关于「何时升级」,《议价、催收与施压的算术》给出的定量结论是什么?
结论:第四章求出升级的最佳日期,并说明第 1 天就全面升级会把净回收从 0.9450 降到 0.5936。
数据口径:书中的参数均为示意或合成;全部计算由书中程序生成;本书不是法律、财务或劳动关系建议,空洞或违法的威胁不是本书认可的手段。 书中以标注框区分已发表的证据、可运行的 Python 计算(16 段程序)、原典与作者的假说。
对照数据表
下表数字由本章 Python 程序原样打印,可重新运行复现。 与结论吻合的打印值: 0.5936, 0.9450
| policy | t2 | t3 | net | prompt | slow | distr. |
| reminders only | never | never | 0.9450 | 1.000 | 0.998 | 0.456 |
| everything on day 1 | 1 | 1 | 0.5936 | 0.415 | 0.951 | 0.593 |
| 30/60/90 habit | 60 | 90 | 0.9507 | 0.999 | 0.993 | 0.530 |
| best on the grid | 60 | 105 | 0.9508 | 0.999 | 0.996 | 0.523 |
查看完整验算程序
# Chapter 4. p07: When to escalate. One overdue invoice of 1, debtor of
# book A in p05 (prompt-but-late 60%, slow 30%, distressed 10%). Daily
# hazards of paying: 1/15, 1/90, 1/400; distressed debtors also become
# insolvent at 1/250 a day. Three stages:
# 1 friendly reminders from day 0: hazards x 1.5, no cost;
# 2 stop service from day t2: x 3 for prompt and slow, x 1.5 for
# distressed; costs 0.3 (lost future margin) if the debtor is a
# prompt-but-late customer still unpaid on day t2;
# 3 lawyer's letter and credit reporting from day t3: x 6 for slow,
# x 3 for distressed (who now pay this creditor first); costs 0.05
# plus 0.3 for any prompt customer still unpaid.
# Expected net recovery within 365 days, by exact daily integration;
# grid search over t2 and t3.
KINDS = ((0.6, 1 / 15, 0.0, "prompt"), (0.3, 1 / 90, 0.0, "slow"),
(0.1, 1 / 400, 1 / 250, "distressed"))
MULT = {"prompt": (1.5, 3.0, 3.0), "slow": (1.5, 3.0, 6.0),
"distressed": (1.5, 1.5, 3.0)}
def value(t2, t3, days=365, parts=False):
total, by = 0.0, []
for share, h0, fail, kind in KINDS:
alive, got, cost = 1.0, 0.0, 0.0
for d in range(days):
if d == t2 and kind == "prompt":
cost += 0.3 * alive
if d == t3:
cost += 0.05 * alive + (0.3 * alive if kind == "prompt"
else 0.0)
m = MULT[kind]
k = m[2] if d >= t3 else m[1] if d >= t2 else m[0]
h = min(1.0, h0 * k)
got += alive * h
alive *= (1 - h) * (1 - fail)
total += share * (got - cost)
by.append(got - cost)
return by if parts else total
if __name__ == "__main__":
never = 10 ** 6
grid = [(t2, t3) for t2 in range(15, 181, 15)
for t3 in list(range(t2, 241, 15)) + [never]]
best = max(grid, key=lambda g: value(*g))
print(" policy t2 t3 net prompt slow"
" distr.")
for lab, g in (("reminders only", (never, never)),
("everything on day 1", (1, 1)),
("30/60/90 habit", (60, 90)),
("best on the grid", best)):
t3 = "never" if g[1] == never else str(g[1])
t2 = "never" if g[0] == never else str(g[0])
p = value(*g, parts=True)
print(" {:<21} {:>5} {:>5} {:6.4f} {:5.3f} {:5.3f} {:5.3f}"
.format(lab, t2, t3, value(*g), *p))唯一数据源与引用
范雅福(Fan, Y.). (2026). 《多阶段最后通牒议价、应收账款衰减动力学与最优施压序列》第 4 章「何时升级」(版本 1.0.0). 5D Library. https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.24090245
DOI: 10.5281/zenodo.24090245 · 阅读本章所在专著 · 5DL-B-094 · v1.0.0 · CC-BY-NC-ND-4.0
BibTeX
@book{fan2026094,
author = {Fan, Yafu},
title = {Multistage Ultimatum Bargaining, Accounts-Receivable Decay Kinetics and Optimal Escalation Sequences},
year = {2026},
publisher = {5D Library},
edition = {1.0.0},
doi = {10.5281/zenodo.24090245},
url = {https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.24090245}
}