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Chapter 7 Reading the Classics: the Balanced Standard, the Ever-Normal Granary and “Light and Heavy”

This chapter reads the earlier discussion beside several ancient Chinese texts: the words of Ji Ran and Bai Gui in the “Money-Makers” chapter of the Records of the Grand Historian, Sang Hongyang’s balanced standard (pingzhun) in the Records’ “Treatise on Balanced Standard”, Li Kui’s balanced purchase (pingdi) and Geng Shouchang’s ever-normal granary (changping cang) in the “Treatise on Food and Money” of the Book of Han, and the art of “light and heavy” (qingzhong) in the Guanzi’s “State Reserves”. The aim is not to show that the ancients had invented options, but to see how they understood the fluctuation and regulation of prices, and to state plainly that these texts concern the regulation and trading of physical goods by governments and merchants: there is no transferable contract, no premium, and no holder’s right to choose whether to exercise. The author’s framework calls this a “prototype of grain options”; after checking, it should be rewritten as mechanisms of price stabilisation and reserve management, whose resemblance to options is only structural. The author has checked the quotations against the standard received texts; they are cited by work, juan and chapter title only, without page numbers of modern printed editions, and the references list the standard modern editions (司马迁 撰 1959; 班固 撰,颜师古 注 1962; 黎翔凤 撰,梁运华 整理 2004). The English renderings of the classical passages are the author’s translations.

Ji Ran: “not above eighty, not below thirty”

Source text

夫粜,二十病农,九十病末。末病则财不出,农病则草不辟矣。上不过八十,下不减三十,则农末俱利,平粜齐物,关市不乏,治国之道也。

论其有余不足,则知贵贱。贵上极则反贱,贱下极则反贵。贵出如粪土,贱取如珠玉。财币欲其行如流水。(司马迁 撰 1959)

(Records of the Grand Historian, chapter 129, “Money-Makers”, words of Ji Ran)

In plain language: when grain sells at twenty cash a shi, the farmers suffer; at ninety, the traders and artisans suffer. If traders suffer, goods do not circulate; if farmers suffer, the fields go to weed. If the price goes no higher than eighty and no lower than thirty, farmers and traders both benefit; selling grain at a level price and evening out the prices of goods, so that the barriers and markets never lack supplies, is the way to govern a state. Examine what is in surplus and what is in shortage, and you will know what will be dear and what cheap. When dearness reaches its peak it turns to cheapness; when cheapness reaches its bottom it turns to dearness. Sell what is dear as if it were dung; buy what is cheap as if it were pearls and jade. Money and goods should flow like running water.

In the “Money-Makers” chapter these two passages are Ji Ran’s advice to King Goujian of Yue. The framework attributes “sell what is dear as if it were dung, buy what is cheap as if it were pearls and jade” to the “Money-Makers” chapter, correctly, but the speaker is Ji Ran, not Bai Gui, who appears later. The first passage sets a price band, between thirty and eighty. The second is a judgement about price reversion: extreme dearness is followed by cheapness and extreme cheapness by dearness, so one should act against price extremes. In today’s language, the first is a policy floor and ceiling and the second an empirical belief in mean reversion; neither is a probability model, and neither says over what time scale prices revert.

Bai Gui: “what others discard I take, what others take I give”

Source text

白圭,周人也。当魏文侯时,李克务尽地力,而白圭乐观时变,故人弃我取,人取我与。夫岁孰取谷,予之丝漆;茧出取帛絮,予之食。(司马迁 撰 1959)

(Records of the Grand Historian, chapter 129, “Money-Makers”)

In plain language: Bai Gui was a man of Zhou. In the time of Marquis Wen of Wei, when Li Ke was devoted to making the most of the land, Bai Gui delighted in watching the changes of the times; so what others discarded he took, and what others took he gave. In a year of good harvest he bought grain and sold silk and lacquer; when the cocoons came to market he bought silk and floss and sold grain.

Bai Gui was a merchant, not an official. His method was contrarian inventory trading: buying when supply is plentiful and prices low, selling when others need the goods. It differs from both the variance risk premium of Chapter 2 and the spread trades of Chapter 3: he traded physical goods and bore storage and price risk, and his profit came from supplying inventory between good and bad harvests, not from mispricing in a contract.

The balanced standard: the state as trader

Source text

置平准于京师,都受天下委输。召工官治车诸器,皆仰给大农。大农之诸官尽笼天下之货物,贵即卖之,贱则买之。如此,富商大贾无所牟大利,则反本,而万物不得腾踊。故抑天下物,名曰「平准」。(司马迁 撰 1959)

(Records of the Grand Historian, chapter 30, “Treatise on Balanced Standard”)

In plain language: a Balanced Standard office was set up in the capital to receive all the goods sent in from across the empire. Artisan officials were summoned to make carts and other equipment, all paid for by the Grand Minister of Agriculture. The officials under him gathered up the goods of the whole empire, selling when prices were high and buying when they were low. In this way rich merchants and great traders could make no large profits and would return to the root occupation of farming, and the prices of things could not leap upwards. Because it held down the prices of the empire’s goods, it was called the “Balanced Standard”.

According to the treatise, this system was introduced in the first year of the Yuanfeng era of Emperor Wu (110 BCE) when Sang Hongyang headed the Grand Ministry of Agriculture, together with his extension of equitable transport (junshu) and his management of the salt and iron monopolies (which dated from the Yuanshou era, before the balanced standard). Sima Qian’s account is not praise. The same treatise goes on:

Source text

是岁小旱,上令官求雨,卜式言曰:「县官当食租衣税而已,今弘羊令吏坐市列肆,贩物求利。亨弘羊,天乃雨。」(司马迁 撰 1959)

(Records of the Grand Historian, chapter 30, “Treatise on Balanced Standard”)

In plain language: that year there was a small drought, and the emperor ordered officials to pray for rain. Bu Shi said: “The government should feed and clothe itself from rents and taxes alone. Now Hongyang has officials sitting in the market behind shop stalls, peddling goods for profit. Boil Hongyang, and Heaven will send rain.”

So the balanced standard was contested from the start: it was a means of holding prices down, and also a means for the state to monopolise trade and raise revenue. Reading it as pure “risk management” misses its fiscal and political meaning.

Balanced purchase and the ever-normal granary

Source text

是故善平籴者,必谨观岁有上中下孰。……故虽遇饥馑水旱,籴不贵而民不散,取有余以补不足也。(班固 撰,颜师古 注 1962)

寿昌遂白令边郡皆筑仓,以谷贱时增其贾而籴,以利农,谷贵时减贾而粜,名曰常平仓。民便之。(班固 撰,颜师古 注 1962)

(Book of Han, chapter 24A, “Treatise on Food and Money”, part 1)

In plain language: therefore one who is good at balancing grain purchases must carefully observe whether the year’s harvest is of the upper, middle or lower grade. … So even in famine, flood or drought, grain is not dear and the people do not scatter: what is in surplus is taken to make up what is lacking. (Geng) Shouchang then proposed that all the frontier commanderies build granaries, buying grain at a raised price when it was cheap, to benefit the farmers, and selling at a reduced price when it was dear; these were called ever-normal granaries. The people found them convenient.

The first passage is the “balanced purchase” method that, according to the treatise, Li Kui devised for Marquis Wen of Wei early in the Warring States period; the same passage says that “very dear and very cheap do the same harm”, in the spirit of Ji Ran’s “twenty harms the farmers, ninety harms the traders”. The second passage is the proposal of Geng Shouchang, Deputy Grand Minister of Agriculture, in the Wufeng era of Emperor Xuan (57–54 BCE). The framework places the “ever-normal” granary with the Records; it should be said that the ever-normal granary does not appear in the Records but in the Book of Han’s “Treatise on Food and Money”. Ever-normal granaries were abolished and revived repeatedly in later dynasties; Will and Wong, with others, studied the state civilian granary system of the Qing from 1650 to 1850 in detail (Will and Wong 1991).

Note “buying grain at a raised price when it was cheap”: the ever-normal granary bought above the market price when grain was cheap. This corresponds to the variant in the program below that buys whenever the price is below 45, rather than only when it breaks through the floor.

The Guanzi, “State Reserves”: the art of light and heavy

Source text

岁有凶穰,故谷有贵贱;令有缓急,故物有轻重。

夫民有余则轻之,故人君敛之以轻;民不足则重之,故人君散之以重。敛积之以轻,散行之以重,故君必有什倍之利,而财之櫎可得而平也。(黎翔凤 撰,梁运华 整理 2004)

(Guanzi, “State Reserves”)

In plain language: years bring dearth or plenty, so grain is dear or cheap; orders are lax or urgent, so goods are light or heavy (cheap or dear). What the people have in surplus they hold light, so the ruler gathers it in while it is light; what they lack they hold heavy, so the ruler disperses it while it is heavy. Gathering and storing when light, dispersing and circulating when heavy, the ruler is sure to gain tenfold, and the level of prices can be kept even.

The framework calls this material the “‘Light and Heavy’ chapter of the Guanzi”, which needs clarifying: the Guanzi has no single chapter of that name. The “Guanzi Qingzhong” is a group of nineteen chapters in the later part of the book (sixteen survive), including “State Reserves”, “Mountain Kingdom’s Accounts” and “Light and Heavy A” to “F”; the book quotes “State Reserves”. These chapters are attributed to Guan Zhong but are generally dated to the Warring States or Han period (Rickett 1998). Their core idea is that the state uses reserves and money to gather when goods are “light” (cheap) and release them when “heavy” (dear), both evening out prices and profiting from the difference. Weber argues that qingzhong thinking still echoed in China’s price-reform debates of the 1980s (Weber 2021).

A buffer-stock model

The program below writes Ji Ran’s price band as the simplest possible buffer-stock model: harvests are lognormal, with a 5 % chance each year of a disaster that cuts the harvest by 40 %; the market price is proportional to the quantity of grain on the market raised to the power −2.5 (inelastic demand), with a normal-year price of 50; the granary buys when the price would fall below 30 (or 45 in the variant), restoring the price to that level, and sells from stock when the price would exceed 80, bringing it back to 80; 5 % of the stock spoils each year. Each row simulates 20,000 years. All parameters are illustrative.

Calculation

# A buffer-stock granary in the spirit of Ji Ran's band ("not above 80, not below 30")
# and the Han ever-normal granary: buy when the price would fall below 30, sell from
# stock when it would rise above 80; a variant also buys whenever the price is below 45.
# ILLUSTRATIVE model: harvests are lognormal with occasional disasters; price = 50 x
# (grain on the market)^(-2.5); 5 % of the stock spoils each year. 20,000 simulated years
# per row; trading income in the same price units (an average harvest is worth 50).
import math, random

def year_price(q):
    return 50 * q ** -2.5

def market_q(p):
    return (p / 50) ** -0.4

def simulate(cap, buy_below, rng, years=20000, lo=30.0, hi=80.0):
    stock, low, high, band, empty, profit = 0.0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0.0
    for _ in range(years):
        q = math.exp(rng.gauss(0, 0.15)) * (0.6 if rng.random() < 0.05 else 1.0)
        stock *= 0.95
        if year_price(q) < buy_below:                # buy: raise the price to the trigger
            buy = min(q - market_q(buy_below), cap - stock)
            stock += buy; q -= buy; profit -= buy * year_price(q)
        elif year_price(q) > hi:                     # sell: cap the price at the ceiling
            sell = min(market_q(hi) - q, stock)
            stock -= sell; q += sell; profit += sell * year_price(q)
            empty += year_price(q) > hi + 1e-9
        p = year_price(q)
        low += p < 20; high += p > 90; band += lo - 1e-9 <= p <= hi + 1e-9
    n = years
    return low / n, high / n, band / n, empty / n, profit / n

if __name__ == "__main__":
    print("capacity (x mean   price<20  price>90  within   years above 80   net trading")
    print("harvest), buy if   ('hurts   ('hurts   30-80    with the granary  income per")
    print("price below        farmers') trade')            empty            year")
    for cap, trig in ((0.0, 30), (0.25, 30), (0.5, 30), (0.25, 45), (0.5, 45), (1.0, 45)):
        lo, hi, band, empty, prof = simulate(cap, trig, random.Random(1959))
        print(f"  {cap:4.2f}, {trig}         {lo:6.1%}   {hi:6.1%}   {band:6.1%}"
              f"    {empty:6.1%}           {prof:+6.2f}")
# capacity (x mean   price<20  price>90  within   years above 80   net trading
# harvest), buy if   ('hurts   ('hurts   30-80    with the granary  income per
# price below        farmers') trade')            empty            year
#   0.00, 30           0.6%    10.4%    77.2%     14.8%            +0.00
#   0.25, 30           0.0%     8.2%    87.5%     11.5%            +0.21
#   0.50, 30           0.0%     8.0%    88.8%     11.2%            +0.20
#   0.25, 45           0.3%     3.6%    90.9%      5.1%            +0.23
#   0.50, 45           0.1%     1.7%    95.6%      2.3%            -0.10
#   1.00, 45           0.0%     0.9%    98.4%      1.3%            -0.59

Without a granary, prices lie between 30 and 80 in 77.2 % of years, exceed 90 (“harming the traders”) in 10.4 % and fall below 20 (“harming the farmers”) in 0.6 %. A granary that buys only when the price breaks below 30 hardly improves when its capacity rises from 25 % to 50 % of an average harvest: in more than 11 % of years the price still exceeds 80 with the granary empty. The reason is that buying opportunities are too rare: a price below 30 needs a bumper harvest, while the short harvests and disasters that push the price above 80 are more common, so stock never builds up. Buying whenever the price is below 45 (much like “buying at a raised price when grain is cheap”), with capacity of half an average harvest, cuts the years above 90 to 1.7 % and the years with an empty granary to 2.3 %; but the granary’s net trading income turns negative (−0.10 a year, where an average harvest is worth 50), and more so with larger capacity (−0.59), because it buys more often at middling prices and bears the spoilage.

Structural parallels and their limits

Set beside the earlier chapters, the model shows some structural resemblances:

Ancient mechanism Modern structural analogue Differences
Price floor (“not below thirty”; balanced purchase, ever-normal buying) Farmers in effect hold a put struck at 30, the granary is the writer No contract or premium; farmers cannot choose to “exercise”, the state decides how much to buy
Price ceiling (“not above eighty”; balanced standard, ever-normal selling) Consumers in effect hold a call struck at 80, the granary is the writer When the granary is empty the ceiling fails, like a writer whose capacity is exhausted
The granary carries both sides A written strangle, bearing price-volatility risk Income comes from the buy–sell margin and the treasury, not from option premium
Storage capacity and spoilage The writer’s capital and margin limits, the cost of carry Spoilage is physical, not an interest rate
Bai Gui’s contrarian inventory trading Mean-reversion trading, supplying liquidity Physical goods, with storage risk

These parallels are analogies, useful for seeing the structure of price regulation: anyone who promises to stand behind extreme prices bears a tail risk resembling that of an option writer, and that capacity is limited by inventory (capital) and runs out precisely when it is needed most. A variance seller losing in the months of volatility spikes (Chapter 2) and a granary running dry after successive bad harvests share one structure.

But the limits must be stated. First, these texts contain no transferable, priced right, so one cannot say that antiquity had “options” or “prototype options”. Second, the balanced standard and the ever-normal granary were administrative and fiscal tools of government, resting on state coercion and taxation, different in kind from derivatives traded voluntarily in a market. Third, “when dearness reaches its peak it turns to cheapness” is an empirical judgement that gives no time scale, size or probability for the reversal and cannot be equated with a modern mean-reversion model. Fourth, the numbers in the texts (twenty, thirty, eighty, ninety) are price levels used in argument, not statistical estimates. The book therefore says only that ancient price regulation and modern risk management can illuminate each other structurally, not that the ancients “already discovered” option pricing or the volatility risk premium.

Chapter summary

Ji Ran’s “not above eighty, not below thirty” sets a price band, and “when dearness reaches its peak it turns to cheapness” is an empirical judgement about reversion; Bai Gui’s “what others discard I take, what others take I give” describes a merchant’s contrarian inventory trading. The balanced standard, balanced purchase and the ever-normal granary were government institutions that stabilised prices by trading reserves; the ever-normal granary comes from the Book of Han’s “Treatise on Food and Money”, not from the Records, and the Guanzi’s “light and heavy” writings form a group of chapters rather than a single one. The buffer-stock model shows that a granary that buys only below the floor cannot defend the ceiling, and that more active buying defends it at a loss. These mechanisms resemble options only in structure; they are not prototypes of options.

References

Rickett, W. Allyn. 1998. Guanzi: Political, Economic, and Philosophical Essays from Early China. A Study and Translation, Volume II. Princeton University Press.
Weber, Isabella M. 2021. How China Escaped Shock Therapy: The Market Reform Debate. Routledge.
Will, Pierre-Étienne, and R. Bin Wong. 1991. Nourish the People: The State Civilian Granary System in China, 1650–1850. Center for Chinese Studies, University of Michigan.
司马迁 撰. 1959. 史记. 中华书局.
班固 撰,颜师古 注. 1962. 汉书. 中华书局.
黎翔凤 撰,梁运华 整理. 2004. 管子校注. 中华书局.

Fan, Y. (2026). Implied Volatility Surfaces, Skew Premia and Quantitative Risk Control of Vertical Spreads: Microstructure Pricing and Time-Stop Dynamics under Non-Gaussian Tails [期权隐含波动率曲面、偏度溢价与垂直价差结构的定量风控] (Version 1.0.0). 5D Library. https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.23796765 · Licensed under Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International (CC BY-NC-ND 4.0).