; makes goods abundant through merchants so that money circulates; settles prices with measures so as to draw in buying and selling; establishes trust with written contracts to stop lawsuits; forbids counterfeits and removes fraud through traders who know prices; forbids violence and removes theft by punishment; and, through the state treasury (quanfu), buys up unsold goods and handles credit. The great market opens in the afternoon, mainly for the common people; the morning market opens in the morning, mainly for merchants; the evening market opens in the evening, mainly for pedlars.
The three clauses quoted in the author’s framework, “以次叙分地而经市,以陈肆辨物而平市,以政令禁物靡而均市”, agree with the received text. The quotation follows the standard collated text; some online transcriptions read 行市 and 征价 and omit 日昃, against the dictionaries and other works that quote the passage, and the book follows the received readings 行布, 征儥 and 日昃. Two further passages of the same work bear directly on this book’s theme:
Source text
凡治市之货贿、六畜、珍异,亡者使有,利者使阜,害者使亡,靡者使微。……国凶、荒、札、丧,则市无征而作布。(孙诒让 撰,王文锦、陈玉霞 点校 1987)
(Rites of Zhou, “Offices of Earth”, “Market Director”)
贾师各掌其次之货贿之治,辨其物而均平之,展其成而奠其贾,然后令市。(孙诒让 撰,王文锦、陈玉霞 点校 1987)
(Rites of Zhou, “Offices of Earth”, “Price Officer”)
In plain terms: in managing the goods, livestock and rarities of the market, what is lacking is to be supplied, what is beneficial made abundant, what is harmful eliminated, and what is extravagant reduced. … When the state suffers bad harvests, famine, pestilence or mourning, the market is exempted from levies and coin is cast. The price officers each manage the goods of their own section of the market: they distinguish the goods and keep their prices even, examine the transactions and fix the prices, and only then order the market to open.
Historical context. The date of the Rites of Zhou has long been disputed; a common view places it between the Warring States and the early Han. It is a systematic design of an ideal bureaucracy, not a record of how markets actually worked in the Western Zhou. The “market director” and “price officers” should therefore be read as institutional proposals: the market is seen as a place where the government divides the ground, sets measures, fixes prices and manages credit. Three points are worth noting. First, “settling prices” and “fixing prices” are prices set by officials, not prices discovered by buyers and sellers in an order book; the dealer of Chapter 1 and the order book of Chapter 5 describe precisely the mechanism by which prices are formed by trading itself. Second, “establishing trust with contracts” and “forbidding counterfeits” deal with the genuineness of goods and the reliability of contracts, problems that modern exchanges solve through listing and clearing rules, not the information asymmetry this book discusses (trading between those who know the future value and those who do not). Third, the division into great, morning and evening markets, separating trade by time and participants, resembles in structure the way modern markets separate call auctions, continuous trading and tiers of participants; but the resemblance is only structural.
The Mencius: the conspicuous mound
Source text
季孙曰:「异哉子叔疑!使己为政,不用,则亦已矣,又使其子弟为卿。人亦孰不欲富贵?而独于富贵之中,有私龙断焉。」古之为市也,以其所有易其所无者,有司者治之耳。有贱丈夫焉,必求龙断而登之,以左右望而罔市利。人皆以为贱,故从而征之。征商,自此贱丈夫始矣。(焦循 撰,沈文倬 点校 1987)
(Mencius, “Gongsun Chou II”)
In plain terms (the first sentences are the author’s rendering, the rest Legge’s translation (Legge 1895)): Jisun said, “How strange Zishu Yi was! He sought office for himself and, not being employed, should have let it rest there; but he had his sons and younger brothers made ministers. Who does not want riches and honour? Yet amid riches and honour he alone kept a private mound to himself.” “Of old time, the market-dealers exchanged the articles which they had for others which they had not, and simply had certain officers to keep order among them. It happened that there was a mean fellow, who made it a point to look out for a conspicuous mound, and get up upon it. Thence he looked right and left, to catch in his net the whole gain of the market. The people all thought his conduct mean, and therefore they proceeded to lay a tax upon his wares. The taxing of traders took its rise from this mean fellow.”
The passage comes from the section in which Mencius, having resigned his office in Qi, declines the king’s offer of a residence and a stipend of ten thousand zhong: he uses the “conspicuous mound” as a metaphor for monopolising the benefits of office. The author’s framework quotes “古之为市者”; the received text has “古之为市也”, and the quotation is corrected accordingly. Longduan means a raised mound, and it is generally thought to be the origin of the later word longduan (垄断, “monopoly”).
Read in the language of this book, the passage has three layers, each of which must be labelled an analogy. First, “exchanging what one has for what one lacks” sees the market as a place of exchange, and “officers to keep order” limits the government’s role to keeping order. Second, “climbing the mound and looking right and left” is an image of information and position: whoever stands on high sees buyers and sellers at once and can profit between them. This resembles in structure the dealer facing informed traders in Chapter 1 and the value of queue position in Chapter 5, but Mencius is concerned with the moral “meanness”, not with the mechanism of price formation. Third, “they proceeded to tax him” concerns taxing such a profiteer, and Mencius’s tone is plainly regretful: a tax on one man ended as a tax on all traders.
The program below is the author’s model, to show the consequences of these arrangements in the simplest possible market. The values of 200 buyers and the costs of 200 sellers are drawn uniformly between 0 and 100, and each trades one unit. A is a single-price call auction with the price “settled” by officials (the price that maximises volume); B is a monopolist middleman on the “mound” who posts one bid and one ask and keeps the spread; C taxes each of B’s trades by 10; D extends the same tax to all trades; and E is a middleman who “looks right and left”, sees everyone’s reservation price, and trades with each at that price (perfect price discrimination).
Calculation
# Author's toy model for Chapter 7 (an analogy, not a historical reconstruction): 200
# buyers with values and 200 sellers with costs drawn uniformly from 0..100 (one unit
# each). Five arrangements:
# A a single-price call auction (officials "settle the price", cheng jia): the price
# maximising executed volume; each buyer with value >= p meets a seller with cost <= p
# B a monopolist intermediary on the "conspicuous mound" (longduan) who posts one bid
# b and one ask a and keeps the spread on min(sellers <= b, buyers >= a)
# C B, after a per-unit tax t = 10 on the intermediary's trades (cong er zheng zhi)
# D A, after the same tax is extended to every trade (zheng shang zi ci ... shi)
# E an intermediary who "looks left and right" and sees every reservation value:
# he pays each seller her cost and charges each buyer his value (perfect price
# discrimination)
import random
def draw(rng, n=200):
return sorted(rng.uniform(0, 100) for _ in range(n)), sorted(rng.uniform(0, 100)
for _ in range(n))
def auction(vals, costs, tax=0.0):
best = (0, None)
for p in [x / 10 for x in range(0, 1001)]: # buyers pay p, sellers get p - tax
q = min(sum(v >= p for v in vals), sum(c <= p - tax for c in costs))
if q > best[0]:
best = (q, p)
q, p = best
bs = sum(v - p for v in sorted(vals)[-q:]); ss = sum(p - tax - c for c in costs[:q])
return q, p, bs + ss, q * tax
def monopolist(vals, costs, tax=0.0):
best = (-1, 0, 0, 0)
for q in range(1, len(vals) + 1): # choose the quantity; a, b clear it
a = sorted(vals)[-q]; b = costs[q - 1]
prof = q * (a - b - tax)
if prof > best[0]:
best = (prof, q, a, b)
prof, q, a, b = best
bs = sum(v - a for v in sorted(vals)[-q:]); ss = sum(b - c for c in costs[:q])
return q, a, b, bs + ss, prof, q * tax
if __name__ == "__main__":
rng = random.Random(1077); vals, costs = draw(rng)
full = auction(vals, costs)[2]
print("arrangement volume bid / ask traders middleman tax"
" lost")
def row(lab, q, b, a, tr, mid, tx):
pr = f"{a:5.1f} (one)" if b is None else f"{b:4.1f} / {a:4.1f}"
print(f"{lab:31s} {q:4d} {pr:11s} {tr:6.0f} {mid:6.0f} {tx:4.0f}"
f" {full - tr - mid - tx:4.0f}")
q, p, s, _ = auction(vals, costs)
row("A call auction (one price)", q, None, p, s, 0, 0)
q, a, b, s, prof, _ = monopolist(vals, costs)
row("B mound monopolist", q, b, a, s, prof, 0)
q, a, b, s, prof, tx = monopolist(vals, costs, tax=10)
row("C monopolist, taxed 10 per unit", q, b, a, s, prof, tx)
q, p, s, tx = auction(vals, costs, tax=10)
row("D call auction, all trades taxed", q, None, p, s, 0, tx)
q0 = auction(vals, costs)[0]
e = sum(sorted(vals)[-q0:]) - sum(costs[:q0])
print(f"{'E discriminating middleman':31s} {q0:4d} own values 0 {e:6.0f}"
f" 0 {full - e:4.0f}")
print("(traders = buyers' plus sellers' surplus; lost = call-auction surplus minus"
" what\n traders, middleman and tax collector receive together)")
# arrangement volume bid / ask traders middleman tax lost
# A call auction (one price) 96 49.1 (one) 4858 0 0 0
# B mound monopolist 52 22.9 / 71.8 1335 2543 0 980
# C monopolist, taxed 10 per unit 40 17.7 / 79.9 746 2087 400 1625
# D call auction, all trades taxed 83 53.2 (one) 3967 0 830 60
# E discriminating middleman 96 own values 0 4858 0 0
# (traders = buyers' plus sellers' surplus; lost = call-auction surplus minus what
# traders, middleman and tax collector receive together)The call auction executes 96 units, with traders’ surplus of 4,858. The monopolist middleman cuts volume to 52 units, bidding 22.9 and asking 71.8; he earns 2,543, traders keep only 1,335, and the total surplus lost is 980. After a tax of 10 on the middleman, volume falls further to 40 and the loss rises to 1,625, with only 400 in tax: in this model, taxing the monopolist does not correct the monopoly but makes trade even thinner. Extending the tax to all trades lowers volume from 96 to 83, raises 830 in tax and loses only 60. The middleman who sees every reservation price executes all 96 units with no loss of efficiency, but takes the whole surplus of 4,858. This last row comes closest to the theme of this book: an information advantage need not reduce trade, but it decides who gets the gains from it.
The History of Song: the market-exchange law
The author’s framework mentions “records in Shen Kuo’s Dream Pool Essays of brokers or the market-exchange office quoting and matching prices”. This round of checking found no entry in the Dream Pool Essays describing brokers or the market-exchange office “quoting and matching” (the tools available could not search every juan in full text, so the possibility cannot be excluded entirely, but it should not be cited until an exact juan is found). This chapter therefore does not cite the Dream Pool Essays and uses instead the record of the market-exchange law in the “Treatise on Food and Money” of the History of Song, checked against online transcriptions.
Source text
先是,有魏继宗者,自称草泽,上言:「京师百货无常价,贵贱相倾,富能夺,贫能与,乃可以为天下。今富人大姓,乘民之亟,牟利数倍,财既偏聚,国用亦屈。请假榷货务钱,置常平市易司,择通财之官任其责,求良贾为之转易。使审知市物之价,贱则增价市之,贵则损价鬻之,因收余息,以给公上。」于是中书奏在京置市易务官。凡货之可市及滞于民而不售者,平其价市之,愿以易官物者听。若欲市于官,则度其抵而贷之钱,责期使偿,半岁输息十一,及岁倍之。(脱脱 等 撰 1977)
(History of Song, “Treatise on Food and Money”, part 2, section 8, “Market Exchange”)
In plain terms: before this, one Wei Jizong, describing himself as a commoner, submitted a memorial: “The goods of the capital have no constant price, and dear and cheap overturn each other; only one who can take from the rich and give to the poor is fit to govern the realm. Now rich and powerful families exploit the people’s urgent needs to make profits several times over; wealth is concentrated in a few hands, and the state’s revenues are straitened. I ask that money of the Monopoly Goods Office be lent to establish an ever-normal market-exchange office, that officials versed in finance be put in charge, and that good merchants be found to turn goods over for it. Let them know market prices thoroughly, buy when goods are cheap at a raised price and sell when they are dear at a lowered price, and take the surplus for the government.” Thereupon the Secretariat memorialised that officials of a Market Exchange Bureau be established in the capital. Any goods that could be bought, and goods stuck in the people’s hands unsold, were bought at a fair price; those who wished to exchange them for government goods were allowed to. Those who wished to buy from the government were lent money against an appraisal of their collateral, to be repaid by a set date, with interest of one-tenth per half-year and double that for a full year.
The market-exchange law was established in the fifth year of Xining (1072), as part of Wang Anshi’s New Policies. The same section records criticism of it:
Source text
商旅所有者尽收,市肆所无者必索,率贱市贵鬻,广裒赢余,是挟官府为兼并也。(脱脱 等 撰 1977)
(History of Song, “Treatise on Food and Money”, part 2, section 8, “Market Exchange”)
In plain terms: whatever travelling merchants have, it buys up entirely; whatever the shops lack, it is sure to demand; it buys cheap and sells dear throughout and amasses surpluses widely: this is using the government to monopolise. (In the same section these words are Zeng Bu’s report of what Wei Jizong, by then a supervisor of the Market Exchange Bureau, said against Lü Jiawen, who ran the bureau and was accused of taking excessive interest to win rewards; so among the critics was the proposer of the law himself.)
The same section also says, “其弊也,以官府作贾区,公取牙侩之利,而民不胜其烦矣”: the law’s defect was that it turned the government into a shop and openly took the profits of the brokers (yakuai), and the people could not bear the trouble. In recording the border market exchange it also speaks of “recruiting brokers to bring foreign goods to the Market Exchange Bureau to trade” (“募牙侩引蕃货赴市易务中贾”). So brokers do appear in this section, but in a criticism of brokerage profits and in arrangements for border trade, not in any record of “quoting and matching”.
Historical context. The Market Exchange Bureau was a state agency that bought, sold and lent against collateral. Wei Jizong’s proposal resembles in structure the dealers of Chapters 1 and 2: buy when prices are low and sell when they are high, stabilise prices with inventory and earn the difference. But the differences matter just as much. A modern market maker faces competition, queues by price–time priority, earns her income from the spread and bears inventory and adverse-selection risk; the Market Exchange Bureau operated with government money and coercive power, and its critics held that it had itself become a “monopoliser”, which is exactly Mencius’s “conspicuous mound”, except that the one on the mound was the government. “Quoting and matching” in the author’s framework is modern vocabulary and does not describe the bureau accurately. Books 38 and 39 discussed price stabilisation, equitable transport, the ever-normal granary and the jiaozi; they are not repeated here.
Structural comparison and its limits
| Ancient text | Modern concept | Limits of the comparison |
|---|---|---|
| The market director “settles prices with measures”; the price officers “examine transactions and fix prices” | Price-formation mechanisms (call auctions, dealer quotes) | Prices were set by officials in antiquity; modern prices are formed by trading |
| Great, morning and evening markets separated by time and participants | Trading sessions and market tiers | A structural resemblance only; the ancient division served administration and ritual |
| “Establishing trust with contracts”, “forbidding counterfeits” | Clearing, contracts and rules on product quality | Concerned with genuineness and credit, not information asymmetry about future value |
| “Climbing the mound, looking right and left to net the market’s gains” | A middleman’s informational and positional advantage, monopoly spreads | Mencius makes a moral judgement; the program’s model is the author’s analogy |
| The bureau “buys cheap at a raised price, sells dear at a lowered price” | Market making that stabilises prices with inventory | State-run, coercive and uncontested; its critics called it “monopolising” |
These are only structural resemblances. First, the Rites of Zhou is a design for ideal institutions, the Mencius a moral argument and the History of Song a historian’s account and assessment of a specific policy; they differ in kind, and none is an analysis of the mechanism of price formation. Second, the ancient texts have no concepts of probability, conditional expectation or equilibrium, and it cannot be said that the ancients “had already discovered” the Glosten–Milgrom model or the theory of market making. Third, the participants, money, credit and enforcement of ancient markets were entirely different from those of modern electronic markets. The book therefore says only that the two can illuminate each other in structure, not that the ancients “long ago discovered” modern market microstructure theory.
Chapter summary
The market director and price officers of the Rites of Zhou represent an ideal institutional design in which the government divides the market, sets prices and manages credit; the three clauses quoted in the author’s framework check out. The Mencius reads “古之为市也”, and the “conspicuous mound” is a moral parable about a middleman profiting from an advantageous position; in the author’s model a monopolist middleman halves volume, taxing him makes trade thinner still, and a middleman who knows every reservation price does not reduce trade but takes all the surplus. No record of “brokers or the market-exchange office quoting and matching” was found in the Dream Pool Essays; the History of Song is used instead: the Market Exchange Bureau bought low and sold high with government money and lent against collateral, and its critics said it “used the government to monopolise”. These are structural resemblances, not anticipations of modern theory.
References
Fan, Y. (2026). High-Frequency Limit Order Book Microstructure, Hawkes Self-Exciting Point Processes and Adverse-Selection Flow Toxicity: From the Avellaneda–Stoikov Market-Making Equations to VPIN, Read Beside Classical Chinese Thought on Market Equilibrium [高频限价订单簿微观结构、霍克斯自激点过程与逆向选择毒流] (Version 1.0.0). 5D Library. https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.23828065 · Licensed under Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International (CC BY-NC-ND 4.0).