关于「限量品落地手册:编号牌卡、工作坊席位、编号版画、精品配额与四件套蒸馏规格」,《限量稀缺与早鸟阶梯定价》给出的定量结论是什么?
结论:同一个模型放在四类东西上,得出四种不同的默认做法。牌卡保留事先公布的阶梯,但早鸟档改为核验身份后的登记抽签;工作坊不设早鸟,正价抽签、实名、按面值转让;版画发行时抽签,发行后收 0.05 到 0.10 的转售分成;典藏版先按需求定版数,再用公开的混合规则配额。拍卖在这套模型里几乎处处占优,只在收藏者剩余上略输,它真正的代价在模型之外,要用投诉与复购去量。木盒版的价格拆解提醒卖方:买家可以只为椟付钱,但卖方必须说清楚椟里装的是什么。最后一节把这一切写成定价试算器的新规格。
数据口径:「限量」「早鸟」宣称的消费者保护规范只写一般框架,不是法律意见。 书中以标注框区分已发表的证据、可运行的计算、原典与作者的假说,每条假说都写明什么结果会推翻它;原典考辨取《韩非子·外储说左上》的「买椟还珠」,讨论包装溢价与内容价值的分离。
对照数据表
下表数字由本章 Python 程序原样打印,可重新运行复现。 程序只用 Python 标准库与结论吻合的打印值: 0.10
Golden cases for op ladder_allocation (deck: 500 units, ladder 100@249, 150@269, 250@289)
T1 fcfs, 1 per verified id OK clear 304.35; day 10.26; tier days 1.00,4.24,10.26
revenue 137,500; resale 40 (0.080), profit 2,820; top-value 0.738; fan access 0.744; surplus 50,065
T2 fcfs, 1 per account, no id check REFUSE L4 (resale share 0.320 > 0.10)
T3 lottery at 289, 1 per verified id OK clear 304.35; day 14.00; tier days -,-,-
revenue 144,500; resale 34 (0.068), profit 1,043; top-value 0.816; fan access 0.818; surplus 49,984
T4 uniform auction, reserve 289 OK clear 304.35; day 14.00; tier days -,-,-
revenue 155,333; resale 28 (0.056), profit 436; top-value 0.944; fan access 0.828; surplus 48,666
T5 20 undisclosed spares printed REFUSE L1 (edition 500 offered 500 hidden spares 20 reprint False)
T5b same 20 spares, destroyed on record OK clear 304.35; day 10.26; tier days 1.00,4.24,10.26
revenue 137,500; resale 40 (0.080), profit 2,820; top-value 0.738; fan access 0.744; surplus 50,065
T6 limited, pledge only REFUSE L3 (devices no_reprint_pledge)
T7 regular tier only 50 units REFUSE L2 (regular tier share 0.10 < 0.20)
T8 later tier cheaper REFUSE L2 (a later tier is cheaper: [269, 249, 289])
T9 deadline extended after launch REFUSE L2 (published day 0, extended True)
T10 units 0 REFUSE L5 (input out of range)
T11 fcfs, soft demand, resale 280-320 OK clear 257.53; unsold 56; tier days 1.43,6.15,-
revenue 121,316; resale 40 (0.080), profit 840; top-value 0.794; fan access 1.000; surplus 35,024查看完整验算程序
# Chapter 7. p72: Reference "ladder_allocation" op for the pricing kit: checks, then ladder + allocation.
# This is the executable core of the new op; its printed lines are the golden sample (cases T1..T11).
# Book-wide sample (p10): 1,440 collectors, v_i = 260 * exp(0.40 * z_i), z_i the (i + 0.5) / n normal
# quantile (deterministic); 160 resale accounts run by 40 people, each valuing a unit at 0.9 of an
# expected resale price spread evenly over RM 330-380. Collectors arrive in an order shuffled with
# random.Random(seed), spread evenly over `days`. Collector clearing price c = the units-th highest v.
# Resale units: with id_check, one entity per person, else one per account; each holds per_id_limit.
# FCFS: resale units move first (scripts are fast) and buy while their value >= the current tier price;
# then collectors buy one unit if v >= price. Lottery: collectors and resale units in one shuffled order
# (seed + 1), everyone at the regular (last-tier) price. Uniform auction: all bids, price = max(reserve =
# regular price, (units + 1)-th highest bid), the top `units` bids win.
# Refusal order: L5 bad input, L1 fictitious scarcity, L3 limited without a verifiable commitment
# device, L2 ladder not real; then simulate, and L4 if resale share > max_resale_share (fcfs, lottery).
# All brands, prices and demand parameters are fictional assumptions, not measurements. Golden output
# made with CPython 3.11 (random.Random shuffles fix the fcfs days and the lottery draw).
import math
import random
from statistics import NormalDist
VERIFIABLE = ("numbered", "plate_destroyed", "public_counter")
MECHS = ("fcfs", "lottery", "uniform_auction")
def refuse(code, why):
return {"verdict": "REFUSE", "code": "REFUSE " + code, "why": why}
def check(c):
t, d, cl = c["tiers"], c["demand"], c["claim"]
if c["units"] <= 0 or d["n"] <= 0 or d["median"] <= 0 or d["sigma"] <= 0 or d["days"] <= 0 \
or c["mechanism"] not in MECHS or not t or any(u <= 0 or p <= 0 for u, p in t):
return refuse("L5", "input out of range")
spare = cl["produced"] - c["units"] - cl["spares_destroyed"]
if cl["limited"] and (c["units"] > cl["edition"] or spare > 0 or cl["reprint_planned"]):
return refuse("L1", "edition {} offered {} hidden spares {} reprint {}".format(
cl["edition"], c["units"], max(spare, 0), cl["reprint_planned"]))
if cl["limited"] and not set(cl["devices"]) & set(VERIFIABLE):
return refuse("L3", "devices {}".format(",".join(cl["devices"]) or "none"))
units = [u for u, _ in t]
prices = [p for _, p in t]
if sum(units) != c["units"]:
return refuse("L2", "tier units sum {} != units {}".format(sum(units), c["units"]))
if any(b < a for a, b in zip(prices, prices[1:])):
return refuse("L2", "a later tier is cheaper: {}".format(prices))
if units[-1] / c["units"] < c["min_regular_share"]:
return refuse("L2", "regular tier share {:.2f} < {:.2f}".format(units[-1] / c["units"],
c["min_regular_share"]))
if c["published_day"] > 0 or c["deadline_extended"]:
return refuse("L2", "published day {}, extended {}".format(c["published_day"],
c["deadline_extended"]))
return None
def simulate(c):
d, t, rs = c["demand"], c["tiers"], c["resale"]
nd = NormalDist()
n, units, regular = d["n"], c["units"], t[-1][1]
v = [d["median"] * math.exp(d["sigma"] * nd.inv_cdf((i + 0.5) / n)) for i in range(n)]
clear = sorted(v, reverse=True)[units - 1] if n >= units else 0.0
ent = rs["people"] if rs["id_check"] else rs["accounts"]
u = [rs["haircut"] * (rs["lo"] + (rs["hi"] - rs["lo"]) * (j + 0.5) / ent)
for j in range(ent) for _ in range(rs["per_id_limit"])]
order = list(range(n))
random.Random(d["seed"]).shuffle(order)
sales, tier_day = [], [None] * len(t) # (value, price, day, is_collector)
if c["mechanism"] == "uniform_auction":
bids = sorted([(x, True) for x in v] + [(x, False) for x in u], key=lambda b: -b[0])
price = max(regular, bids[units][0] if len(bids) > units else 0.0)
sales = [(x, price, float(d["days"]), col) for x, col in bids[:units] if x >= price]
else:
stock = [k for k, _ in t]
def tier():
return next((k for k, s in enumerate(stock) if s > 0), None)
def take(x, day, col, fixed=None):
k = tier()
stock[k] -= 1
sales.append((x, t[k][1] if fixed is None else fixed, day, col))
if stock[k] == 0:
tier_day[k] = day
if c["mechanism"] == "fcfs":
for x in sorted(u, reverse=True):
if tier() is not None and x >= t[tier()][1]:
take(x, 0.0, False)
for r, i in enumerate(order):
if tier() is None:
break
if v[i] >= t[tier()][1]:
take(v[i], d["days"] * (r + 0.5) / n, True)
else:
entries = [(v[i], True) for i in order] + [(x, False) for x in u]
random.Random(d["seed"] + 1).shuffle(entries)
for x, col in entries:
if tier() is None:
break
if x >= regular:
take(x, float(d["days"]), col, regular)
res = [s for s in sales if not s[3]]
col = [s for s in sales if s[3]]
elig = sum(1 for x in v if x >= regular)
out = {
"clear": clear, "sold": len(sales), "left": units - len(sales),
"sellout_day": max(s[2] for s in sales) if len(sales) == units else None,
"tier_day": tier_day, "revenue": math.fsum(s[1] for s in sales),
"resale_units": len(res), "resale_share": len(res) / units,
"resale_profit": math.fsum(s[0] - s[1] for s in res),
"top_share": sum(1 for s in col if s[0] >= clear) / units,
"fan_access": sum(1 for s in col if s[0] >= regular) / elig if elig else 0.0,
"surplus": math.fsum(s[0] - s[1] for s in col),
}
if c["mechanism"] != "uniform_auction" and out["resale_share"] > c["max_resale_share"]:
return refuse("L4", "resale share {:.3f} > {:.2f}".format(out["resale_share"], c["max_resale_share"]))
out["verdict"], out["code"] = "PLAN", "OK"
return out
def run(c):
return check(c) or simulate(c)
def base():
return {"units": 500, "tiers": [(100, 249), (150, 269), (250, 289)], "mechanism": "fcfs",
"demand": {"n": 1440, "median": 260.0, "sigma": 0.40, "days": 14, "seed": 13672},
"resale": {"accounts": 160, "people": 40, "lo": 330.0, "hi": 380.0, "haircut": 0.9,
"per_id_limit": 1, "id_check": True},
"claim": {"limited": True, "edition": 500, "produced": 500, "spares_destroyed": 0,
"reprint_planned": False, "devices": ["numbered", "public_counter", "plate_destroyed",
"no_reprint_pledge"]},
"min_regular_share": 0.20, "max_resale_share": 0.10, "published_day": 0,
"deadline_extended": False}
def case(name, note, **over):
c = base()
for k, val in over.items():
c[k] = dict(c[k], **val) if k in ("demand", "resale", "claim") else val
r = run(c)
if r["verdict"] == "REFUSE":
print("{:3s} {:38s} {} ({})".format(name, note, r["code"], r["why"]))
return
so = "unsold {}".format(r["left"])
if r["sellout_day"] is not None:
so = "day {:.2f}".format(r["sellout_day"])
fc = c["mechanism"] == "fcfs"
td = ",".join("-" if x is None or not fc else "{:.2f}".format(x) for x in r["tier_day"])
print("{:3s} {:38s} OK clear {:.2f}; {}; tier days {}".format(name, note, r["clear"], so, td))
print(" revenue {:,.0f}; resale {} ({:.3f}), profit {:,.0f}; top-value {:.3f}; "
"fan access {:.3f}; surplus {:,.0f}".format(r["revenue"], r["resale_units"], r["resale_share"],
r["resale_profit"], r["top_share"], r["fan_access"],
r["surplus"]))
if __name__ == "__main__":
print("Golden cases for op ladder_allocation (deck: 500 units, ladder 100@249, 150@269, 250@289)")
case("T1", "fcfs, 1 per verified id")
case("T2", "fcfs, 1 per account, no id check", resale={"id_check": False})
case("T3", "lottery at 289, 1 per verified id", mechanism="lottery")
case("T4", "uniform auction, reserve 289", mechanism="uniform_auction")
case("T5", "20 undisclosed spares printed", claim={"produced": 520})
case("T5b", "same 20 spares, destroyed on record", claim={"produced": 520, "spares_destroyed": 20})
case("T6", "limited, pledge only", claim={"devices": ["no_reprint_pledge"]})
case("T7", "regular tier only 50 units", tiers=[(200, 249), (250, 269), (50, 289)])
case("T8", "later tier cheaper", tiers=[(100, 269), (150, 249), (250, 289)])
case("T9", "deadline extended after launch", deadline_extended=True)
case("T10", "units 0", units=0)
case("T11", "fcfs, soft demand, resale 280-320", demand={"median": 220.0},
resale={"lo": 280.0, "hi": 320.0})唯一数据源与引用
范雅福(Fan, Y.). (2026). 《高奢稀缺配额拍卖、早鸟阶梯涨价动力学与限量实体品溢价母典》第 7 章「限量品落地手册:编号牌卡、工作坊席位、编号版画、精品配额与四件套蒸馏规格」(版本 0.1.0). 5D Library. DOI 待发布
DOI 待发布 · 专著页正式发布后上线(本站暂无专著页) · 5DL-B-136 · v0.1.0 · CC-BY-NC-ND-4.0
BibTeX
@book{fan2026136,
author = {Fan, Yafu},
title = {Luxury Scarcity Allocation Auctions, Early-Bird Price-Ladder Dynamics and Limited-Edition Physical Premiums},
year = {2026},
publisher = {5D Library},
edition = {0.1.0},
note = {DOI pending}
}