5D Library › Cart-Abandonment Recovery Kinetics, Sunk-Data Retention Ratchets and High-Ticket B2B Qualification Mechanisms · 中文
Chapter 5. A Two-Licence Menu and Screening by Application Form
First, a correction of source
Discussions of “screening” for high-ticket products often cite the model of Rothschild and Stiglitz. That model is about competitive insurance markets: several insurers offer menus of policies, buyers of different risk choose for themselves, and an equilibrium may not exist at all (Rothschild and Stiglitz 1976). One seller designing two products for two kinds of client is closer to the monopoly menu problem of Mussa and Rosen: the premium product goes to high-value clients, and the quality of the basic product is held down so that high-value clients do not want to pass as low-value ones (Mussa and Rosen 1978).
When the friction of an application form screens
Calculation
# Chapter 5. p10: Does a longer application form screen for fit? Prior
# share of high-fit applicants 0.20. Each extra question makes a share
# of applicants give up: d_high for high-fit, d_low for low-fit. Friction
# improves the mix only if d_low > d_high (the single-crossing condition
# of screening); with equal drop rates it only loses applicants.
PRIOR = 0.20
def after(k, d_high, d_low, n=1000):
h = n * PRIOR * (1 - d_high) ** k
l = n * (1 - PRIOR) * (1 - d_low) ** k
return h, l
if __name__ == "__main__":
for d_high, d_low in ((0.04, 0.04), (0.03, 0.08), (0.06, 0.08)):
print(" drop per question: high {:.2f}, low {:.2f}".format(
d_high, d_low))
for k in (0, 5, 10):
h, l = after(k, d_high, d_low)
print(" {:2d} questions: {:5.1f} high, {:5.1f} low,"
" high share {:.3f}".format(k, h, l, h / (h + l)))
# drop per question: high 0.04, low 0.04
# 0 questions: 200.0 high, 800.0 low, high share 0.200
# 5 questions: 163.1 high, 652.3 low, high share 0.200
# 10 questions: 133.0 high, 531.9 low, high share 0.200
# drop per question: high 0.03, low 0.08
# 0 questions: 200.0 high, 800.0 low, high share 0.200
# 5 questions: 171.7 high, 527.3 low, high share 0.246
# 10 questions: 147.5 high, 347.5 low, high share 0.298
# drop per question: high 0.06, low 0.08
# 0 questions: 200.0 high, 800.0 low, high share 0.200
# 5 questions: 146.8 high, 527.3 low, high share 0.218
# 10 questions: 107.7 high, 347.5 low, high share 0.237“Keep unsuitable clients out with a long application form” works under one condition only: each extra question makes unsuitable clients more likely to give up. This is the single-crossing condition of screening theory. If both kinds give up at 0.04 per question, after 10 questions high-fit clients fall from 200 to 133.0 and low-fit from 800 to 531.9, and the share stays at 0.200: the friction only drives clients away. If high-fit clients give up at 0.03 per question and low-fit at 0.08, the share rises to 0.298 after 10 questions; if the former is 0.06, it rises only to 0.237, while nearly half of the high-fit clients are lost (107.7 remain).
Note
In practice. Choose application questions that are easy for suitable clients and hard for unsuitable ones: an approved budget, a definite deadline, the decision maker filling in the form personally. A long generic form adds friction without improving the mix.
Hypothesis · not established
The author’s hypothesis (not yet tested): in the author’s business licence applications, adding an “approved budget” question raises the share of applicants who end up buying, without lowering the number of sales. What would show it wrong: in a randomised experiment the group with the added question makes significantly fewer sales, or its share of buyers does not rise.
Summary
A two-licence menu lets clients choose for themselves through the price gap; it is screening in the manner of Mussa and Rosen, not the insurance market of Rothschild and Stiglitz. An application form screens only when the single-crossing condition holds.
References
Fan, Y. (2026). Cart-Abandonment Recovery Kinetics, Sunk-Data Retention Ratchets and High-Ticket B2B Qualification Mechanisms: Multi-Pulse Follow-Up Timing, Switching-Cost Accumulation and Screening Equilibria [弃单挽回动力学、沉没数据续费棘轮与高客单顾问筛选机制] (Version 1.0.0). 5D Library. https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.24090209 · Licensed under Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International (CC BY-NC-ND 4.0).