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Chapter 6 Time: Quasi-Hyperbolic Discounting, Procrastination and the Friction of Forms
Why a few minutes’ work is postponed again and again
Someone wants to subscribe to a service, claim a refund, take up a benefit or cancel a membership she no longer needs. It would take a few minutes and the benefit is clear, yet she keeps putting it off until the offer expires, the refund window closes or another month is charged. The author’s framework asks to compare Laibson’s quasi-hyperbolic (–) discounting with exponential discounting and to compute the friction cost of multi-step forms and the “procrastination–default” threshold. This chapter first checks the source and properties of the – model, then follows O’Donoghue and Rabin in distinguishing naive from sophisticated procrastination, and finally gives an author’s model of multi-step forms.
Three discount functions
Exponential discounting applies the same discount to each extra day of waiting, so today’s preference between “next Monday or next Tuesday” is the same as on Monday itself (time consistency). Empirically, people are often willing to wait when the choice is distant and unwilling when it is close. Hyperbolic discounting is one function describing this; quasi-hyperbolic discounting is a convenient approximation to it.
Evidence
The quasi-hyperbolic discount function , (, ) was first proposed by Phelps and Pollak (1968) to describe how each generation weighs its own consumption against that of later generations, in “game-equilibrium growth” between generations (Phelps and Pollak 1968). Laibson (1997) applied the same function to one person’s “selves” at different dates, analysing consumption, saving and how illiquid assets (“golden eggs”) act as commitment devices (Laibson 1997). Frederick, Loewenstein and O’Donoghue’s 2002 review discusses the wide spread of estimated discount rates and the evidence for different discounting models (Frederick et al. 2002). Augenblick, Niederle and Sprenger (2015) found clear present bias in real-effort tasks and almost none in intertemporal choices over money (Augenblick et al. 2015).
The framework’s “Laibson quasi-hyperbolic discounting (β–δ)” should therefore note that the functional form originates with Phelps and Pollak. Augenblick and co-authors’ result matters especially here: filling in a form is an effort, not an intertemporal choice over money, and present bias is more pronounced in exactly this kind of task.
Calculation
# Exponential versus quasi-hyperbolic (beta-delta) discounting. Phelps & Pollak (1968)
# introduced the beta-delta form for successive generations; Laibson (1997) applied it to
# one person's successive selves: D(0) = 1, D(t) = beta * delta^t for t >= 1.
# Exponential: D(t) = delta^t. Hyperbola (Mazur form) for comparison: D(t) = 1/(1 + k t).
# Time unit: one day. Illustrative parameters: beta 0.7, delta 0.9995, k 0.05.
BETA, DELTA, K = 0.7, 0.9995, 0.05
def d_exp(t): return DELTA ** t
def d_bd(t): return 1.0 if t == 0 else BETA * DELTA ** t
def d_hyp(t): return 1 / (1 + K * t)
F = (("exponential", d_exp), ("beta-delta", d_bd), ("hyperbolic", d_hyp))
print("discount factor t = 0 1 7 30 365")
for lab, f in F:
print(f" {lab:14s} " + "".join(f"{f(t):6.3f}" for t in (0, 1, 7, 30, 365)))
print("per-day rate 1 - D(t+1)/D(t) t = 0 1 30 365")
for lab, f in F:
rates = [1 - f(t + 1) / f(t) for t in (0, 1, 30, 365)]
print(f" {lab:26s} " + "".join(f"{r:8.4f}" for r in rates))
print("100 on day s or 120 on day s + 7, as judged today (day 0):")
for s in (0, 1, 7, 30, 90):
pick = ["120 later" if 120 * f(s + 7) > 100 * f(s) else "100 sooner" for _, f in F]
print(f" s = {s:2d}: exponential {pick[0]:10s} beta-delta {pick[1]:10s}"
f" hyperbolic {pick[2]}")
print("beta-delta: 100 now iff 1.2 beta delta^7 < 1"
f" (beta < {1 / (1.2 * DELTA ** 7):.4f});"
" for s >= 1 beta cancels")
s_star = next(s for s in range(1000) if 120 * d_hyp(s + 7) > 100 * d_hyp(s))
print(f"hyperbolic: sooner for s < {s_star}, later from s = {s_star}"
f" (later iff s > 35 - 1/k = {35 - 1 / K:.0f})")
# discount factor t = 0 1 7 30 365
# exponential 1.000 1.000 0.997 0.985 0.833
# beta-delta 1.000 0.700 0.698 0.690 0.583
# hyperbolic 1.000 0.952 0.741 0.400 0.052
# per-day rate 1 - D(t+1)/D(t) t = 0 1 30 365
# exponential 0.0005 0.0005 0.0005 0.0005
# beta-delta 0.3004 0.0005 0.0005 0.0005
# hyperbolic 0.0476 0.0455 0.0196 0.0026
# 100 on day s or 120 on day s + 7, as judged today (day 0):
# s = 0: exponential 120 later beta-delta 100 sooner hyperbolic 100 sooner
# s = 1: exponential 120 later beta-delta 120 later hyperbolic 100 sooner
# s = 7: exponential 120 later beta-delta 120 later hyperbolic 100 sooner
# s = 30: exponential 120 later beta-delta 120 later hyperbolic 120 later
# s = 90: exponential 120 later beta-delta 120 later hyperbolic 120 later
# beta-delta: 100 now iff 1.2 beta delta^7 < 1 (beta < 0.8363); for s >= 1 beta cancels
# hyperbolic: sooner for s < 16, later from s = 16 (later iff s > 35 - 1/k = 15)Illustrative parameters are , per day and . The quasi-hyperbolic function applies a 30 % discount once between day 0 and day 1 and only 0.05 % per day thereafter, like the exponential; the hyperbolic daily rate falls gradually from 4.76 % to 0.26 %. In the choice “100 on day or 120 on day ”, the exponential discounter always takes 120; the quasi-hyperbolic discounter takes 100 only when (100 is available today), provided , that is ; the hyperbolic discounter takes 100 for all , the reversal being set by . The quasi-hyperbolic function separates “now” from “later” sharply, the hyperbolic lets preferences change continuously with distance; both produce preference reversals, the exponential does not. The left panel of Figure 5 shows the three curves.
Naive and sophisticated
Evidence
O’Donoghue and Rabin (1999) analysed when present-biased people choose to do things. A naive person believes her future selves will not be present-biased and will follow today’s plan; a sophisticated person knows her future selves are just as present-biased and reasons backwards. For tasks whose costs come now and benefits later (writing a report, filling in a form), a naive person may procrastinate indefinitely; a sophisticated person, foreseeing her own delay, sometimes acts earlier, but may also delay comfortably because she foresees that a future self will act. For activities whose rewards come now and costs later (indulgences), the directions reverse (O’Donoghue and Rabin 1999). Ariely and Wertenbroch (2002) found that students voluntarily set themselves costly deadlines, but that self-imposed deadlines were less effective than evenly spaced external ones (Ariely and Wertenbroch 2002).
Reminders, deadlines and a counter-intuitive property of the model
The author’s model has another property worth stating. The today/tomorrow threshold is the naive person’s decision rule (she always believes the next self to act is tomorrow’s, ); its derivative in is : the smaller the drop-out risk , the lower the threshold and the more readily the naive person delays. The sophisticated person’s comes from backward induction and she uses this threshold only when the next self to act is tomorrow’s; in general a smaller also makes waiting cheaper, , pushing in the same direction by an amount that depends on . So a measure that lowers the risk of “forgetting” (a reliable reminder service, for instance) may in the model reduce the number who complete on the day while raising the share who eventually complete — for the naive person, completion on the last day, , rises as falls. Judging a reminder by “same-day conversion” alone may give the opposite verdict from “eventual completion”. The inference comes only from the author’s model and needs testing.
Ariely and Wertenbroch supply evidence on the deadline side: in their classroom and proofreading studies, students were willing to set themselves binding deadlines, and such self-imposed deadlines improved performance, but less than evenly spaced deadlines imposed from outside (Ariely and Wertenbroch 2002). In this chapter’s model an intermediate deadline cuts one long window into several short ones, and the last day of each forces the naive person to act once; this suggests why the number and spacing of deadlines may matter more than having a deadline at all. The correspondence is an analogy; the model has no learning or fatigue.
Chapter summary
The quasi-hyperbolic discount function originates in Phelps and Pollak’s intergenerational model; Laibson applied it to one person’s dates; it and the hyperbolic function both produce preference reversals, the exponential does not. Present bias is clearer in effort tasks than in choices over money. In the author’s form model the threshold for today beating tomorrow is 2 steps; with 3 to 14 steps the naive person waits for the last day and completes with probability 0.488, while the sophisticated person completes on day 2 with probability 0.902 for 4 to 7 steps, her day of action becoming non-monotone beyond that; when cost exceeds both give up. Defaults make no difference for exponential discounters, change the outcome for about half of naive people and for about a tenth of sophisticated ones. The framework’s “procrastination–default threshold” is, in this model, two thresholds, and it is the author’s model, not a published result.
References
Fan, Y. (2026). Choice Architecture, Cumulative Prospect Theory and Computational Behavioural Economics of Pricing Interfaces: From Loss-Aversion Value Functions and Asymmetric Dominance to Hyperbolic Discounting, Read Beside the Qingzhong Chapters of the Guanzi [选择架构、累积前景理论与销售界面价格锚定的计算行为学] (Version 1.0.0). 5D Library. https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.23836260 · Licensed under Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International (CC BY-NC-ND 4.0).